# Hacking the Voter

Lessons From a Decade of Russian Military Operations

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# Agenda

- "Why," not just "how"
- Information conflict
- Tactics in context
- What's next






 Head of Strategic Cyber Threat Intelligence
 Booz Allen Hamilton


 Prior experience in elections, diplomacy, & law

CTI by way of social sciences

• B.A. History @ Cornell

• M.A. International Relations @ Yale





## Now Just How, but Why?


Why conduct an operation?

• Why act at this time?

Why use these tactics?

What was the objective?

 How do operations relate to each other?



# Background Reading

- Russia's Military Doctrine explains the tactics, targets, and timing of GRU cyber operations
- TL;DR: the GRU has often done exactly what it said it would do

# Soviet-Era Election Interference



# Familiar Tactics, but Shifting Responsibilities



# Information Confrontation

The continuous competition over beliefs, opinions, perceptions, and feelings to enable the furthering of states' agendas

"So, tell me more about how bad life is here! (translation)






# Russian Military Bought Into Information Confrontation

- Codified into core military doctrinal documents since 2000
- Addition of new missions like protecting "historical, spiritual, and patriotic traditions"

## Information Confrontation's Two Sides



"Informational-Technical" Capabilities

Fancy Bear // APT28 // Sofacy









Sandworm

# Greater Utility Than Just Changing Outcomes



**Undermine** Opponents




Create New Opportunities




Shape Domestic Opinions




#### Disrupt election infrastructure





Publicize and authenticate narrative of unreliable elections infrastructure





#### Leak documents allegedly showing a conspiracy to rig an election

#### 05/25/2014. Got access to confidential data of the assistant Kolomoisky!

We, CyberBerkut, gained access to the documents stored on the computer of Alexei Salkoch, assistant I. Kolomoysky, and also hacked his email. Among the documents downloaded from Salkoch's computer, we found information about the financing of I.Kolomoisky's battalions of the National Guard Dnepr-1, Donetsk-1, Lugansk, and the Special Forces Special Forces battalion Artemovsky.

Documents from the computer of Salkoch, assistant I.Kolomoysky

Salkoch's electronic correspondence, along with a list of products to be handed over to Victory Day veterans, contains autobiographies of sales officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and millions of bills for the purchase of communications equipment, clothing, cold steel, medicines, meals and surveillance equipment to equip checkpoints. In addition, among the documents of Alexei Salkoch, there are instructions and plans of the UNA-UNSO to seize power and promote his candidate in the so-called "presidential election".

Documents UNA-UNSO from the computer Salkoch, assistant I. Kolomoisky

That's what the "help" of Europe, which the usurpers of power praised!

We recommend that everyone check out the full archive of materials:

http://www.filefactory.com/file/5pfw9lj8ky85/salkoch\_new.7z (updated)

We are CyberBerkut! We will not forget! We will not forgive!

 Forge and launder evidence consistent with existing polarizing narratives using sources of authority

 Hinder ability to counter this narrative



# Bulgaria (2015)

Block access to key sources of election information



## France (2017)

 Time releases to limit campaign's ability to debunk

Launder leaks through online conspiracy communities

 Target undisclosed elections infrastructure





 Block access to key sources of election information

 Coordinate with community thought leaders

False-flag violence



## USA (2016)

 Launder leaks via journalists, faketivists, etc.

 Time releases to maximally inflame political & social divisions, suggesting a rigged election



## USA (2016)

- Recon and intrusions in election infrastructure never used
- Narrative of "large scale voter fraud" and "vote rigging" amplified by IRA trolls



## USA (2016)


Whataboutism: discrediting critics by charging them with hypocrisy





#### Faux-Criminal Ransomware

- Leverage existing narrative of ransomware attacks on state and local governments
- Disable election infrastructure



Doops, your important files are encrypted.

If you see this text, then your files are no longer accessible, because they have been encrypted. Perhaps you are busy looking for a way to recover your files, but don't waste your time. Nobody can recover your files without our decryption service.

We guarantee that you can recover all your files safely and easily. All you need to do is submit the payment and purchase the decryption key.

Please follow the instructions:

1. Send \$300 worth of Bitcoin to following address:

1Mz7153HMuxXTuR2R1t78mGSdzaAtNbBUX

2. Send your Bitcoin wallet ID and personal installation key to e-mail wowsmith123456@posteo.net. Your personal installation key:

74fZ96-2N×1Gm-yHQRWr-S8gaN6-8Bs1td-U2DKui-ZZpKJE-kE6sSN-o8tizV-gUeUMa

If you already purchased your key, please enter it below. Key:  $\_$ 

## Push Alert System Abuse

Hijack trusted sources to disseminate disinformation

CyberCaliphate's in your home! We see you reading this message! We're watching you! Allah Akbar!

We're CyberCaliphate!
With Allah's permission
we're coming for you!
You'll see no mercy
infidel!

Limited Power Outages

Hinder the ability to vote

Exacerbate voting access concerns

Cost / benefit worthwhile?




# Consider Your Informational Utility

Organizational profile shapes utility to adversaries



### Consider Your Informational Context

Informational adversaries leverage confirmation bias phenomenon



Rumors & Conspiracy



News and Social Media Narratives



Stereotypes and Cultural Biases

Learn From Operations Against "Accepted" Targets

Cyber and information conflict actors often first use tactics internally and against historic opponents





## Sound Bytes

- Election interference isn't just about changing election outcomes
- Attackers maximize strategic value of tactics, targets, and timing
- Strategic opponents demand strategic defenses

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