

Black-box Laser Fault Injection on a Secure Memory

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Secret protection in embedded systems

Microcontrollers

FLASH memory, basic readout protection fuses
Low-cost
Low resistance against hardware attacks

Secure Elements

Physical attacks counter-measures
Evaluated by accredited labs
Restricted access (JCVM, NDA, ...)

Microchip ATECC508A

Secure memory
IoT applications
Easy access, no NDA
Is this secure ?

Coldcard Wallet

Bitcoin hardware wallet

Version Mk2 studied

STM32L4 Microcontroller

Main firmware



ATECC508A

Stores the "Seed" (private key)
Protected with authentication



ATECC508A

Reduced software attack surface

Confidential firmware

Voltage glitch sensors

Top-metal shield

Internal clock generator

No laser counter-measures

Motorised XYZ stage

Laser source

ALPHA NOV


← Microscope objective lens
50X

← Optical fiber

↑
Device Under Test

Scaffold control board

<https://github.com/Ledger-Donjon/scaffold>





Silicon is transparent to infra-red light

Integrated circuits are photosensitive

Light can enable transistors conduction...

... hence introducing computation errors!

Laser is a powerful and semi-invasive tool



What's the plan?


Identify assets and seek an attack path

Prepare and instrument the sample

Target

Test

ATECC508A Memory Layout



ATECC508A Memory Layout

CONFIG	
#0 - 36 bytes	#1 - 36 bytes
#2 - 36 bytes	#3 - 36 bytes
#4 - 36 bytes	#5 - 36 bytes
#6 - 36 bytes	#7 - 36 bytes
#8 - 416 bytes	
#9 - 72 bytes	
#10 - 72 bytes	
#11 - 72 bytes	
#12 - 72 bytes	
#13 - 72 bytes	
#14 - 72 bytes	
#15 - 72 bytes	
OTP	

ATECC508A Memory Layout

CONFIG	
Unused	Pairing secret
Anti-phishing	PIN1 hash
PIN2	PIN1 try counter
PIN2 try counter	PIN3
PIN4	
Seed1	
Seed2	
Seed3	
Seed4	
BrickMe	
Firmware hash	
Unused	
OTP	

Accessing data slots

ReadMemory command:

03	07	02	82	1800	0a78
Command	Length	OpCode Read Memory	DATA zone + Length	Adresse	CRC

Response when access granted:

23	303132333435363738396162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70717273747576	384a
Length	Data (32 bytes)	CRC

Accessing data slots

ReadMemory command:

03	07	02	82	1800	0a78
Command	Length	OpCode Read Memory	DATA zone + Length	Adresse	CRC

Response when access denied:


1	10	384a
Length	Error code EXECUTION_ERROR	CRC

PIN1 data slot configuration

Raw	0x8f43
Write config	Encrypt
Write key	3
Read key	15
→ Is secret	Yes
→ Encrypt read	No
Limited use	No
No MAC	No

PIN1 data slot configuration

Raw	0x8f43
Write config	Encrypt
Write key	3
Read key	15
Is secret	No
Encrypt read	No
Limited use	No
No MAC	No



No

Code hypothesis

```
1 config_address = get_config_address(slot);
2 config = eeprom_read(config_address);
3
4 if (!config.is_secret){
5     data_address = get_data_address(slot);
6     data = eeprom_read(data_address);
7
8     if (config.encrypt_read)
9         encrypt(data);
10
11     i2c_send(data);
12 } else {
13     i2c_send(EXECUTION_ERROR);
14 }
```

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
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When?


Power analysis

Circuit processing activity can be observed on the power trace



Power analysis

Reading a granted data slot




Power analysis

Reading a denied data slot



Power analysis

Reading a denied data slot



Power analysis

Comparison of averaged traces




Power analysis

Comparison of averaged traces




Where?


Circuit Dissection




Circuit Dissection




Circuit Dissection




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Infrared imaging



Infrared imaging



Infrared imaging



Targeting

The image displays a software interface for targeting a circuit board. On the left is a control panel with the following elements:

- Logo: A stylized orange and red shield-like icon.
- Navigation icons: A grid of icons including a cursor, a square, a red box, a square with a circle, a magnifying glass with a plus sign, a magnifying glass with a minus sign, a magnifying glass with a double-headed arrow, a magnifying glass with a circle, a camera, a photo, a red 'S' icon, and a three-dot menu.
- Objective: A dropdown menu set to "20 X".
- Scanning density: A slider set to "200".
- Laser 1 section:
 - Pulse power: A slider set to "80 %".
 - Offset current: A slider set to "0 mA".
 - Buttons: "Apply", "Adjust", "Move", and a dropdown arrow.
 - Fire button: A button with a yellow warning triangle icon and the text "Fire".

The main area shows a grayscale image of a circuit board. A red rectangular box highlights a specific component in the center, with a red crosshair centered within it. The board features various components, including a large vertical component on the left and several smaller components on the right and bottom.

Targeting

The screenshot displays a laser targeting software interface. On the left is a control panel with the following elements:

- Navigation icons:** A grid of icons for navigation and zooming, including arrows, a magnifying glass, and a red 'S' icon.
- Objective:** A dropdown menu set to "20 X".
- Scanning density:** A slider or input field set to "200".
- Laser 1 settings:**
 - Pulse power:** A slider set to "80 %".
 - Offset current:** A slider set to "0 mA".
- Buttons:** "Apply", "Adjust", "Move", and a "Fire" button with a yellow warning icon.

The main display area on the right shows a grayscale image of a building. Two red rectangular boxes are overlaid on the image, indicating target areas. A mouse cursor is positioned over the top-right corner of the upper box. A red crosshair is visible in the center of the lower box. The image is framed by a dark, irregular border.

Targeting

The interface is divided into two main sections. On the left is a control panel with a dark background and orange icons. At the top left is a shield-like icon. Below it are four rows of icons: navigation (arrow, square), zoom (minus, plus, zero), camera (camera, photo), and a menu (three dots). Below the icons are two dropdown menus: 'Objective:' set to '20 X' and 'Scanning density:' set to '200'. Underneath is the 'Laser 1' section with 'Pulse power' at '80 %' and 'Offset current' at '0 mA'. At the bottom of the control panel are three buttons: 'Apply', 'Adjust', and 'Move', followed by a 'Fire' button with a yellow warning triangle icon.

The right section shows a grayscale image of a building's facade. Two red rectangular boxes are overlaid on the image. The larger box covers the upper right portion of the building. The smaller box is positioned lower and to the left, containing a red jagged line that appears to be a target path or a specific point of interest.

Targeting

Objective: 20 X

Scanning density: 200

Laser 1

Pulse power: 80 %

Offset current: 0 mA

Apply Adjust Move

Fire

The main display shows a thermal image of a building with a red bounding box and red dots connected by lines, indicating target points.

Targeting

The interface is divided into two main sections. On the left is a control panel with a dark background and orange accents. At the top left is a logo resembling a stylized shield or helmet. Below it is a grid of icons for navigation and zooming. The settings section includes a dropdown for 'Objective' set to '20 X', a text input for 'Scanning density' set to '200', and a section for 'Laser 1' with 'Pulse power' at '80 %' and 'Offset current' at '0 mA'. At the bottom of the control panel are buttons for 'Apply', 'Adjust', 'Move', and a 'Fire' button with a yellow warning icon. On the right is a large thermal image of a building. The image is overlaid with a red semi-transparent rectangle. Inside this rectangle, several red dots are scattered, and a red line connects some of them, forming a path or outline. The background of the image is dark with a grid pattern.

Targeting

The image displays a targeting interface. On the left is a control panel with the following elements:

- Objective: 20 X
- Scanning density: 200
- Laser 1
 - Pulse power: 80 %
 - Offset current: 0 mA
 - Buttons: Apply, Adjust, Move
 - Fire button (indicated by a yellow warning triangle icon)

The main view on the right is a red-tinted aerial photograph of a city. A red polygon is drawn over a building, and several red dots are scattered across the scene, representing targets or data points.

Testing campaign

Known data is loaded prior to testing:

303132333435363738396162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70717273747576



Testing campaign

For each test:

1. Laser shooting time configuration
2. Laser beam displacement
3. Power-on
4. Initialization
5. Laser activation
6. *ReadMemory* command + Laser shoot
7. Laser deactivation
8. Response readout
9. Power-off
10. Result and parameters logging

Testing campaign

343617

faults injected


Many days of testing

1546 responses received

No success observed...



Analysis



Analysis



Oh wait!

The attack seems to work!

Can we do it without losing data?

Attack refinement

Optimal parameters identification

New sample preparation and programming

Test run

Success!

Two minutes of testing only

PIN1 and pairing secret data slots can be revealed

Grants access to Seed1 data slot

Coldcard Mk2 vulnerable

Realistic attack

Did we killed chips?

Yes!

Misconfiguration due to misunderstanding

Failed sample preparation

Data corruption with bad EEPROM write

Possible software mitigations

Double checking

Sensitive constants value

Kill-chip

Possible hardware mitigations

Light sensors for laser detection

Power trace jamming

CPU clock frequency randomization

Error-Detection-Codes on memories

Cost of mitigations

Implementing them correctly is difficult.

More counter-measures requires more silicon area.

Power and performance is impacted.

Counter-measures may be patent protected.

Security is expensive!

Conclusion

High potential attack
Very expensive equipment

Specific configuration
P-256 keys are not affected

Less resistant than a Secure Element

ATECC508A now deprecated
Superseded by ATECC608A

Thank you!

