



Carrying our Insecurities with Us: the Risks of Implanted Medical Devices in Secure Spaces

Alan J. Michaels, PhD
Research Professor and Director, Electronic System Lab
Virginia Tech Hume Center for National Security and Technology

The Risks of Implanted Medical Devices in Secure Spaces



Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF)



Implanted Medical Devices (IMDs)

“SCIF of the Future” Research Team



Zoe Chen



Paul O'Donnell



Eric Ottman



Steven Trieu



Alan Michaels


ajm@vt.edu

Motivation

Security Clearance:

- Highly selective process
- 12-24 months and ~\$75K
- Leads to unique expertise

Median age of National security workforce is >10 years older than average workforce



Rapidly increasing capabilities of connected implanted medical devices improving quality of life for millions

- Unique class of industrial IoT
- Remotely configurable
 - Bluetooth communications
 - GPS tracking


Relatively few devices are designed / manufactured inside the United States

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
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Implanted Medical Devices (IMDs)




Implanted Medical Devices (IMDs)

WIDEX EVOKE CIC
Micro Smart
Hearing Aid



Implanted Medical Devices (IMDs)




WIDEX EVOKE CIC
Micro Smart
Hearing Aid



Automated Device for
Asthma Monitoring and
Management (ADAMM)



Implanted Medical Devices (IMDs)



WIDEX EVOKE CIC
Micro Smart
Hearing Aid




Automated Device for
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Open Artificial Pancreas System
(OpenAPS) Insulin Pumps



Implanted Medical Devices (IMDs)



WIDEX EVOKE CIC
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
Open Artificial Pancreas System
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Confirm Rx
Insertable
Cardiac Monitor



Implanted Medical Devices (IMDs)



WIDEX EVOKE CIC
Micro Smart
Hearing Aid



Automated Device for
Asthma Monitoring and
Management (ADAMM)



Open Artificial Pancreas System
(OpenAPS) Insulin Pumps



Confirm Rx
Insertable
Cardiac Monitor



Azure
Pacemaker




SCIF Requirements*

Physical Security

- Tight perimeter (walls, doors, windows, floors, ceilings)
- Managed penetrations (cables, pipes, HVAC)
- RF shielding for TEMPEST
- Acoustic isolation

Technical Security

- 2a: “**RF transmitters shall not be introduced to a SCIF** unless evaluated and mitigated to be a low risk to classified information by a competent authority...”
- 2b: Restrict access to authorized personnel
- 2c: Intrusion detection systems
- 2e: “**Portable electronic devices pose a risk to SCI** since they often include capabilities to interact with other information systems and can enable hostile attacks targeting classified information in SCIFs.”



Physical

- Tight
- Man
- RF s
- Aco

Techn

- 2a:
eva
com
- 2b:
- 2c:
- 2e:
incl
can

* Physical an
* Technical S




SCIF Requirements*

Physical Security


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Portable Electronic Devices



Portable Electronic Device Risk

PED Risk Levels*

Low-risk PEDs:

- Are without recording or transmission capabilities
- Allowed in without mitigation.
Calculators, RX-only pagers, RX-only radio

Medium-risk PEDs:

- Have built-in features that enable recording or transmitting text, images/video, or audio
- Features can be physically disabled; allowed in with appropriate mitigations.
Dumb phones, airplane mode devices, mics that can be disabled

High-risk PEDs:

- Have recording and/or transmitting capabilities that cannot be sufficiently mitigated
- May use if mitigation measures reduce the risk to low.
Electronics with RF transmitters (WiFi, Bluetooth, etc), cameras / audio, smart phones

Crude guidelines

- Does it have batteries?
- Does it have memory?
- Does it have sensors?
- Can it talk to other devices?
- What benefit does it serve?

Reasonable Accommodations



ICPM-2005-700-1*

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICY MEMORANDUM
NUMBER 2005-700-1

Subject: Intelligence Community Update to Director of Central Intelligence (DCID) 6/9, Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs)

Authority: The National Security Act of 1947, as amended; the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; Executive Order 12333, as amended; Executive Order 13354; Executive Order 13355; and other applicable provisions of law.

- Effective immediately, DCID 6/9, Annex D, Part I, pertaining to electronic equipment in SCIFs is superseded by attachments 1 and 2 and is retitled "Portable Electronic Devices in Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities." This update reflects advancements in this technology and provides standards for a program to permit these devices entry into a SCIF.
- The Office of the Director of National Intelligence staff will administratively update the affected DCID and incorporate these provisions in a future Intelligence Community directive.

Patrick P. Keenan
Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Management

1 December 2005
Date

Attachments:
Tab 1 – Annex D, Part I, Portable Electronic Devices in Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities
Tab 2 – Table for Portable Electronic Device (PED) Mitigation

ICPG-110.1 (2009)

UNCLASSIFIED

Employment of Individuals with Disabilities

A. AUTHORITY: The National Security Act of 1947, as amended; Executive Order (EO) 12333, as amended; EO 13548; EO 13164; Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 110, *Intelligence Community Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity*; and other applicable provisions of law.

B. PURPOSE: This Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) provides guidance to the Intelligence Community (IC) for the employment of individuals with disabilities.

C. APPLICABILITY: This Guidance applies to the IC, as defined by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and to such elements of any other department or agency as may be designated an element of the IC by the President, or jointly by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the head of the department or agency concerned.

D. POLICY

- IC elements shall be model employers for individuals with disabilities.
- IC elements shall adhere to the applicable provisions of federal equal employment opportunity (EEO) laws and regulations, provide equal opportunity in employment for all persons, and prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability. Equal opportunity in employment includes hiring, placement, and advancement opportunities.
- IC elements shall provide reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals with a disability who request accommodations, in accordance with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended (hereinafter, "Rehabilitation Act"), and its implementing regulations, when it does not place an undue hardship on the employer.
 - A disability is a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Amendments Act of 2008 construes the statutory term "disability" broadly in favor of expansive coverage to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. An individual with a disability has, or is regarded as having, a disability or a record (past history) of such an impairment.
 - Qualified, with respect to an individual with a disability, means that the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the employment position the individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position.

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICY GUIDANCE
110.1

UNCLASSIFIED


EO 13163 (7/2000)
EO 13518 (11/2009)
EO 13548 (7/2010)

* Superseded by ICD-705, v1.2/v1.3/v1.4

Risks Associated with IMDs



Risks Associated with IMDs




Type	Vulnerability Name	Affected Vendors	CVE
Crash	Link Layer Length Overflow	Cypress NXP	CVE-2019-16336 (6.1) CVE-2019-17519 (6.1)
	Truncated L2CAP	Dialog Semiconductors	CVE-2019-17517 (6.3)
	Silent Length Overflow	Dialog Semiconductors	CVE-2019-17518 (6.4)
	Public Key Crash	Texas Instruments	CVE-2019-17520 (6.6)
	Invalid L2CAP Fragment	Microchip	CVE-2019-19195 (6.8)
	Key Size Overflow	Telink Semiconductor	CVE-2019-19196 (6.9)
Deadlock	LLID Deadlock	Cypress NXP	CVE-2019-17061 (6.2) CVE-
	Sequential ATT Deadlock	STMicroelectronics	CVE-
	Invalid Connection Request	Texas Instruments	CVE-
Security Bypass	Zero LTK Installation	Telink Semiconductor	CVE-2




Hackers Grid

Penetration Testing Tech Robotics Raspberry P



Ubertooth One Getting Started – Kali Linux




Risks Associated with IMDs



Risks Associated with IMDs



Risks Associated with IMDs




Risks Associated with IMDs



Sensors



Trusted Supply Chain



IMDs

Bluetooth



Cloud Connectivity



GPS




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
Hacking / Coercion




PED Risk after current Mitigations

ICD-705 Guidance on Medical Devices (Chapter 10)


- v1.2, 4/2012: N/A
- v1.3, 9/2015: Footnote: *Medical devices are exceptions to these requirements.*
- v1.4, 9/2017: (Paragraph 3) *Approval for medical devices will comply with all applicable laws and oversight policies, including the Rehabilitation Act, and the latest IC medical device approval process. As a minimum, the medical device must be reviewed to determine any technical security issues introduced by the device. Based on the security/technical review, medical devices may be approved by the Accrediting Official for introduction and use within a SCIF.*
- Now, 2020:



Proposed Mitigations




Proposed Mitigations




Proposed Mitigations

(1) Random Physical Inspections




Proposed Mitigations

(2) Ferromagnetic Detection Systems




Proposed Mitigations

(3) RF Shielding Apparel





Proposed Mitigations

(4) Zeroization




Proposed Mitigations

(5) Password Activated Software




Proposed Mitigations

(6) Temporarily Muting Transducers




Proposed Mitigations

(7) Personal Jamming




Proposed Mitigations

(8) General Signal Jamming/AP Spoofing




Proposed Mitigations

(9) Tracking/RF Fingerprint technologies




Proposed Mitigations

(10) Denying Entry




Proposed Mitigations

- (1) Random Physical Inspections*
- (2) Ferromagnetic Detection Systems*
- (3) RF Shielding Apparel*
- (4) Zeroization*
- (5) Password Activated Software*
- (6) Temporarily Muting Transducers*
- (7) Personal Jamming*
- (8) General Signal Jamming/AP Spoofing*
- (9) Tracking/RF Fingerprint technologies*
- (10) Denying Entry*



Proposed Mitigations

- **(1) Random Physical Inspections** are similar to ICD-705 policy on government provided devices. Poses a low risk to the user; however, without sufficient knowledge on the specific device, difficult to catch the unauthorized extraction of data.
- **(2) Ferromagnetic Detection Systems** may help identify smart devices before they enter any secure area, leading to facility manager decision whether or not to admit the individual. These systems do not prevent data extraction, only the detection of the physical device.
- **(3) RF Shielding Apparel** could be a foil vest that blocks communication with the IMD. This proposed vest would be worn by the host upon entering the facility. Signal leakage is still a concern.
- **(4) Zeroization** is a safe method, but requires knowledge of the device and settings. All sensor data collected inside the SCIF must be removed to ensure protections. Because of this, a greater risk is imposed upon the user, because stored settings or essential functions may be disrupted.
- **(5) Password Activated Software** is an administrator controlled software that takes over control of the device and limits suspect functions until a password is entered. This one-time use password would be provided to the employee after they have left the secure area.
- **(6) Temporarily Muting Transducers** ensures valuable data cannot be recorded and stored. Users with cochlear implants would lose functionality as well as other similar styles of implants, many of whose residual capabilities impair human health.



- **(7) Personal Jamming** actively impairs the communication or sensor functions, much like an audio white noise generator.
- **(8) General Signal Jamming/AP Spoofing** hijacks Bluetooth, WiFi, and other commercial signals, preventing communication to third parties. This proves beneficial as no privacy laws are violated, yet could result in battery draws or other unintended effects to the medical device.
- **(9) Tracking/RF Fingerprint technologies** mark an individual and monitor location and possibly record any signals. Such a technique likely violates privacy/HIPAA laws.
- **(10) Denying Entry** completely eliminates the risk of data extraction, however the user would not be permitted to conduct any work within the area. While denial provides security, it fails to meet the practical needs of our ageing workforce.

Discarded Mitigations

- 1. Require medical device manufacturers to develop SCIF friendly devices*
 - Only 2% of the population – no business case*
 - International manufacturing – infeasible*
- 2. FDA require medical device security standards*
 - Likely to occur independent of present discussion*
 - Medical device design is already HARD*


Bottom Line



Policy guidance looking towards future medical technology



Meeting contradictions of security policy, HR policy, health benefits of IMDs, and truly protecting classified information



Weighing risks/impacts to users and risks to classified information



black hat[®]
USA 2020
AUGUST 5-6, 2020
BRIEFINGS

Carrying our Insecurities with Us: the Risks of Implanted Medical Devices in Secure Spaces



Alan J. Michaels, PhD
ajm@vt.edu