MSC EvilTwin loader

Name

miner.ps1
runner.ps1

MD5

239e8a3ee1fafe452d0b59eadb32247b
99a80820ae6dc60c9e9307e6ed8ef211

SHA-1

1377a69ae519d1cf000fa51869454e31ba92056d
2e4ae2af76c6239eb4191853221b4a40139cc122

SHA-256

0ac748baaad6017e331a8d99aae9e5449a96ba76fb7374f5d8c678ae52b7db9f
f381a3877028f29ec7865b505b5c85ce77d4947d387d3f30071159fa991f009a

Size

276 KB (282803 bytes)
276 KB (282808 bytes)

File type

PowerShell

Table 3. MSC EvilTwin loader

The MSC EvilTwin loader (Figure 9) represents a novel approach (CVE-2025-26633) to malware deployment by leveraging specially crafted Microsoft Saved Console (.msc) files. The MSC EvilTwin loader creates two directories: C:\Windows \System32<space>\ and C:\Windows<space>\System32\en-US. These directories mimic legitimate system paths to give credibility to the files placed within them. The loader contains two Base64-encoded payloads, referred to as decodedBytesOriginal and decodedBytesFakes.

The decodedBytesOriginal variable contains a decoy XML configuration .msc file, while the decodedBytesFakes variable contains a crafted .msc file with a placeholder {htmlLoaderUrl}. This placeholder is later replaced with the URL https://82[.]115[.]223[.]182/encrypthub/ram/, which contains PowerShell commands.

The loader writes the decoy .msc file to C:\Windows \System32\WmiMgmt.msc and the malicious .msc file to C:\Windows \System32\en-US\WmiMgmt.msc. The {htmlLoaderUrl} placeholder in the malicious file is replaced dynamically with the specified URL (Figure 10).

The loader then executes the malicious .msc file using Start-Process. This execution downloads and runs a PowerShell script from the specified URL to deliver the next-stage payload. Afterward, the loader introduces a 30-second delay using the Start-Sleep command, likely to ensure successful execution and avoid detection.

Finally, the loader performs a cleanup operation by removing the created directories and files (C:\Windows \System32\C:\Windows \System32\en-US, and C:\Windows) to minimize forensic traces.

Figure 9. MSC EvilTwin loader main logic

Figure 9. MSC EvilTwin loader main logic

Figure 10. Execute code hosted on C&C server via MMC.exe’s view object method ExecuteShellCommand

Figure 10. Execute code hosted on C&C server via MMC.exe’s view object method ExecuteShellCommand

In runner.ps1 (Table 3), the malware downloads and deploys the Rhadamanthys stealer onto an infected system. The file ram.exe (SHA256: bad43a1c8ba1dacf3daf82bc30a0673f9bc2675ea6cdedd34624ffc933b959f4) serves as the Rhadamanthys loader, which is responsible to install and activate the Rhadamanthys stealer on the compromised machine.