AI GROUP 

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• GTG-16005 (151 million exchanges observed between May and July 2026), in which a cluster of Alibaba-affiliated operators targeted the chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning transcripts of Claude Opus 4.6 and 4.7 in what has been described as the "largest distillation attack we have ever measured." It peaked at roughly 3 million exchanges per day launched from more than 3,500 fraudulent accounts targeting agentic tasks, software engineering, kernel development, and long-horizon tasks.
• GTG-16002 (23 million exchanges observed between May and July 2026), in which Moonshot AI stealthily rerouted customer requests to Claude as opposed to processing them using Kimi, and then displayed responses from Claude to users. In tandem, a subset of these exchanges were captured and saved to train its CoT model. Over a 10-day period, Moonshot is said to have relayed almost 300,000 customer requests to Anthropic using a proxy service network of 5,380 fraudulent accounts, most of them located in Singapore and Japan.
• GTG-16001 (More than 12.1 million exchanges observed over 14 days in July 2026), in which DeepSeek followed the same approach as Moonshot AI to silently relay exchanges to Claude without informing its customers and extract CoT transcripts.
• GTG-16006 (More than 3.4 million exchanges observed over 17 days in June and July 2026), in which Zhipu (aka Z.ai) ran a CoT extraction pipeline and replayed Claude reasoning traces through Claude to train its models. The activity took place by rotating through 273 fraudulent accounts.
• GTG-16008 (More than 400,000 exchanges observed over 20 days in March and April 2026), in which Xiaomi replayed user conversations and coding sessions from its own MiMo models to Claude, through OpenClaw and OpenCode coding harnesses, to bolster training data used for future models.
• GTG-16012, in which SenseTime purchased transcripts of user exchanges with Claude from third-party data vendors.
• GTG-16003, in which MiniMax built its own proxy network service through a shell company that offers access to models developed by Anthropic and OpenAI, likely with an aim to collect exchanges between users and U.S. frontier models to train its models.

• GTG-50014 (aka MeowSHA, frkoo, and blazespider), a French-speaking operator and a suspected affiliate of the ShinyHunters collective that ran a distributed credential-harvesting pipeline across a fleet of 10 AWS EC2 workers that mass-downloaded 1.8 million distinct Android APKs from multiple app-store sources, scanned them for hard-coded secrets using TruffleHog, and sent verified findings to a Telegram group.

• Another ShinyHunters affiliate that specialized in supply chain theft by compromising software-as-a-service (SaaS) vendors to steal data belonging to downstream customers, accelerate reconnaissance, and enable data exfiltration.

• GTG-10007, a Chinese-speaking operator likely based out of Hunan province, some of whom have been identified as undergraduate students at a Chinese university and have used Claude to conduct intrusion attempts against production systems, reconnaissance of foreign-government networks across the Middle East, Europe, and Southeast Asia, a vulnerability-research and exploit development effort against major endpoint-security products, and develop an intelligence-collection platform for bulk-harvesting of open-source material aligned with Beijing's priorities. The threat actor targeted about 50 organizations across education, retail, energy, technology, healthcare, finance, manufacturing, and government sectors globally. The group also maintained an autonomous vulnerability research program to produce working exploits for previously unknown vulnerabilities in network and security appliances.

• GTG-50021, a Russian and Ukrainian-speaking group that ran a fraudulent AI reseller operation offering cheap Claude access, only for customers' traffic to be silently proxied to a different AI model, while the illicit scheme installed a credential harvester to siphon their Anthropic account credentials and sell them to other proxy resellers for malicious use.

• GTG-50020, a Russian-speaking, financially-motivated actor that has historically targeted hotel booking and financial technology platforms but has since focused on the AI supply chain by stealing model provider API keys and unsuccessfully attempting to gain access to pre-release AI models. The threat actor is estimated to have targeted about 30 AI vendors in a four-day window using similar techniques.

• GTG-50029, a single French-speaking actor that used Claude to target European political parties, media, think-tanks, and the SaaS providers used by these organizations, including by exploiting a previously undocumented WordPress re-installation race condition that made it possible to create a rogue administrator account without valid credentials, as well as by abusing an exposed search endpoint to breach a political campaign management platform and siphon sensitive data. The threat actor has also been observed deploying web shells and a browser exploitation C2 framework against other targets. Central to the attacker's operation was a purpose-built doxxing platform named "fafsearch" that offered the ability to cross-reference individual breach dumps against exfiltrated data.

• GTG-04001, a Russian-speaking actor in Bangui that engaged in a foreign information manipulation and interference operation in the Central African Republic to amplify pro-Russia, anti-France talking points.

• GTG-54002, a commercial "influence-as-a-service" operation that used Claude to mass-produce and rewrite political content across about 70 fabricated news websites. The operation has been traced back to LKM Company, a France-based digital advertising agency.

• GTG-84005, a single account that used Claude to run a commercial election manipulation platform primarily targeting users in Malaysia based on political and social factors, such as their race and religion, by posing as a defensive cyber intelligence and counter-disinformation tooling outlet. The activity has been found to share links with BBS Bilisim Teknolojileri, an Istanbul-based technology company.

• GTG-24015, a set of four accounts that used Claude as an "editorial and news production desk" to distribute them via state media outlets like Sputnik Moldova, RIA Novosti, Sputnik en Español, Sputnik Africa, and RT's English-language newsroom.

• GTG-34001, a set of three Iranian state-aligned accounts that used Claude to shape public opinion, turn official government intelligence bulletins into tailored content, and disseminate the content across social media platforms.

• GTG-54006, a sustained, automated disinformation network that used Claude to generate fabricated Bengali-language news in Bangladesh and promote the country's Awami League party. The activity has been linked to a single actor based in Gaibandha District in Bangladesh via a set of 29 Claude accounts that were rotated to bypass platform limits and detection.

• GTG-84006, a distributed influence operation that targeted Iranian audiences across the world with an aim to impersonate real activists and engage in live political conversations. The activity has been linked to People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) and the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI).

• GTG-54004, an account used by a single actor to mass-produce Kenyan political content as part of what's suspected to be a domestic astroturfing campaign with a pro-administration bent.

• GTG-84002, an account used by a single actor to run a sustained influence operation against the Muslim Brotherhood, the Sudan conflict, and the United Nations accountability mechanisms.

• GTG-54009, a commercial surveillance platform that used Claude to analyze, classify, and profile the social media activity of users in Iran and the Persian Gulf region. The activity is assessed to have been carried out by, or on behalf of, an Israeli-Singaporean commercial intelligence vendor named S2T Unlocking Cyberspace.

• GTG-14010, a China state-aligned operation that used Claude to track, profile, and recruit Uyghurs and Uyghur armed formations in Syria. The actor has been found to use the AI model to convert conversations extracted in bulk from over 100 monitored WhatsApp groups and dozens of Telegram channels into structured Chinese-language data and "creating profiles of individuals who might be vulnerable to targeting due to financial stress, family separation, and ideological disillusionment."

• GTG-14020, a set of accounts likely linked to a Chinese government-aligned intelligence operation that used Claude to build Chinese-language dossiers targeting religious leaders and Chinese diaspora figures across Asia, as well as map religious venues and instruct the model to adopt "China's standpoint."

• GTG-14021, a set of accounts from China-based actors that used Claude to support surveillance and transnational repression, including prompting the model to assume the role of an intelligence analyst serving China's national security apparatus.

• GTG-14022, a China-based "public opinion monitoring" and dissident surveillance operation that used Claude to produce government briefings that listed dissidents, activists, ethnic minority and Chinese diaspora communities, and foreign media as threats to political stability while asking it to play the role of a "senior emergency public opinion analyst serving the government of the People's Republic of China."

• GTG-34007, a set of 16 accounts operated by two Iranian-nexus actors associated with paramilitary and domestic security agencies that used Claude to build a frontend for what appears to be a government-controlled surveillance case-management system, run social-network analysis over 155,216 X posts, and build domestic surveillance capabilities via a malicious Mozilla Firefox extension named "al-Najm al-thāqib" to harvest user identities from major social network platforms.

• GTG-50027, a single account that used Claude to design a national mass interception and surveillance platform called Lakana 360 for Mali's state intelligence service to monitor about 25 million SIM cards spanning three of the country's national mobile operators, and generate intelligence dossiers for any phone number. The platform has a separate layer that collects call records, text messages, and voice calls across the mobile networks.

• GTG-30004, an Iran-nexus threat actor that used Claude to develop an automated, open-source intelligence identity-profiling service targeting Israeli and Jewish diaspora organizations.

• GTG-30005, an Iran-nexus threat actor that used Claude to gather and analyze publicly accessible data to develop targeting recommendations against U.S. naval forces in the region and build software components of a domestic mass-surveillance platform that combined automatic license-plate recognition with mobile-device identifier interception.

• GTG-30006, an Iranian threat actor that leveraged free Claude.ai accounts to develop malware, a delivery pipeline, and a phishing portal targeting domestic Iranians. This included a bogus ESET NOD32 antivirus login page that transmits captured credentials to Telegram, a ClickFix-style Windows Run dialog lure, and geofenced delivery pages. The threat actor has also used Claude to build SECOMS64, a modular Windows implant with keylogging, screenshot capture, and Chrome credential extraction capabilities.